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Preface  
The Task Force aimed to shed new light on the main aspects of the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID), drawing on the vast practical experience of the Task Force 
members, the timely input given by regulators and the European Commission and the 
benefit of a substantial body of academic research and analysis.  
It was acknowledged at the outset of the Task Force’s work that the revision of MiFID 
was to be more than an ordinary assessment conducted a few years after the introduction of 
a new directive, and that it was important to take into account the lessons of the financial 
crisis in a context of growing uncertainty about the future of Europe's capital markets. It was 
believed that the review represented a significant opportunity to strengthen the role of the 
internal market and to regain investors' confidence, which had been badly damaged by the 
recent financial crisis. As noted in the G20 context, MiFID is part of the process of 
strengthening the effectiveness of regulation, especially in areas that had previously been 
unregulated. Greater transparency, investor protection and market stability are some of the 
main steps that will give our financial markets sounder, safer and more resilient 
foundations.  
MiFID is one piece in a broader legislative and regulatory framework regarding the 
financial markets and it is important to ensure that the revised MiFID maintains appropriate 
coherence with other forthcoming laws and regulations, whose interplay in the 
implementation process should preserve legal certainty and a properly harmonised regime 
for investment services. 
The work of the Task Force and the final report, independently drafted by the 
rapporteurs, come at a crucial moment for the MiFID review. Through the Task Force, the 
industry has sought to make a contribution that can play a major role in supporting the work 
of public authorities to disentangle the effects of the crisis from the issues raised by separate 
market failures or regulatory or supervisory gaps. The report is therefore an attempt to make 
a thoughtful qualitative and quantitative analysis of the major problems at stake and where 
feasible, to put forward proposals that take into account market developments and reflect the 
latest findings in the academic literature.  
The Task Force was composed of market participants from practically all relevant 
segments of the securities industry, whose interests and sensitivities clearly did not always 
coincide. Therefore a consensus could not realistically be reached on a number of important 
issues, but it did create a unique opportunity for the Task Force to lay out the issues in a fair 
and balanced way and to articulate the arguments of the different views of these industry 
segments, providing legislators, regulators and supervisors with a deeper insight into 
market views and the state-of-art literature. The issues at stake are often arcane and highly 
technical, but the way they will be tackled by the public authorities in the coming months 
will have a major impact not only on the functioning of the financial markets and on the 
competitive position of the various players involved in the chain between investors and 
issuers, but also, most importantly, on the well-being of large and small investors and 
business units in Europe.  
This is why the Task Force felt that it was more important to articulate the issues and 
the different views that prevail than to purport to submit elusive and vague consensus 
positions or high-level conclusions to which each and all members of the Task Force could 
agree. The latter approach would mask the real issues at stake and be an ineffective basis on 
which public authorities could make their own policy decisions. 
This objective guided the Chair of the Task Force throughout the five intense meetings 
that the Task Force held in the second half of 2010. A key factor of success was going to be ii | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
that all segments of the industry would be able to express their views in an open and 
constructive way, that the rationale for the various views would be properly articulated and 
understood, and that reliable supporting data would be provided to allow for a neutral and 
balanced assessment. It is to the credit of all Task Force members that, notwithstanding the 
complexity and sensitivity of the issues, they have successfully met this challenge. And it is 
to the credit of the rapporteurs that they have produced a report that sums up these issues in 
a lucid and balanced way. While this report will not make the task of the public authorities 
seeking to define the future path of MiFID altogether easy, it should at least allow it to be 
placed on a stronger factual and conceptual basis. If one considers the complexity of the task, 
this is a worthwhile outcome. 
 
Pierre Francotte 
Chairman of the Task Force 
Brussels, 9 February 2011 | 1 
Executive Summary  
 
The review of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) is a 
worthwhile but delicate exercise, coming at a time of great uncertainty for the 
economic outlook and the impact of re-regulation in Europe. The review is an 
opportunity to boost investor confidence and strengthen the resilience, 
efficiency and transparency of financial markets and instruments. Investor 
protection and market efficiency should remain the guiding principles of the 
Directive, but it must also be compatible with the growing demand for market 
safety and financial stability. This report is therefore an opportunity to 
contribute to the debate led by the European Commission and the new 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) by providing an 
articulated and balanced position on MiFID.  
Task Force  
While initially limited to strengthening conduct of business requirements 
and reviewing mandatory areas, several factors have called for a more 
extensive review of the Directive. New priorities have emerged as the debate 
on the causes of the financial crisis has advanced and new institutions have 
been established on both sides of the Atlantic to monitor markets and macro-
prudential risks. Also, the advantages of technological innovation are seen 
differently today than they were before the crisis.  
The functional approach of MiFID is set to become more prescriptive, in 
line with other forthcoming legislation and the G20 objective to leave no area of 
financial markets unregulated. By reducing the number of exemptions and 
extending the scope of the Directive, the breadth of implementing measures will 
expand, together with the role of ESMA and national supervisors. In this 
context, there will be almost no scope for self-regulation. Instead, the task will 
fall upon supervisors to keep rules up to date with fast-moving market 
innovation.  
Post-crisis 
The objective of the review is to improve market integrity, stability and 
efficiency, as well as investor protection. Given the breadth of the changes 
foreseen, this Task Force has chosen to focus on three core areas:  
1)  Transparency 
2)  Market structure and  
3)  Provision of investment services.  
While the review has identified some regulatory gaps, it mainly seeks to 
improve the way the Directive is implemented and enforced by national 
authorities. The European Commission and ESMA should minimise the risk of 
adding layers of regulation where failures are the result of inadequate 
supervision or enforcement. Clarifying intended scopes of current regulation 
may help to create a more harmonised framework of supervisory practices. 
Most importantly, the review should clarify ambiguities in the legal text when 
the application of the law is inconsistent.  
The Review 
Investors should benefit from the new MiFID. The revision of the legal 
text should aim at solving legal and market divergences across Europe, and 
make sure that the benefits of the new competitive environment are spread 
along the value chain and passed on to final users, retail and wholesale 
investors, as appropriate. 
Final users 
When it comes to assessing the effects of MiFID, it is difficult to  Impact of 2 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
disentangle the impact of regulation from the effects of the recent financial 
crisis. Nevertheless, the creation of a harmonised regulatory framework for the 
provision of investment services in Europe is a paramount achievement of the 
Directive.  
MiFID has changed European capital markets in many ways. It has 
brought greater competition between trading venues and between investment 
firms both on trading costs and execution services. It has also contributed to 
substantial investments in technology for trading and platforms. The growth of 
dark trading venues, such as MTF (multilateral trading facility) dark pools and 
broker-dealer crossing networks (BCNs), has been another interesting 
consequence of the new environment. Finally, the Directive has widened the 
scope of transparency requirements, harmonised the framework of business 
conduct rules and improved the protection for investors.  
Still, there is scope to bring more clarity to some definitions and further 
harmonise rules and supervisory practices. In other areas, such as market 
quality (price formation) and integrity, the impact of the Directive is not yet 
apparent, since evidence remains fairly controversial and inconclusive. 
MiFID 
Transparency   
Transparency plays a crucial role in the smooth functioning of financial 
markets and the monitoring of systemic risk. It also ensures that the process of 
price formation works well, through efficient price discovery mechanisms. 
Regulatory action is needed in some respects, however, not only to take stock of 
the recent financial crisis but also to assess the experience gained since the 
transposition of the Directive.  
Transparency is no panacea for market failures,  however. Ill-defined 
transparency requirements would harm efficiency in less-liquid markets with 
no increase of investor protection or reduction of systemic risk. Conversely, 
markets could become less-liquid and thus more volatile. Hence, regulatory 
intervention should be proportional to the structure of each market and take 
into account the dynamics through which orders find their market-clearing 
price. 
Transparency 
Retail and wholesale markets are intrinsically different due to their 
divergent market structures. Yet, the design of transparency requirements 
should not only look at the nature of investors, but also at the characteristics of 
the market itself. The Commission may need to launch a public consultation in 
order to request data that would constitute a technical basis on which to better 
distinguish retail and wholesale actors for each financial instrument. 
Investor 
categories 
Equity markets 
Pre-trade transparency supports the smooth functioning of venues’ trading 
mechanisms, as well as efficient price discovery and implementation of best 
execution policies.  
Pre-trade 
transparency 
Under certain conditions, pre-trade transparency may impair market 
liquidity. Hence, MiFID introduced waivers, which should be retained. A move 
towards a more rule-based approach should be balanced with flexible 
application and ongoing supervision in order to meet market needs. However, 
conflicting views between members emerge when discussing the breadth of 
Waivers MIFID 2.0: CASTING NEW LIGHT ON EUROPE’S CAPITAL MARKETS | 3 
 
these exemptions.  
Turning to post-trade disclosure, the financial crisis called for a further 
layer of market transparency. A new regime should include the disclosure of 
aggregate data on capital markets to monitor systemic risk and increase market 
integrity and efficiency. The extension of trade reporting to both shares 
admitted to trading only on MTFs or organised trading facilities and to equity-
like instruments would be helpful, since all these instruments serve similar 
purposes. However, for other financial instruments, the mere extension of the 
rules for equities would most likely generate inconsistencies, given their diverse 
nature.  
Trade 
reporting 
In the post-MiFID environment, several aspects have contributed to 
reducing the quality of data and hindering its consolidation. The MiFID 
review should look at the standardisation of both data formats (code identifiers, 
etc.) and flags to solve issues in some specific areas (e.g. OTC trades). The 
relevance of trade flags stems from the support they offer to liquidity discovery 
mechanisms across trading venues. Market initiatives should reduce the 
number of trade flags, currently around 50, to fewer than 10 across Europe.  
In this regard, ESMA should guide the currently industry-led initiatives to 
improve standardisation and reduce inconsistencies. However, either the 
Commission or ESMA should be able to impose consistency if commercial 
initiatives do not lead to a satisfactory solution within a reasonable timeframe. 
Data quality 
The disclosure of data in real-time is fundamental for the efficiency of 
price formation processes. New technologies can help reduce delays. However, 
reducing the maximum allowed for trade reporting from three minutes to one 
minute misses the point; regulators’ supervision should make sure that firms 
are not taking more than real time for other reasons than technical delays. In 
any case, the legal obligation is to report ‘as close to real time as possible’ and 
should be duly enforced. The industry is working to make all market data that 
is not subject to delays freely available after 15 minutes, in line with ESMA’s 
recommendations. Moreover, delays should be permitted in specific 
circumstances, with appropriate calibration for trades done at the end of the 
day.  
Time limits for 
trade 
reporting 
Despite the importance of a consolidated quotation system, priority 
should be given to removing obstacles to the use of consolidated post-trade 
data solutions. In particular, it is important to improve investor access to both 
pre- and post-trade data. The challenge is to promote beneficial competition for 
end investors and support best execution.  
To achieve consolidation, formats would need to be standardised and 
granularity increased, which would curb costs for users and increase 
accessibility. Some market participants have already committed to reduce costs 
for final users by unbundling fees for pre- and post-trade data; a step in the 
right direction that data vendors and distributors would do well to follow. 
When lower data collection costs are realised, they should be passed-on to final 
users.  Regulators and competition authorities should draw attention to 
potentially unfair market practices and anti-competitive market conditions 
that impede markets from offering data solutions at a ‘reasonable’ cost, rather 
than attempting to define when a cost is actually ‘reasonable’. 
The US experience with the unintended consequences of a consolidated 
tape run by a public entity should suggest alternative solutions. Consolidated 
Consolidated 
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tapes can be designed and offered by competing data operators (so-called 
‘Approved Public Arrangements’ or APAs), once the rules of the game have 
been clearly defined and duly enforced. These tapes could cover not only shares 
but also other financial instruments admitted to trading on regulated markets 
(RMs), MTFs or organised trading facilities (OTFs), as long as a sound regime 
has been put in place.  
Regulators should set the conditions to facilitate the consolidation and 
timely delivery of data to investors in real time, fully unbundled through APAs. 
Operators would have to meet strict requirements and be responsible for the 
detection of multiple publications (misreporting or double-counting). Only if 
the industry fails to meet these conditions, ESMA should adopt the necessary 
arrangements to set a single consolidated tape in the EU.  
Confidential transaction reporting to regulators serves the integrity of 
financial markets. Extending the scope of the reporting may reduce the risk of 
manipulation on less-liquid markets and improve market integrity and 
surveillance. Disclosure would then cover all financial instruments admitted 
to trading on RMs, MTFs and OTFs, with no distinction as to where and how 
they are actually traded. This move would need to be coordinated with other 
EU initiatives, such as the review of the Market Abuse Directive (MAD), and 
the harmonisation of current supervisory practices across Europe. Information 
should be meaningful and not overburden regulators’ supervisory activities. 
Transaction 
reporting 
Bond markets   
A strong push towards pre-trade public disclosure for non-equity financial 
instruments would require a rethink of the current market structure for less-
liquid asset classes, and consequently a shift in the intermediation towards 
auction markets and from a mainly institutional demand to a more retail and 
small professional one to ensure a constant and sufficient demand over time. 
Pre-trade transparency is, therefore, strictly needed in auction markets in order 
to stimulate investors’ willingness to bid, since they are able to see other parties’ 
binding commitments in advance.  
Some market participants agree that available data are sufficient and that 
further pre-trade transparency is not really needed. Instead, at this stage, they 
believe regulators should focus on improving post-trade disclosure.  
Other market participants, however, believe that an ad hoc pre-trade 
transparency for bonds would be appropriate. This regime would apply 
waivers, and would cover bonds listed on regulated markets or multilateral 
trading facilities or organised trading facilities, whether order-driven, quote-
driven or inter-dealer platforms. Information should be more easily available, to 
help price discovery and open the market to retail and small professional 
investors.  
Pre-trade 
transparency 
A transparency regime for bond markets should provide meaningful 
information to stimulate price discovery. The speed, breadth and depth of 
information should be designed around ‘dynamic’ liquidity measures. Since 
there is not a single measure of liquidity readily available, transparency 
requirements should be developed on an instrument-by-instrument basis. This 
task should rather be left to secondary legislation, such as Level 2 implementing 
measures or binding technical standards. 
Post-trade 
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Liquidity is a dynamic aspect, which may take different forms according 
to the characteristics of the financial instrument and the trading mechanism. 
This reality should be taken into account which allows exemptions or deferred 
publication in order to preserve an efficient and sound price formation process. 
Dynamic measures of liquidity can be designed around aspects such as 
frequency of trades, overall turnover or prospective liquidity, product 
standardisation or transaction size. Finally, since data is fragmented, data 
formats and flags may need to be further standardised for the purpose of pre-
trade transparency. 
Derivatives and structured financial products   
Derivatives and structured products are mainly traded on a bilateral basis. 
These trades occur either purely ‘over-the-counter’ or through ‘inter-dealer 
platforms’ under a request-for-quote (RFQ) model. A pre-trade transparency 
regime, therefore, should be designed in a different way than for auction 
markets. Liquidity in dealer markets, such as markets for bonds, derivatives 
and structured products, is underpinned by quote-driven auctions, inter-dealer 
platforms or bilateral negotiations. To function well, bilateral markets 
(interdealer or purely bilateral) need less pre-trade transparency than order-
driven ones, such as equity markets. Executable prices might thus not always be 
consistently available. The current market structure, however, does not impede 
future market developments in the years to come towards a different structure 
of intermediation and nature of the demand. 
Current MiFID rules on transparency were devised for equities, so 
applying them bluntly to derivatives and structured products could generate 
unintended consequences for the incentives for dealers to provide liquidity by 
using their private information. They could potentially exit illiquid products 
and confine their activities to those that are inherently more liquid. Pre-trade 
transparency for complex non-equity products would only work by first 
changing the way these products are traded and the nature of the demand, 
which would need to be constant and sufficiently high over time (as for auction 
markets). 
Pre-trade 
transparency 
A post-trade transparency regime for derivatives and structured products 
should be more detailed and tailored to the nature of these products. Where 
listed on RMs and/or MTFs, the regime could be designed with the same 
methodology employed for bonds, but its implementation should follow a 
phased approach.  
Exemptions and due calibrations should be allowed in order to preserve 
efficient price formation and guarantee the effective monitoring of systemic 
risk. Calibrations should take into account the nature of these markets and each 
financial instrument, rather than a division into broader categories (e.g. by 
asset classes). A mere application of post-trade transparency to a general list of 
instruments would definitely hamper market liquidity. As for bond markets, 
measurements of liquidity should be taken into account with due care to avoid 
adverse consequences in terms of liquidity for wholesale participants.  
The extension of trade reporting to non-equity markets can be facilitated 
by current infrastructures, thereby reducing costs. It is critical, however, that 
transparency requirements remain independent from the eligibility criteria for 
trading and clearing. In effect, the requirements to access a central counterparty 
Post-trade 
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clearing (CCP) are not based only on liquidity itself but also on technical and 
legal aspects. Hence, the mere eligibility for the clearing of an instrument is not 
an appropriate test for transparency purposes, nor is it appropriate to assess the 
level of liquidity or the frequency of trades. 
Structured financial products (SFPs) and OTC derivatives are good tools 
to free capital back to the real economy and better allocate risks and resources. 
They help spread credit risk and transfer it to those who are more able to bear 
it. However, the financial crisis has taught us that spreading risk among 
counterparties through complex instruments does not ultimately cancel it out. 
Information about the underlying assets and net exposures should 
always be publicly available in aggregate level to monitor systemic risk. 
Regulators should have access to data via reporting, especially through trade 
repositories. During times of financial distress, aggregated information on net 
exposures would help contain herd behaviour set off by market opacity.  
Trade repositories have sufficient skills and capabilities to collect and 
aggregate information about net exposures. Financial institutions would need to 
disclose information on net exposures in a way that does not compromise the 
confidentiality of sensitive information, but at the same time provides 
meaningful information (more detailed) to regulators and to the market. Trade 
repositories would then be able to aggregate this information and offer a global 
picture. 
Aggregate 
data 
Narrowing  exemptions for commodity derivatives under MiFID may 
have a substantial impact on the business of non-financial companies. Some 
market participants advocate these changes as an important step towards a 
more level playing field, with greater transparency and investor protection, 
while others ask for further research on the consequences of narrowing these 
exemptions, in terms of costs of hedging relevant exposures. The need for 
consistency across several regulations in the commodity business probably 
demands a more articulated answer.  
‘Curbing speculation’ is a vague objective, given that the distinction 
between hedging and speculative trading remains highly controversial. 
Regulators, instead, should shed light on the risks of price manipulation that 
arise from the accumulation of dominant net positions in future and derivatives 
markets. Strengthening supervisory powers, especially through position limits, 
could help to control price manipulation, in particular for physical markets or 
markets for non-storable commodities (e.g. electricity), but would not 
necessarily mitigate systemic risk. A more effective alternative would be to use 
position management tools to impede net sizes reaching a dominant position. 
Commodity 
derivatives 
Market structure    
Competition among trading venues on execution services and among 
investment firms on the provision of other investment services have generated 
positive effects, such as lower trading costs. Competition needs, however, to be 
fair and based on a level playing field among MiFID official trading venues. 
Markets benefit today from the interaction of various groups of users and 
platforms.  
Being a vital part of the network, competition appears where markets are 
contestable, not only from a technological standpoint but also in terms of fair 
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market practices. This implies the need to lower barriers to entry and exit for 
users and platforms (contestability), including sunk costs, as well as to monitor 
market practices in a dynamic way.  
This report also acknowledges the importance of ensuring a harmonised 
approach in the application of MiFID requirements for official trading venues. 
Regulated markets and multilateral trading facilities should be subject to 
convergent legal obligations and supervisory oversight across member states. 
This convergence already exists in some European countries such as the UK.  
Align RMs 
and MTFs 
On the classification of broker-dealer crossing networks (BCNs), the Task 
Force discussed two different views.  
On the one side, it is argued that some OTC trading escapes MiFID rules 
on pre-trade transparency for trading platforms and systematic internalisers, 
and does not provide sufficient post-trade information. It also alledged that it 
escapes MTFs’ rules on access, discretion and surveillance. In this view, some of 
the BCNs would perform the same function as RMs and MTFs, while others 
may be more akin to systematic internalisers. BCNs would operate as 
‘multilateral’ trading mechanisms by matching trades as ‘riskless’ counterparty. 
BCNs that do not meet the definition of OTC trading would rather be classified 
either as multilateral trading platforms or systematic internalisers (SIs). 
Otherwise, pre-trade transparency obligations would be circumvented to the 
detriment of price discovery, investor protection and market integrity. 
Conversely, other market participants believe that advanced brokerage, 
offered to wholesale counterparties through BCNs, meets the MiFID definition 
of OTC trading. They note that trades may fall below the standard market size 
only after splitting them to reduce market impact. These ‘child’ orders would 
then be internally matched, but mostly routed to external trading venues, such 
as RMs and MTFs. The Directive, in their view, would actually refer to ‘parent’ 
orders, since fiduciary duties and conduct of business rules apply to them as a 
whole. Finally, a Broker-dealer Crossing System (BCS) should not be considered 
‘multilateral’ since the dealers assume risks when providing best execution and 
other conduct of business arrangements, which neutral platforms do not 
provide.  
BCNs 
OTC equity trading plays an important role in financial markets, in 
particular when it comes to the best execution of complex institutional orders. 
Therefore, the review of MiFID should not ban these trading activities. The 
review should rather clarify the criteria that define ‘OTC trades’ with proper 
flexibility, in particular what kinds of trades are subject to OTC requirements 
under MiFID (e.g. ‘child’ or ‘parent’ orders). In addition, it should foster the 
availability of data in order to allow the full assessment and enforcement of best 
execution rules. Finally, it should ensure that price formation processes and 
market quality are preserved and, if possible, improved. 
OTC equity 
trading 
The data employed in the run-up to the MiFID review by the Committee 
of European Securities Regulators (CESR) to ascertain the size of OTC equity 
trading are not sufficiently accurate. Analysis based on this data cannot be 
considered conclusive and has probably led to an overestimation of the size of 
this market. More effort needs to be made to assess market quality in Europe 
with accuracy and to clarify the actual size of OTC equity trading, its origin 
and its impact on price formation processes. There is a compelling need to 
improve the quality of market data by reducing inconsistencies and increasing 
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granularity through the use of harmonised flags.  
The G20 called for derivatives to be further standardised and traded on 
electronic platforms, ‘where appropriate’. A greater push towards 
standardisation and organised trading should balance the benefits of a more 
transparent and orderly setting with the costs incurred by a potentially lower 
availability of customised derivatives, which would mean a greater possibility 
to leave some risk in the system not properly hedged. These proposals raise 
challenges for regulators and market participants with regard to investor 
choice, market liquidity and efficiency, and potential overlaps with the MTF 
regime. The MiFID review needs to address them in a way that is proportional 
and consistent with the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) and 
other relevant EU Directives. 
Organised 
trading 
facilities 
Financial market infrastructures are networks that can operate in a 
competitive environment. MiFID and competent authorities may need to 
strengthen actions to keep barriers to entry and exit low, giving due attention to 
economies of scale and scope, and other potential efficiencies. The Code of 
Conduct improved price transparency. More remains to be done, however, to 
solve existing commercial and technical challenges and increase accessibility 
through unbundling and interoperability of current infrastructures.  
Ultimately, MiFID favours freedom of access by investment firms to 
competing market infrastructures. In effect, while the original Directive 
envisaged non-discriminatory access to competing infrastructures, the 
transposition of this provision and its enforcement have been inconsistent 
across EU member states, in particular in relation to the definition of the 
‘legitimate commercial ground’ to deny access. The review of MiFID should try 
to bridge these inconsistencies, together with other legislative proposals such as 
the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), Securities Law 
Directive (SLD) and Central Securities Depositories Regulation (CSDR). 
Infrastructure 
access 
Promoting structural changes in non-equity markets to give easier access 
to retail investors may raise conflicting views. For some market participants, 
the market for fixed income securities should remain wholesale and dealer-
driven. In their view – even though a commendable objective – direct retail 
access to non-equity instruments may destabilise these markets, as it may 
generate higher volatility with no liquidity enhancements. These effects would 
ultimately heighten risks for retail investors, given the increasing complexity of 
fixed income securities. Instead, other stakeholders firmly support the opening 
of bond markets to retail investors. They believe greater transparency would be 
a liquidity driver for these markets. Under proper delays and exemptions, the 
potentially negative impact of retail trading activities would be fairly limited. 
Retail market 
access 
Issuers are important actors for innovation and a more efficient allocation 
of resources in our economies. Some market participants believe that issuers 
should be duly informed and agree where their shares are traded in secondary 
markets. This proposal, however, does not find wide support among both 
market participants and policy-makers, since in their view it raises relevant 
issues of market efficiency, legal entitlement of the right and conflicts of 
interest.  
Issuers 
The systemic importance of modern capital markets highlights the inner 
tensions between financial stability, market efficiency and technological 
innovation. A well-functioning market must balance efficiency and safety to 
Impact of 
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avoid disequilibria. The role of technology in the configuration of market 
infrastructure has become ever more important. Markets are redesigning their 
infrastructures thanks to innovative technology. In short, speed and volumes 
will probably continue to grow, but trading venues may have to deal with more 
frequent crises and outages.  
Technological innovations and techniques have brought revolutionary 
changes to trading. Among these changes, there are major benefits, such as 
better order management and control of market impact; or more efficient and 
faster feed of information into prices. Both these changes generate gains in 
terms of lower spreads and better price discovery that benefit participants 
throughout the value chain.  
However, modern trading also presents a number of challenges, such as 
an increase in fundamental market volatility, which in turn has brought speed 
and volumes to critical levels. Advanced execution services like direct-market 
or sponsored access have radically increased speed and volumes for 
transactions, in an attempt to cope with increasing volatility. Limits to 
infrastructure capacity nevertheless mean that higher speed and volumes risk 
generating market disorder and financial instability.  
To overcome these challenges, intermediaries and trading venues need to 
strengthen their own monitoring. A coherent set of emergency procedures in 
case of market disruptions should be designed in consultation with market 
participants (e.g. circuit breakers). There are several efficient monitoring 
systems already in place, which could serve as model systems. Finally, trading 
rules should be harmonised across markets to avoid instability arising from 
arbitrage. 
Provision of investment services   
Business conduct rules and organisational requirements play a crucial role in 
the provision of investment services, by strengthening investor protection and 
market integrity across Europe. However, a more harmonised implementation 
of regulatory actions and supervisory practices by member states should 
become a priority.  
 
Best execution duties lie at the foundation of the fiduciary relationship 
between service providers and clients. MiFID tries to grasp all factors 
influencing the best execution of a financial transaction, and does it in a very 
general manner. This situation, however, is not necessarily to the detriment of 
final investors as long as execution policies are properly implemented and data 
allows sufficient verifiability of execution.  
Investors receive information about their execution policies that may be 
sometimes incomplete. Even with most advanced execution metrics, available 
data appear insufficient to make a thorough evaluation of execution quality in a 
fragmented market. 
Some market participants argue that best execution policies should be 
applied ‘dynamically’ and that simply complying with formal legal 
requirements is not enough to provide real best execution. Other participants 
however challenge the view that issues with best execution come from 
execution policies that are MiFID-compliant. Both recognise that those issues 
emerge from a consistent lack of data on execution quality from trading 
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platforms, which is under discussion in the debate on the new transparency 
regime.  
Although the crisis showed that some of the eligible counterparties (ECPs) 
were not able to understand risk ‘properly’, the client categorisation regime 
should not be subject to a major overhaul, other than those changes currently 
proposed for local authorities. Some market participants suggest that portfolio 
managers should be entitled to unilaterally require the reclassification as ‘retail’ 
clients. They argue that even though portfolio managers are eligible 
counterparties under MiFID, they manage money on behalf of professional and 
retail clients and they have the obligation to act in their best interest. Others, 
however, advocate the inappropriateness of this request since portfolio 
managers do not simply execute on behalf of their clients, but they would 
directly gain (commissions on profits) from rules that should theoretically only 
benefit retail investors. 
Client 
categorisation 
Investment advice must always be ‘suitable’ under MiFID. Some market 
participants claim there should be a thorough review of the mechanisms of 
incentives to make advice more ‘independent’. In particular, they argue that 
investment advice should be based on a neutral and ‘independent’ system of 
remuneration, by only receiving fees from the clients. No commission should be 
set by product providers.  
Other market participants argue that obliging investors to pay for it 
would increase the access costs to these services and dramatically reduce the 
use of advisory services, with potential long-term costs for end investors. They 
suggest keeping the advice fee embedded in the commission, but disclosing 
whether the advisor is solely remunerated by the client or also by a product 
provider.  
All cost items and remuneration arrangements should be fully 
disclosed before signing the contract. This would improve the ability of 
investors to choose the service that best suits their own interest. Changes in 
MiFID will need to be reconciled with other regulatory initiatives such as 
Packaged Retail Investment Products, the Insurance Mediation Directive 
Review, and the Prospectus Directive. 
Investment 
advice 
The suitability test is crucial in the provision of investment advice and 
portfolio management services. Views diverge on how to assess the knowledge, 
financial situation and objectives of investors, and in particular, on how deep 
the suitability test should look into investor habits and the willingness to take 
risks. Some regret the lack of harmonisation in the implementation of 
suitability requirements for discretionary portfolio management. They would 
welcome action by ESMA to improve legal certainty and reduce barriers to 
market investment products across the EU. Other market participants, however, 
do not think any intervention is needed in this regard and are satisfied with the 
current level of harmonisation, which takes into account the natural market 
differences among member states. 
Suitability test 
MiFID foresees a different regime for ‘execution-only’ services based on 
the product classification between complex and non-complex financial 
instruments. Any change should take into account the fact that complexity does 
not necessarily mean more risk. The objective should be to verify if the product 
is in line with investors’ understanding of the ultimate risk that they are 
finally going to bear. Regulation should not decide the level of risk investors 
Product 
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want to take. 
Some market participants believe that certain UCITS (Undertakings for 
Collective Investments in Transferable Securities) might have become too 
complex to be easily understood by investors to skip the appropriateness test, at 
least for retail clients. Others argue that classification, in particular for UCITS, 
should remain as such, since a change in classification could damage the UCITS 
brand outside the EU.  
MiFID rules on conflicts of interest represent a first step in the 
introduction of a common approach across Europe for the prevention, 
identification, management and disclosure of such conflicts. Further initiatives 
to strengthen the current regime and align supervisory practices would 
enhance the treatment of these conflicts and benefit financial markets. A 
harmonised set of sanctions should be combined with enough flexibility for 
member states to adapt rules and procedures in line with their national 
contexts. 
Conflicts of 
interests 
Organisational requirements play a crucial role in ensuring business 
continuity, market integrity and investor protection. A proper implementation 
of the Directive should be ensured by harmonising organisational requirements 
and supervisory practices across Europe, and by removing ambiguities in the 
legal text. Ensuring consistency with other upcoming legislation would then 
avoid inefficiencies. It would also promote a uniform regime of investor 
protection and market integrity within Europe, which would ultimately 
increase legal certainty and the attractiveness of investment services. 
 
Organisational 
requirements 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The report deals with regulatory and economic challenges faced by European 
regulators in the process of revising the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID). It focuses on three fundamental areas of the regulation of 
financial markets and instruments: 1) transparency, 2) market structure and 3) 
provision of investment services. Within these areas, the report highlights 
major trade-offs faced by regulators, industry and investors in the review 
process. The summary of recommendations merges the findings of this report 
with a more actual contribution to the regulatory and policy-making process. 
The document does not claim to cover all issues and details raised by the 
MiFID Review. 
Content 
1.1  The MiFID Review 
The MiFID Review is perceived by some as a way to address pending issues of 
the preceding Directive, and by others as a way to reduce imbalances and to 
level the playing field. Both views converge on the necessity to restore 
investors’ confidence. As a result, the revision will have a high political 
visibility as one of the major responses to the recent financial crisis. 
Revising a legislative piece three years after its introduction is a regular 
and worthwhile exercise. Yet, striking the right balance between potentially 
conflicting objectives, such as financial stability and market efficiency, is a 
painful exercise. The review aims to further harmonise the regulatory 
framework for investment firms and market infrastructures, while the impact 
of the wider post-crisis re-regulation in these and other areas remains unclear. 
It is a sensitive piece of legislation, which affects the competitive position of a 
number of players. It also comes at a delicate moment for Europe’s capital 
markets, where it is necessary to rebuild investors’ confidence and to 
strengthen the internal market. Due to its level of detail, the review of MiFID is 
a very technical undertaking. Therefore, European regulators need qualitative 
and quantitative data through the support of private initiatives.  
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The Directive mandates a review of a 9 areas: 
1)  Extension of pre- and post-trade transparency requirements to financial 
instruments other than shares (Art. 65, MiFID), 
2)  Removal of obstacles to the consolidation of data (Art. 65, MiFID), 
3)  Systematic internalisers provisions (Art. 65, MiFID), 
4)  Tied agents (Art. 65, MiFID), 
5)  Best execution (information on execution quality; Recital 76, 
Implementing Directive), 
6)  Gold-plating, 
7)  Telephone recording (Art. 51.4 and 51.5, Implementing Directive), 
8)  Requirements for authorisation (Art. 31, 32, MiFID) and the 
9)  Commodity derivatives exemption (Art. 65, MiFID). 
Mandatory 
areas 
However, other issues will also be considered, including most of the G20 
commitments to increase the safety and stability of the financial system. 
Amongst the most important categories are following: 
1)  Transparency requirements (such as pre-trade transparency issues and 
waivers, delays on publication time and a new transaction reporting 
regime); 
2)  Regulatory boundaries between venues, e.g. levelling the playing field 
between regulated markets (RMs) and multilateral trading facilities 
(MTFs);  
3)  Legal treatment of broker-dealer crossing networks and other platforms 
currently operated in the OTC space for equity and non-equity financial 
instruments; 
4)  Issues of financial stability (rules for new trading technologies and 
implications for financial stability);  
5)  Investor protection (e.g. selling practices, market access, client and 
product categorisation) and 
6)  A special regime for SMEs.  
The Committee of European Securities Regulations (CESR) has grouped 
the issues of the review under three major areas: 1) transaction reporting 2) 
equity markets (structure and transparency) and 3) investor protection and 
intermediaries (CESR, 2010a,b,c). Therefore, this legislative initiative will have 
to interact with other important initiatives, such as the review of the MAD 
(Market Abuse Directive),1 that cover diverse segments of the investment 
services industry.  
Other relevant 
issues 
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Table 1. The MiFID review 
Mandatory areas  Other areas 
Data consolidation  Pre-trade transparency waivers 
Systematic internalisers regime  Transparency for non-equity asset 
classes 
Tied agents  Transaction reporting (with MAD) 
Commodity derivatives exemption  Trading venues classification and legal 
treatment 
Requirements for authorisation  Disorderly markets 
Gold plating  Selling practices (with PRIPs) 
Best execution (data execution quality)  Market access 
Telephone recording  Client categorisation 
  Product classification (with UCITS Dir.) 
  Special regime for SMEs 
  Conflicts of interest and inducements 
  Organisation requirements 
  Investment advice 
  Safeguards and asset segregation 
  Post-trade transparency delays 
Source: MiFID, European Commission (2010b). 
Some outstanding issues regarding MiFID, however, are not related to 
regulatory gaps, but to the way the Directive was implemented and enforced 
by national authorities. The European Commission and the new European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)2 need to look into the nature of these 
problems when considering changes to MiFID. Regulators should minimise the 
risk of adding layers of regulation where failures are rather the result of 
inadequate supervision or enforcement. Clarifying the intended scope of 
current regulation may help to create a more harmonised framework of 
supervisory actions. The revision will affect not only the rules of the business 
conducted by those providing intermediation as well as trading venue services, 
but also the interests of investors (both institutional and retail) and issuers.  
Supervisory 
coordination 
MiFID came into force in November 2007 (see Figure 1).3 As cornerstone 
legislation, it had broad implications for many institutions across sectors, 
including investment firms, trading venues and regulatory authorities. On the 
one side, the Directive has unequivocally promoted the creation of a new 
harmonised framework of rules across Europe that was not there before (e.g. 
Implementat-
ion 
                                                      
2 Replacing CESR from January 2011. 
3 For details on the transposition of the Directive across Europe, see http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ 
securities/isd/mifid_implementation_en.htm.  16 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
conduct of business rules and a new pre- and post-trade transparency regime). 
On the other side, this regulation has promoted a competitive environment for 
the provision of investment services. However, implementation and 
supervisory controls have not been uniform across member states, creating an 
uneven playing field among market participants, which the review should 
solve. There needs to be a better understanding of the impact of MiFID on 
European financial markets, as the current economic and financial crisis may 
have distorted the real impact of its implementation. The next sections provide 
some thoughts and data for assessing the major effects of the Directive. 
Figure 1. MiFID timeline 
Source: European Commission website and authors. 
Finally, as shown above, the review may follow a strict set of deadlines in 
order to be approved by 2011 and followed by implementing measures by 2012. 
 
2.  The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
2.1  The legislative process 
 
The MiFID Directive and its implementing measures are one of the most 
important components of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP). The FSAP 
represents the follow-up of the 1998 European Council’s conclusions and 
Commission’s communication,4 condensed in the 2000 Lisbon Agenda. The 
FSAP included 45 measures5 (originally 42; of which 29 were directives) and 
aimed at developing a single market for financial services, and renewed by the 
Europe 2020 agenda (EU COM, 2010a). This Plan represents one of the foremost 
attempts of European institutions to improve EU financial markets integration6 
MiFID and the 
FSAP 
                                                      
4 See European Council, ‘Presidency Conclusions’, 15-16 June, 1998, Cardiff, (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/54315.pdf);  
European Commission, ‘Financial Services: Building a Framework for Action’, COM 625, 28 October 1998, p. 3, 
(www.europa.eu). 
5 Originally there were 42 measures, of which 29 were directives (plus the amendment to the 14th Company Law 
Directive, which was blocked). The Commission then added a Communication on clearing and settlement (COM 
312, 2004) and a Regulation on cross-border payments (EC Regulation 2560/2001). 
6 Financial integration of European markets has been on the policy agenda since the 1960s. It was already in the 
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and to favour a better legislative process for innovative financial regulation. 
The FSAP aimed at boosting cross-border transactions and financial 
integration; it remains, however, hard to disentangle the effects of this set of 
measures from the effects of the Economic and Monetary Union and more 
recently of the financial crisis. The impact of new pieces of regulation such as 
MiFID, MAD, the Prospectus Directive, Transparency Directive, IAS 
Regulation, Takeover Bid Directive, Capital Requirements Directive have 
provided European financial markets with a common and unique framework 
of rules for capital markets.  
The MiFID, the MAD, the Transparency Directive and the Prospectus 
Directive have been designed and implemented with a new legislative process, 
named ‘Lamfalussy procedure’.7 This new legislative process entails three 
levels that represent a combination of regulatory (level 1 and 2), supervisory 
(level 3), and enforcement (level 4) actions. It foresees extensive consultations 
with industry and experts committees (so-called ‘comitology’), and strong 
cooperation between national authorities. Level 1 directives are approved with 
the regular co-decision procedure.8 
The 
Lamfalussy 
procedure 
The recent financial crisis, however, calls for a deeper analysis of how 
these measures – and MiFID in particular – performed vis-à-vis the disruption 
in global financial markets. Nevertheless, the MiFID Review occurs in the 
context of discussions around a new set of directives that make up the 
European strategy to tackle market failures, restore confidence and promote the 
internal market and a more open market architecture to favour cross-border 
transactions. However, economic, legal and social barriers among member 
states, e.g. taxation, are slowing down the creation of a fully integrated retail 
and wholesale pan-European financial market.  
A pan-
European 
market 
Under the overarching goal of ensuring a single market for financial 
services, MiFID aimed at establishing a legal framework for integrated 
securities and derivatives markets in Europe. The Directive endeavoured to 
change Europe’s capital markets through liberalisation of investment services 
and more investor protection. MiFID, in effect, was a sophisticated and far-
reaching attempt of the Commission to provide the European Community with 
valuable tools for meeting the challenges of the Monetary Union and reaping 
the benefits of a single integrated market for financial services. The revision of 
the legal text aims at solving legal and supervisory divergences across Europe, 
which hamper market integration, addressing unintended effects of the 
Directive, extending its coverage and making sure that the benefits of the new 
competitive environment spread along the value chain and are passed-on to 
MiFID new 
objectives 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Segré Report of 1966; see Group of Experts, “The Development of a European Capital Markets”, European 
Commission, Brussels, 1966.  In May 2007, moreover, the European Council reconfirmed the essential role of 
integrated financial markets to strengthen the four freedoms of the Internal Market; see Council of the European 
Union, “Brussels European Council 8/9 March 2007: Presidency Conclusions”, 7224/1/07 REV 1, 2 May 2007. A 
‘new effort’ to promote greater financial integration for a European single market has been recently promoted by 
the Monti report, which put economic and financial integration at the top of the EU agenda. 
7 Named after the Chairman of the Committee of wise men, Alexandre Lamfalussy, who contributed to defining 
the terms of this procedure in the Final report of the committee of wise men on the regulation of European securities 
markets, Brussels, 15 February 2001. 
8 Art. 294 (ex Art. 251, ECT) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2010 Consolidated Version; 
hereinafter, ‘TFEU’), Official Journal of the European Union, C83/47, 30 March. 18 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
final user, both retail and wholesale. 
2.2  The legal structure 
 
MiFID aimed at designing a ‘coherent’, ‘risk-sensitive’, and ‘comprehensive’ 
regulatory framework for execution of financial instruments to ensure ‘high 
quality of execution’ and thus promote investor protection, and the integrity, 
efficiency, and orderly functioning of financial markets (Recital 5, MiFID). By 
introducing harmonised rules for investment services and securities trading, 
MiFID has opened up the market to competition. It also provided a unique 
framework of investor protection rules, as well as stricter rules to preserve 
market integrity and efficiency. The Directive replaced the Investment Services 
Directive (ISD),9 which was a first attempt to introduce a harmonised regime 
for investment services in 1993, based more importantly on mutual recognition 
supported by a European passport. MiFID applies to all financial instruments, 
excluded commodity derivatives dealt on own account (Art. 2 (i) and (k), 
MiFID) and other instruments and institutions set in Art. 2. In particular, “the 
purpose of this Directive is to cover undertakings the regular occupation or business of 
which is to provide investment services and/or perform investment activities on a 
professional basis. Its scope should not therefore cover any person with a different 
professional activity” (Recital 7, MiFID). Moreover, the Directive applies not only 
to MiFID-official trading venues and investment firms providing investment 
services on regular basis, but also to credit institutions authorised under 
Directive 2000/12/EC (not including, for instance, insurance and energy 
companies) and indirectly to Undertakings for Collective Investments in 
Transferable Securities (UCITS) companies, even though a formal exemption 
applies (Art. 2.1 (h), MiFID).10 
Scope and 
principles 
As showed in figure 2, MiFID aims at reaching two high-level principles 
set by the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP):11 i) a single market for 
wholesale financial services; and ii) an integrated securities and derivatives 
market. And this through the implementation of two general goals: investor 
protection, and market efficiency. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the 
need to ensure orderly markets and financial stability has gradually become 
another important objective of the Review and so too of the Directive (see 
Figure 2).  
MiFID pursues these goals via a set of rules, covering four main areas: 
1)  European passport (freedom of action across the EEA once received the 
authorisation in one of the Member States); 
2)  Organisational requirements (compliance officer, outsourcing, internal 
control systems, record-keeping, conflicts of interests); 
3)  Conduct of business rules (clients classification, best execution, know-
your-customer rules, marketing, information to clients, handling orders 
rules); and 
Major areas 
                                                      
9 Directive 93/22/EC, op.cit. 
10 See Box 16. 
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4)  Market structure and transparency (abolition of concentration rule,12 
detailed transaction reporting, pre- and post-trade transparency, other 
trading venue requirements). 
Figure 2. MiFID original principles 
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Source: Authors. 
The comprehensive regulatory regime for investment services and 
securities trading – as modified by MiFID – had opened up capital markets (in 
particular, cash equity markets) to competition and it has produced a new 
harmonised framework for investor protection, as well as stricter rules to 
preserve market integrity.  
MiFID adopted a functional approach; it regulates the provision of 
investment services irrespective of the institution carrying out the activity.13 
The Directive applies to all market participants (in particular, credit 
institutions, investment firms and market operators) acting within its scope, i.e. 
the investment service activity. For instance, in order to increase investor 
protection, ‘investment advice’ – an ancillary service under the ISD – has 
become a core service under MiFID, so all market players providing this service 
need to be compliant with MiFID. 
The economic downturn caused by the troubled financial situation, 
however, has meant pressure to modify this approach towards a more 
prescriptive one, which aims at ensuring that no areas of financial markets will 
remain uncovered by the regulation (in line with other forthcoming 
legislations, e.g.  European Market Infrastructure Regulation). Reducing the 
‘Functional’ 
approach 
                                                      
12 Before MiFID, countries applied the ‘concentration rule’ (Article 14(3) of the 1993 Investments services 
Directive). This rule stated that member states had the right to concentrate all orders on a regulated market. In 
practice, some member states exercised this right either by restricting all trading or all but the largest orders to be 
executed on the primary exchanges. Some member states did not exercise this right.  
13 A contrasting approach to regulation is the ‘institutional’ one, which tends to regulate market operators 
directly, in virtue of their status of ‘institution’ or legal entity (as defined by the legal text). 20 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
number of exemptions and extending the scope of the Directive will increase 
the number of implementing measures to be defined by ESMA and national 
authorities to make legislation effective. Markets will have almost no space to 
self-regulate and ongoing supervision will need to keep this broad set of rules 
up to date with fast-changing market innovation.  
In order to foster competition, MiFID promoted two actions: the abolition 
of concentration rules (for order execution services) and the extension of the 
ISD European passport regime (for other investment services). Firstly, by 
abolishing national concentration rules (pushing trading on few regulated 
trading venues, i.e. stock exchanges, when member states deemed it necessary 
for an efficient interaction of orders), MiFID established a new regulatory 
structure in which all trading venues, whether run by exchanges or other 
market participants compete for trade execution services on a level playing 
field. Secondly, the single authorisation for investment firms and the right to 
access national infrastructures on a non-discriminatory basis increased cross-
border competition between investment firms. In other words, competition 
under MiFID has two dimensions: competition among trading venues (which 
might be operated by market operators or investment firms, but must follow 
the same rules when conducting the same activity) and competition among 
investment firms when conducting intermediation business. 
In parallel to opening up the market for trading venues and investment 
firms, MiFID sought to harmonise and strengthen market integrity and investor 
protection – retail, in particular – for the cross-border provision of investment 
services, through the use of three sets of tools: 
Promoting 
competition 
a.  ‘Conduct of business’ rules.  
The Directive regulates the relation between retail clients and service 
providers through: best execution duties (Art. 19.1 and 21, MiFID); conflicts of 
interest rules (Art. 13.3 and 18, MiFID); suitability and appropriateness tests 
(so-called ‘know-your-customer rules’; Art. 19.4 and 19.5 MiFID). Other 
relevant requirements are related to: information to clients;14 client 
agreements;15 orders handling;16 and marketing rules.17 Finally, specific rules 
define exemptions for eligible counterparties (Art. 24, MiFID) and help client 
classification.18 Overall, these regulatory requirements address typical issues in 
a fiduciary relationship between service provider and client. 
Conduct of 
business rules 
b.  Organisational requirements for investment firms and trading venues.  Organisational 
requirements 
                                                      
14 Art. 19.8, MiFID, and Art. 40-43 Implementing Directive. 
15 Art. 19.7, MiFID, art 14.3 and 39 Implementing Directive. 
16 Art. 22, MiFID and Art. 47-49 Implementing Directive. 
17 Art. 19.2, MiFID, Art. 24 and 27, Implementing Directive. 
18 See also Implementing Directive, Art. 28 and 50. For non-complex instruments, clients can opt out of these 
safeguards (appropriateness test), asking ‘execution-only’ service. For a definition of ‘non-complex instruments’, 
please, see Art.38, Implementing Directive, or J-P. Casey & K. Lannoo (2009), p. 51. CESR is currently looking into 
the definition of ‘complex’ vs ‘non-complex’ financial instruments. For instance, they might exclude from the 
group of ‘non-complex’ financial instruments all the instruments that embed a derivative and shares in non-
UCITS. UCITS may also be split into two groups consistent with their trading strategies, but the proposal may 
come back at a later stage. See CESR (2010c), pp. 25-26. MIFID 2.0: CASTING NEW LIGHT ON EUROPE’S CAPITAL MARKETS | 21 
 
These consist of a range of broad obligations: a general duty to comply 
with MiFID rules (Art. 13.2 MiFID); creation of internal mechanisms of control 
(e.g. independent internal audit, IT, etc; Art. 13.4-13.5, MiFID); outsourcing (to 
be limited to non-core operational services; Art. 13.5, MiFID); recordkeeping 
and safeguarding of the clients’ financial assets (Art. 6-8, MiFID). Other 
important requirements are: the appointment of a compliance officer (objective 
and independent); rules on personal transactions; effective procedures for risk 
assessment. In addition, MiFID also includes specific requirements for trading 
venues, such as order execution, access and surveillance. 
c.  Transparency regime (pre- and post-trade; see section 4). 
While the first two sets of tools mainly apply to investment firms, the 
third also applies to both investment firms and execution venues. Legal 
requirements impose pre- and post-trade transparency for trades in shares, 
while only an optional extension may be exercised by member states for 
financial instruments other than shares. MiFID transparency regime points at 
multiple objectives, such as investor protection, market integrity, market 
surveillance and market efficiency.  
Transparency 
regime 
Finally, MiFID recognises a general principle that trading platforms need 
to provide users with free access to post-trading infrastructures, for both 
clearing and settlement (Art. 34, MiFID). The purpose of this rule is to preserve 
competition avoid bottlenecks along the value chain, and avoid cross-
subsidisation based on anti-competitive practices. The Directive thus urges 
member states to push regulated markets (RMs) to openup their infrastructure. 
It also recognises that building of cross-border links between trading venues 
and post-trade infrastructures will further favour the creation of a pan-
European market (Art. 35, MiFID). The right of investment firms to decide their 
clearing and settlement infrastructure should apply whether or not the 
transaction has been executed on a regulated market. In effect, MiFID asks RMs 
(Art. 34.2) to make these links available, since they were sole providers in the 
provision of execution services when the Directive came into force. 
Post-trade 
infrastructure 
3.  The impact of the MiFID on European markets: Some evidence 
from cash equity markets 
3.1  Introduction 
MiFID is widely recognised as a major regulatory initiative of the European 
Union in the financial services sector. It is an overhaul of the European 
securities market, aimed at introducing a new, harmonised and competitive 
design for the industry. Under the two abovementioned high-level principles, 
the main objectives of the Directive were market efficiency and investor 
protection. 
It is difficult to disentangle the effects (positive or negative) of the 
implementation from the impact of the recent financial crisis, which – next to 
the competitive pressure from newcomers – has shrunk business volumes of 
incumbent provider of execution services (see Figure 3). Most notably, the 
reduction of frictional costs for trading and the following increase in volumes 
may have been masked by the general cyclical downturn brought about by the 
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financial crisis. The crisis makes the overall long-run effects of the Directive on 
the EU GDP difficult to grasp, but they are estimated at 0.7% and 0.8% (London 
Economics, 2010). 
Figure 3. Impact of the crisis on EEA equity turnover and volumes (lit & dark) 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters, FESE. 
However, the number of trades has been increasing and volumes seem to 
move to pre-crisis levels in 2010.  
In terms of regulation, more needs to be done to fine-tune the current 
legal texts with recent market developments and to avoid regulatory gaps. 
Hitherto, MiFID has promoted a number of key changes: 
 
1)  Greater competition and market fragmentation;  
2)  Very significant investments in technology for trading and platforms;  
3)  Growth of dark pools and broker-dealer crossing systems (in line with 
market fragmentation) ; 
4)  Wider scope of transparency regime; and  
5)  Greater investor protection through a harmonised framework of 
organisational and conduct-of-business (CoB) rules. 
The impact on price formation and market integrity remains highly 
controversial and with no definitive answer. Similar changes in the US seem to 
have brought some beneficial effects too, in particular in terms of lower implicit 
and explicit trading costs19 and greater liquidity (Angel et al., 2010).  
 
3.2  A more competitive environment 
Despite the original scepticism of the industry, the legislation has proven 
successful in increasing market competition and efficiency, driving down direct 
trading and post-trading costs, even though these benefits have not completely 
passed-on end investors. As a result, competition has been concentrating on 
prices (spreads between official trading venues have increased) and execution 
 
                                                      
19 Explicit costs of trading are those costs fully disclosed, such as trading fees, which are usually known before the 
investor enters into a deal. Implicit costs of trading are those ones that may not be fully visible to investors before 
the transaction, such as opportunity costs of executing an order on another platform that may offer higher explicit 
costs, but lower implicit costs in terms of market impact. 
2008 2009
€ 14,562,761,413,782
€ 7,860,089,362,260
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838,628,584 886,100,990
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- 13.38%
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services (provided by investment firms in competition between them, brokers 
and some MiFID official trading venues20). 
MiFID therefore unleashed competition between: 
•  Trading venues (by abolishing concentration rules and allowing 
alternative trading venues); 21  
•  Investment firms (by extending the coverage of the European Passport to 
other services and promoting tied agents); 22 and  
•  Market infrastructures (by providing right of choice and access to 
regulated markets and central counterparties, clearing and settlement 
systems). 23  
Competitors 
The CESR database has currently registered 243 trading systems, of 
which 139 MTFs, 92 RMs and 12 SIs. Concerning the European cash equity 
market, there are 49 lit24 markets (27 MTFs and 45 Regulated Markets) and dark 
markets25 (9 broker-dealer crossing networks and 23 MTF dark pools) as of June 
2010 (Gomber & Pierron, 2010). 
 
Figure 4. Registered trading venues in the European Economic Area (EEA) and  
breakdown for equities 
139
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Multilateral Trading Facilities  Regulated Markets
Systematic Internalisers
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Equity –L i t  Markets
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9
Equity –D a r k  Markets
Dark MTFs Broker Dealer Crossing Networks  
Source: Authors from CESR and Gomber & Pierron (2010). 
                                                      
20 MiFID official trading venues are: regulated markets (RMs), multilateral trading facilities (MTFs), and 
systematic internalisers (SIs). 
21 Art. 4.7, 4.14 and 4.15, MiFID. 
22 Art. 23 and 31, MiFID. 
23 Art. 33, 34, 35, MiFID. 
24 “Lit markets” are pre-trade displayed limit order book and quotes, as contrary of “dark books”, which are limit 
order books that do not disclose book and quotes pre-trade. They are only post-trade transparent. 
25 ‘Dark’ may have different meaning. ‘Dark trading’ or ‘dark markets’ means all  24 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
Box 1. Defining ‘dark’ in securities trading 
The term ‘dark’ is often misperceived by the public opinion, in particular when comes to be 
associated with securities trading, and in particular equity trading. Besides any possible 
pejorative meaning, ‘dark’ trading is a legal f o r m  o f  t r a d i n g ,  f o r e s e e n  b y  M i F I D ,  w h i c h  
performs an important economic function in financial markets. It consists of trading with no 
obligation of pre-trade disclosure of price and volume. Specific conditions to benefit from the 
so-called ‘waivers of pre-trade transparency’ apply (see Section 4.2.2 below). All other legal 
requirements – such as post-trade transparency, transaction reporting and market 
surveillance rules (when trading is done on a MiFID trading venue) – apply in the same way 
than pre-trade transparent (‘lit’) markets. ‘Dark’ venues are generally accessible to non-retail 
investors who want to protect their trading interests from market impact by not disclosing 
them before the transaction takes place. ‘Market impact’ may increase transaction costs and 
reduce incentives to trade. Other reasons to use dark venues are explored into detail in 
section 4.2. As the report illustrates, dark trading may be only damaging when it becomes 
such a relevant part of the market that de facto  impedes the well-functioning of price 
discovery and formation processes on lit markets. 
Concerning with the terminology used in this report, ‘dark liquidity’ usually refers to 
all trading in financial markets done with no pre-trade transparency, either under the MiFID 
exemptions (waivers) or under the MiFID definition of over-the-counter trade.26 ‘Dark 
trading venues’ or ‘dark markets’ refer instead to a sub-category of dark liquidity, which 
includes ‘dark pools’ and broker-dealer crossing systems (see section 5.4). ‘Dark pools’ are 
trading venues classified as MTF (so-called ‘dark MTFs’). Those venues refer to neutral 
trading platforms where trades find their market-clearing price with no obligation of pre-
trade disclosure of investors’ trading interests. 
 
On the one side, a more competitive environment produced positive 
effects, as the reduction of direct trading (and post-trading) costs, with no 
direct detrimental effects for price formation (CFA, 2009). Oxera investigated 
trading and post-trading costs between 2006 and 2008 and confirmed a relevant 
downward trend (Oxera, 2009). This trend was also acknowledged by 
respondents to a 2009 CESR report (CESR, 2009a). 
Trading costs 
More controversial is the discussion on the reduction of implicit trading 
costs (e.g. bid/ask spreads). In 2009, spreads have been higher than pre-MiFID 
(London Economics, 2010), but moving down fast. It is hard to disentangle the 
effects of the crisis (the stock indexes reached their bottom level in February-
March 2009) from the ones brought about by MiFID. However, latest data from 
2010 seems to show a gradual decline of spreads below pre-MiFID levels, in 
line with the stabilisation of financial markets after the crisis (see Figure 5). 
Moreover, incumbents and newcomers have been massively investing in 
infrastructure and new technologies in order to reduce costs of execution, 
increasing speed and quality of execution services. 
 
                                                      
26 As explained in section 5.4.1, OTC trades may not qualify as ‘dark’ trade if they meet the requirements set in 
Recital 53, MiFID. MIFID 2.0: CASTING NEW LIGHT ON EUROPE’S CAPITAL MARKETS | 25 
 
Figure 5. Bid/ask average spread and Implicit Volatility on EuroSTOXX, FTSE100 and CAC40 
 
Source: Credit Suisse AES Analysis, Nov 1, 2007 to Dec 30, 2010; Credit Suisse (2011). 
 
 
 
Source: NYSE Euronext (Response to CESR Consultation; CESR, 2010d). 
On the other side, the growing number of trading venues has boosted 
market fragmentation,27 thus increasing search costs to source liquidity and 
potentially market impact. Nevertheless, new technologies seem to 
counterbalance this negative effect, delivering better order management 
strategies with lower market impact. New technologies and consolidated data 
solutions have drastically reduced the influence of ‘depth in the market of 
reference’ on trading decisions. In effect, estimates show that the impact of 
market depth and volatility on implicit trading costs, and so on trading 
decisions, is very low post-MiFID (London Economics, 2010). This result can be 
 
                                                      
27 See, more generally, Section 5. 26 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
generally ascribed to the offer of multiple trading venues to source liquidity on 
secondary markets for the same stock at a reasonable price and cost.  
Fiercer competition, moreover, resulted in a loss of market shares for 
national regulated markets and in the emergence of new pan-European trading 
platforms (see Figure 6). 
Pan-European 
platforms 
Figure 6. EEA equity markets – 2010 pan-European market shares 
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Sources: BATS Europe, Thomson Reuters, FESE (Jan-Dec 2010; % total turnover, lit, auction, and 
dark order books and hidden orders). For an overview of main financial indicators for 
equity and non-equity markets, please see Annex I. 
These new trading platforms are gradually increasing their market shares 
to the detriment of the incumbents through the offer of pan-European lit and 
dark order books for the secondary markets of most liquid European shares. 
 
The pan-European competition is reflected in the fragmentation of the 
most liquid shares in their national markets (see Figure 7). 
Market shares 
Figure 7. Most liquid EU shares by execution venue  
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Note:  This graph includes the two most liquid shares (as ranked by CESR, by average daily 
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Sources: CESR Database and Fidessa’s Fragulator (% of volumes, YTD, 30 November 2010).  
As shown above, market shares of incumbent-regulated markets have 
consistently shrunk in the last two years. Most liquid shares in their respective 
national markets have gradually been traded on new, alternative pan-European 
platforms competing on execution and related services, especially on cost of 
execution and access to services that allow full exploitation of new trading 
technologies.  
 
As a result of fierce competition, trading venues are struggling to reach 
economies of scale, cutting costs and diversifying sources of revenues. This 
may paradoxically induce the market – in the medium to long term – to 
reconsolidate around a few operators offering pan-European baskets of 
execution and related services for most liquid shares in the secondary markets. 
It is not clear what effect this final equilibrium may have on European capital 
markets, since the benefits of network effects and economies of scale, as a result 
of further integration, may need to be balanced against a less competitive 
environment. However, competition is usually measured through the level of 
market barriers to entry and exit, rather than the number of competitors. 
Hence, the process should be guided by principles of fair competition 
underpinning the MiFID text. 
 
3.3  The introduction of new technologies 
 
In the last decade, European equity markets have experienced evolutionary 
changes in their infrastructure and trading methodologies. The introduction of 
new technologies and greater competition has led trading venues to cater for 
automated trading and investment firms to invest in algorithmic trading and 
high-frequency trading (‘HFT’) technologies.28 These developments stimulated 
new investments in market infrastructures (in particular, new trading 
platforms). Speed and likelihood of execution have become increasingly key 
aspects for professional investors, seeking to reduce the market impact of their 
orders. As a matter of fact, new trading methodologies and technologies have 
entered the scene and they seem to be here to stay.29 
Evolutionary 
changes 
Currently, more than a third of the transactions executed on the UK FTSE 
100 are made through HFT systems (see Table 2) and much more through 
algorithmic trading. In the US, this number was between 40% and 60% of the 
average daily volume in 2009 (Celent, 2009) and is set to be above 70% in 2010, 
as estimated in a recent survey by Aite Group. Trading venues and broker-
dealers have invested massively in technology to accelerate and improve trade 
execution through the use of sophisticated algorithms and to improve capacity. 
The NYSE’s speed of execution for small, immediately executable orders was 
10.1 seconds in January 2005, compared to 0.7 seconds in October 2009 (SEC, 
2010a, p. 6). NYSE Euronext Paris is going to move its servers to London to 
reduce latency and to be closer to the main trading community in Europe, 
while the LSE Group – after the acquisition of the IT firm Millennium – has 
High-
frequency 
trading 
                                                      
28 HFT is a form of high-speed automated trading that it is often use by arbitrageurs and by professional investors 
in order to improve their trading strategies, often supported by complex algorithms. 
29 For a more detailed analysis about the link between new technologies and current market structure, see section 
5.5.2. 28 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
launched an infrastructure called ‘Millennium Exchange’, to which Turquoise 
has recently migrated, while the main markets and third parties’ markets – 
such as Oslo Børs – will migrate in 2011.  
Table 2. Share of HFT by trading venue (shares of order books) 
Trading venue  High-Frequency Tradinga 
Chi-X  40% 
London Stock 
Exchange 
32% 
BME  25-30%b 
NYSE Euronext  23% 
Borsa Italiana  20% 
Turquoise  19%b 
Nasdaq OMX  13%b 
a * % of total trading value. 
b% of total trading volumes. 
Source: CESR responses to consultation paper on micro-structural issues in CESR (2010d).  
 
A report prepared by a Working Group chaired by Pierre Fleuriot and 
commissioned by the French Minister for the Economy, Industry and 
Employment has listed the main trading strategies that can be pursued through 
HFT systems (Fleuriot, 2010): 
•  Market-making (orders sent to capture the spread); 
•  Arbitrage (instantaneous or statistical); and 
•  Speculation (event-driven strategies to predict future price movements). 
This set of strategies falls under those typical functions served by dealers 
and informed traders in financial markets (Harris, 2002). On the one side, 
algorithmic trading (AT) and more specifically HFT systems generally allow a 
faster and more efficient flow of information into prices, with potential price 
discovery and gains in spreads (Hendershott, Jones & Menkveld, 2008 
Brogaard, 2010). AT also seems to continue after market shocks and benefit 
from price reversal (Broogard, 2010), and somehow from assets volatility 
without necessarily adding up to a generally highly volatile scenario. HFT is 
concentrated on most liquid stocks (Nasdaq OMX, 2010). On the other side, 
these systems could put trading platforms under severe stress by increasing 
volumes and speed to critical levels. Its use is expected to grow substantially in 
the coming years, as technologies become more widely available to investors. 
Only the effects of their widespread diffusion will clarify the real benefits and 
costs of technological developments. However – as any other trading tool in 
financial markets – HFT systems may be used beyond their general purposes. 
In this sense, some market participants may want to pursue more aggressive 
trading strategies such as quote stuffing.30 Regulators should therefore 
HFT strategies 
                                                      
30 Quote stuffing is a manipulative practice pursued through high-frequency trading systems consisting of the 
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constantly supervise the actual use of these complex tools, set common 
technical standards, and define legal boundaries. 
AT and HFT systems, in fact, are often erroneously seen as trading 
strategies, while they are only tools that allow high-speed computation of 
orders, new and more efficient trading strategies. However, AT and HFT have 
boosted new trading strategies, such as statistical arbitrage, which have now 
become an essential aspect of end investors’ trading decisions.31 Banks are 
continuously developing and fine-tuning their order-routing systems to remain 
competitive. Quantitative automated trading strategies, such as smart order 
routing through algorithmic trading, have become mainstream in trade 
execution and minimise the risks of sourcing liquidity to reduce market impact. 
Quantitative strategies based on high-frequency trading tools are now a more 
significant component of the market, and the success of this technological 
progress has actually encouraged more entrants. In effect, these sophisticated 
algorithms ought to slice big orders into small ones (so-called, ‘child orders’) 
and spread their execution in a set time frame and price range during the 
trading day. This substantially reduces risks of market impact. Overall, 
algorithmic trading seems to consume liquidity when it is cheap, and supply 
liquidity when it is expensive, that is when spreads widen. This beneficial 
outcome does not seem to increase volatility either (Hendershott & Riordan, 
2009).  
New trading 
technologies 
Moreover, trading platforms offer services to financial institutions in 
order to install their servers close to their data mainframe and reduce their 
latency. Other services to reduce latency, such as Direct Market Access (DMA) 
and Sponsored Access (SA),32 allow entities to directly or indirectly access a 
trading platform with different levels of responsibility and controls over their 
actions (see Section 5.5.2). These new access and low-latency services are critical 
for certain advanced trading strategies and seem to be a source of competitive 
advantage for trading venues. In addition to them, other access services – such 
as unfiltered access33 – may be important for high-frequency trading systems. 
However, they bring new risks for the infrastructure, which need to predispose 
adequate systems and controls to monitor and manage potential misbehaviours 
or human errors (so-called ‘fat fingers’). 
Market access 
In conclusion, despite the indirect benefits of the availability of new 
technologies in financial markets (lower trading costs), retail investors remain 
only partially able to access technologies that facilitate their access to multiple 
trading venues (e.g.  lack of consolidated data solutions). In effect, these 
technologies may benefit retail investors as long as they are used to promote 
easier and cheaper access to pan-European markets. Nevertheless, retail 
investors may have benefited from a modest downward trend of trading costs, 
Retail 
investors 
                                                                                                                                                                      
introduction and instantaneous cancellation of a huge amount of orders in order to slow down the competitors’ 
systems, gain processing time and deceive the market. 
31 Using data from listed firms, Hendershott and Riordan (2009) found that almost 50% of liquidity on Deutsche 
Börse is comes from algorithmic trading. On Nordic markets, 40% is algorithmic trading and only 7% is ‘pure’ 
HFT (Nasdaq OMX, 2010). 
32 See Section 5.5.2. 
33 Unfiltered access is a sort of ‘naked’ sponsored access, in which the members’ client can place an order on the 
trading platform that flows directly into the markets without a first screening of broker-dealer systems.  30 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
as a consequence of an increasingly competitive environment.  
3.4  Evolution in market microstructure and brokerage services 
 
The introduction of new technologies and the new trading environment 
brought about by MiFID34 have accelerated the evolutionary process in market 
microstructure and brokerage services. 
Concerning market microstructure, there are two relevant changes: 1) the 
decline of dealer quote-driven markets in favour of limit order books (dark and 
lit), even in the OTC space (Broker-dealer Crossing Systems, BCSs); 2) the 
growth of dark pools volumes.35 
 
Firstly, the general request for more transparency in trading instruments 
and infrastructures, and trading continuity – plus the evolution of technologies 
and trading systems – have favoured the use of limit order books. The use of 
smart order routing systems and other sophisticated automated trading 
systems advocates the crucial role of transparent limit order books (order-
driven), which ensure more efficient and less costly trading continuity than 
dealer markets as long as there is a sufficient liquidity in the pool. MiFID has 
undoubtedly promoted a wider regime of transparency and investments in 
new trading technologies. However, on limit order books the market impact is 
potentially higher than in quote-driven markets, since dealers have the 
knowledge of the order before setting the price. Therefore, limit order books 
are usually characterised by greater ability to absorb small orders than big ones 
(Malinova & Park, 2008).  
Limit order 
books 
Secondly, the abovementioned change in market microstructure and the 
increased fragmentation of liquidity have increased the requests from market 
operators to deal with institutional orders on non-displayed limit order books 
(or so-called, ‘dark pools’) in order to reduce market impact. In effect, the 
public knowledge of an institutional order hitting the order book may provoke 
‘front-running’ by parasitic traders aimed at using this information to exploit 
the expected price movement at the expense of the institutional orders, which 
may not find enough liquidity if prices move away from the target (so-called 
‘exposure risk’; Harris, 1997). 
Dark pools 
                                                      
34 Smith (2010) has found evidence that link latest developments in market microstructure (like the increased use 
of HFT and automated trading) with the implementation of RegNMS in the US.  
35 For a more detailed discussion, see section 5.5. MIFID 2.0: CASTING NEW LIGHT ON EUROPE’S CAPITAL MARKETS | 31 
 
Table 3. EEA trading venues’ volumes (th of shares; by order book)  
2008 Total 
Volume 
% 
Tot. 
2009 Total 
Volume 
% 
Tot. 
2010 Total 
Volume 
% 
Tot. 
Δ 
‘09/’10 
Lit Order 
Book* 
1,071,687,579 88.03%  1,067,998,138  89.28% 1,191,073,305 87.17% +11.52% 
Order Book - 
Auction 
143,871,002 11.82%  116,440,019  9.73% 146,209,746 10.7%  +25.57% 
Dark Order 
Venues 
1,916,249 0.16% 11,785,681 0.99% 29,083,060 2.13%  +146.77% 
Total  1,217,474,830   1,196,223,839   1,366,366,110  +14.22% 
* Including hidden orders  
Source: Authors from Thomson Reuters. 
As a result, Table 3 above suggests a growth of dark order books volumes 
in the 3Q of 2010, in comparison with 2009. Specifically, the use of dark pools of 
liquidity increased by more than three times last year, although it still remains 
a small fraction of total volumes (1.72%). From three main dark books in 
January 2009, this number was 11 at the beginning of 2010, and new entrants 
(both MTFs and RMs) are increasingly offering similar execution platforms.36 
New systems that allow automated trading activity also offer better reporting 
and clarity on volumes than before. 
Finally, brokerage service providers are experiencing a strong 
consolidation phase as the proliferation of technologies and the need for 
advanced execution services allow a more sophisticated offer through 
centralised platforms. These platforms can thus exploit increasing economies of 
scale and scope (network effects). Cheaper trading costs for high-volume 
traders and institutional investors gave an opportunity to dealers to enter this 
market and combine advanced brokerage with execution services, in order to 
minimise both market impact and risks, and to source liquidity in a fragmented 
market. Broker-dealer crossing networks (BCNs)37 are the result of this 
evolutionary process, as they provide execution services with best execution, 
on a discretionary basis.38 
Brokerage 
services 
3.5  A more comprehensive transparency regime 
 
MiFID recognises the role of transparency in financial markets as a means to 
enhance liquidity and increase investor protection.39 The Directive extended the 
coverage and scope of the transparency regime to all equity trading venues. 
However, the extension to non-equity markets was left to the discretion of 
Coverage 
 
                                                      
36 Section 4.2 will discuss the impact of dark order books on price formation and discovery. 
37 BCNs represent linked groups of broker-dealer crossing systems (or BCSs) designed to form one pool of 
liquidity and reach a critical mass to cross orders. Matching of orders typically takes place with no pre-trade 
transparency and supported by best execution duties. For the sake of simplicity, we will use these two terms 
(BCN and BCS) interchangeably within the text, as we are interested in the function they serve more than in the 
modality they perform those services. 
38 For a more detailed discussion of the economic and regulatory implications of BCNs, please see Section 5.4. 
39 See section 4. 32 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
member states. Only two countries (Sweden and Italy) decided to apply this 
transparency regime to fixed-income. 
The scope of the transparency regime is fairly wide. Legal obligations 
require the disclosure of pre-trade information (quotes) by the abovementioned 
trading venues and post-trade information by investment firms (directly or 
indirectly through a third party) wherever the shares (admitted to trading on a 
regulated market) are actually traded. The post-trade transparency regime 
applies not only to equity orders executed on regulated markets, but also on 
alternative platforms and over-the-counter crossing systems. Information, 
through different reports, is disclosed to the market (trade reporting) and to 
regulators (transaction reporting)40 with different requirements and 
granularity. Pre-trade transparency, however, can be waived in some specific 
cases and in order to serve specific market needs.  
Scope 
Despite the greater scope and the stricter requirements of the MiFID 
transparency regime, the implementation has produced inconsistencies in the 
quality of market data and the reporting methodology. Data for over-the-
counter transactions lacks quality, including duplicate reporting, and creates 
uncertainty about its relevance in Europe’s capital markets.  
Post-MiFID 
3.6  Greater investor protection 
 
Another important achievement of the MiFID is in the area of investor 
protection, through the harmonisation of a meaningful set of business conduct 
rules and organisational requirements. Investor protection has been levelled 
across Europe. Among the most important measures, the introduction of 
conflict of interest rules, best execution and know-your-customer rules (e.g. 
suitability and appropriateness tests), which specify the general duty of the 
agent ‘to act in the principal’s best interest’ (Art. 19.1, MiFID).  
Harmonised 
rules 
The parallel introduction of ‘know-your-customer rules’ and best 
execution for all orders (and all financial instruments,41 e x c e p t  s p o t  f o r e i g n  
exchange products) has promoted a stronger relationship with clients. This is 
true in particular between retail clients and investment firms in the provision of 
specific services (such as order execution services). These two rules have made 
the European and US financial markets regulation closer than ever before. 
Exemptions for professional investors (or eligible counterparties) or dilution 
effects foreseen by the legal text allow to ‘contract around’ or ‘opt-out’ of the 
standard rules (e.g. best execution), in order to minimise transaction costs. 
Moreover, the Directive has harmonised the framework of rules on conflicts of 
interest, which previously fell under the principle of the home country control. 
Finally, concerns have been raised about the implementation of these 
rules. Implementing measures are often adopted to reflect only the minimum 
legal requirements without assessing the quality of execution and the actual 
level of investor protection. 
Main measures 
                                                      
40 See Art. 27-30, 44 and 45 MiFID. 
41 But not all kinds of investors (e.g. eligible counterparties). MIFID 2.0: CASTING NEW LIGHT ON EUROPE’S CAPITAL MARKETS | 33 
 
4.  A ‘renewed’ transparency regime 
 
4.1  The role of transparency in financial markets 
 
Transparency is the possibility by market participants to see the market 
mechanisms, in particular information on market price of a security and its 
determinants (order flow). It has gradually become a crucial aspect of financial 
markets, in parallel with the evolution in market microstructure and new 
technologies. In effect, with full information asymmetry there is no price 
equilibrium and no exchange will take place (Madhavan, 1992), due to strong 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems.42 Therefore, the primary 
objective of transparency – in its many dimensions – is to reduce information 
asymmetry and transaction costs in order to make the exchange between 
buyers and sellers happen, thus reducing search costs and promoting more 
efficient price formation. In other words, appropriate transparency promotes 
price discovery in order to find the market-clearing price (price formation) of a 
financial instrument. 
Definition 
The general problem typically is what kind of information should be 
published and who should be entitled to receive it (O’Hara, 1995). The 
implementation of a transparency regime is a complex exercise. The kind of 
information that should be disclosed needs to be carefully assessed, since full 
disclosure in some case may have unintended consequences. Therefore, the 
type of published information is strictly related to the market microstructure 
(e.g. asset classes, trading organisation) that underpins financial markets.43 
The rapid increase of volumes in the last decade has boosted the use of 
limit order books (auction markets), which have pushed down transaction costs 
(explicit and implicit costs) and ensured continuous trading as requested by 
new technologies (automated trading services). Secondary markets, in 
particular for equity, have gradually moved from more opaque quote-driven 
dealerships to auction markets (limit order books). Limit order books needs a 
certain degree of transparency. To ensure that the order flow is transparent in a 
What 
information... 
                                                      
42 ‘Adverse selection’ is an informational problem that arises when products of a different quality (e.g. lemons 
and good cars; junk and good bonds and so on) are sold at a single price because of asymmetric information 
(inability of the buyer to understand the actual quality/risk of the cars/financial product or borrower), so that too 
much of the low-quality product and too little of the high-quality product are sold. The equilibrium will result in 
a market price (due to this inability of the buyer to understand ex ante the quality of the product) a bit higher 
than the real value of bad-quality products and consistently lower than the real value of high-quality products. 
Hence, the market equilibrium, in the mid-term, will determine that only bad-quality products are sold in the 
market. This fundamental issue can freeze markets, so justifying mechanisms for quality signals, such as neutral 
third-party informational tools (rating agencies, etc.), or regulatory actions to increase transparency or simply 
pre-sale services. See, in general, Akerlof (1970), and Kraakman (1986). ‘Moral hazard’ is an informational 
problem created by the opportunistic behaviour of the more informed party, who tries to exploit the 
informational advantage and the scarce ability of the less informed party to monitor his/her activity. See, in 
general, Holmstrom (1979) and Milgrom & Roberts (1992). 
43 Main empirical literature on market transparency comes from research and empirical studies on equities or 
financial instruments traded on organised trading platforms through order-driven markets or quote-driven 
dealer markets. Studies in financial instruments traded OTC are very limited since there is almost no publicly 
available information and their market share was quite limited until the beginning of the new century. There is 
currently no regime of trade reporting (public disclosure) and transaction reporting (disclosure to regulators). For 
a more detailed discussion on market microstructure,  see section 5.5. 34 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
meaningful way, there are generally two levels of data that may in some 
instances need to be disclosed: 1) pre-trade data (quote); and 2) post-trade data 
(trade disclosure). Such data finally need to be provided with sufficient depth, 
breadth and quality in order to benefit markets.  
The appropriate flow of information generally benefits uninformed 
investors,44 as they increase their knowledge of the market. However, as 
showed in the next sections, disclosing information may be harmful for some 
type of uninformed traders and markets that are not based on auctions. 
Therefore, the general goal to protect uninformed traders – who are not 
necessarily retail – may need to be carefully balanced with risks for market 
efficiency coming from a fully transparent market setting.  
...to whom? 
It is in the market’s interest to have a certain level of transparency. 
However, incentives may not be in line with public policies,45 so regulators may 
need to push market operators to disclose more information. In effect, 
transparency requirements under MiFID (Art. 27-30, 44 and 45, MiFID) serve 
two public policy purposes: 
i)  Price efficiency; and 
ii)  Investor protection. 
Objectives 
Public disclosure requirements (or trade reporting)46 to the public should 
be proportional to the market mechanisms that shape investor behaviours and 
through which securities are generally traded. For sake of simplicity, the 
Report splits the available market mechanisms in open limit-order books (or 
‘order-driven’; hereinafter, OLOB)47 and ‘quote-driven’ dealer markets,48 both 
ensuring continuity of trading.49 Both systems currently support automated 
trading. In general, public disclosure of the order flow improves the flow of 
information into prices and can enhance liquidity50 because it lowers search 
Price 
efficiency... 
                                                      
44 ‘Uninformed investors’ are those that trade with no private information, “but know that prices will reflect the 
information of the informed traders” (Dow and Gorton, 2006). 
45 Transparency is something that everyone benefits from but very few would be willing to provide information 
about their trades without explicit requirements. Therefore, the level of transparency with no regulatory 
intervention may be sub-optimal. See also ESME (2009b). 
46 The Report distinguishes between trade reporting – public disclosure pre-trade or post-trade requirements – 
from transaction reporting, which is a publication system for trade reports to regulators. 
47 OLOBs are systems in which submitted limit orders continuously receives immediate execution against the 
book. Orders are submitted by public investors and dealers. It operates as an auction because the price is formed 
through a continuous multilateral matching of orders. A quote-driven continuous dealer market is a market in 
which investors immediately execute their orders against the quotes provided by competing market-makers. 
Bid/ask quotations typically depend on size of orders. See, in particular, Madhavan (1992). 
48 Quote-driven markets are trading systems whose public quotes are the result of competing quotations offered 
by market-makers and dealers for a certain amount of a specific financial instrument. Main quote-driven markets 
are fixed income and derivatives markets, whose trading activities can be done ‘on exchange’ or ‘over-the-
counter’.  
49 Trading may be also done through periodic auctions, batch or transparent (Pagano-Roëll, 1996). In fact, periodic 
auctions that involve the submission of buy and sell limit orders – which are matched at a price/quantity set by 
the market or the dealer (batch auction) or all crossed at a common price (transparent auction) – are typically part 
of the opening call auction, that is to form prices when there is a low level of liquidity.  
50 Liquidity is a multi-faceted concept and it is difficult to find a definition that can perfectly fit all dimensions of 
securities trading. A market is liquid when it ”is almost infinitely tight, which is not infinitely deep, and […] 
resilient enough so that prices eventually tend to their underlying value” (Kyle, 1985, p. 1317). Three aspects 
emerge in this definition: i) Tightness (which is the possibility to turn over a position at the fastest speed 
technically possible, when needed); ii) Depth (which refers to the ability of the market to absorb quantities 
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costs (more efficient price discovery). It also minimises adverse selection effects 
for uninformed traders, with positive effects on opening spreads especially for 
dealer markets (Pagano & Roëll, 1996; Flood et al., 1999). OLOBs may benefit 
from greater transparency, as enhances liquidity; reduces volatility; and 
increases price efficiency (Giraud & D’Hondt, 2006). Prices are converging 
faster to fundamental values in a more transparent market setting. For instance, 
cash equity markets are so large and involve so many uninformed investors 
that greater transparency requirements (as defined by MiFID) seem beneficial, 
since they reduce volatility and improve market quality. In ‘thinner’ markets, 
with insufficient noise trading, volatility will increase with market disclosure 
(Madhavan, 1996).  
In addition, efficient information transmission between markets may help 
to keep competition in the market between market-makers and trading venues, 
and mitigates risks of fragmentation (Madhavan, 1995). Artificially fragmented 
market settings may harm the market with side effects on the cost of capital 
and the economy.51 
...and 
competition 
However, wide trade disclosure – principally for dealer markets (and 
potentially for liquidity providers in OLOBs) – may reduce transactional 
efficiency in those markets, since disclosure of private information can reduce 
market-makers’ incentive to compete on spreads (Bloomfield & O’Hara, 1999). 
In a nutshell – by increasing transparency – an important trade-off emerges. 
Regulators thus should look at striking the right balance between overall 
benefits for uninformed traders and negative effects upon informed traders 
(including dealers), who will not be able to benefit from their informational 
advantage (market knowledge) if a wider transparency regime applies. In some 
markets, the informational gap may be the only incentive for dealers to deal 
with illiquid products, and thereby create a market where none hitherto 
existed. A trade-off emerges in particular when dealers play a more relevant 
role in the market, as in quote-driven markets for instance. Therefore, two 
factors must be considered when imposing transparency requirements (Kumar 
et al., 2009): 
1)  The active role of informed traders in the market (e.g. a market consisting 
of only institutional investors); 
2)  The active commitment and participation of liquidity suppliers (e.g. 
quote-driven illiquid markets). 
The presence of these two factors may sensibly reduce the beneficial 
effects of greater public disclosure, pre- and post-trade.  
Moreover, the direct exposure of some type of orders (i.e. big size orders) 
to OLOBs can generate market impact and thus push liquidity out of the 
market (implicit transaction costs; Harris, 1997). Non-calibrated transparency 
requirements may indeed harm liquidity, hence widening spreads in quote-
driven markets or reducing book depth52 in order-driven markets and making 
But... 
                                                                                                                                                                      
without having a large effect on price; it is usually not constant over time in some asset classes); iii) Resiliency 
(which is the speed to which prices return to their fundamental value after a move due to regular trading or – 
with more intensity – to external shocks).  
51 See section 5. 
52 Market depth is a measure of liquidity that represents the ability to absorb order flows without large changes in 
prices (Glosten, 1994); it represents the volume required to generate a market unit price change (Kyle, 1985). 36 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
markets ‘thinner’. In order to address those potential trade-offs between 
transparency and market quality and efficiency, MiFID has already set in the 
original text a list of exemptions from disclosure and delayed publications in 
cash equity markets.  
In non-equity markets,53 where trading mechanisms are mainly facilitated 
by dealers, the transparency regime needs to be defined and calibrated in a 
different way, since those markets have a fundamentally different market 
microstructure from cash equity markets.  
 
A transparent market may also generate reputational capital, as an 
efficient transparency system can stimulate surveillance by other traders and 
provide more control over insiders (less moral hazard; Chowdhry & Nanda, 
1991). It also gives more information to investors in order to make more 
informed decisions for their investments, as well as a more effective assessment 
on how intermediaries are complying with their best execution policy. 
Moreover, greater disclosure for investor protection purposes is also ensured 
through an ad hoc transaction reporting system to regulators, which improves 
market surveillance, market integrity and enforcement of current legislation. A 
market subject to manipulation will infuse loss of confidence in the efficient 
market functioning and raise problems of moral hazard. 
Investor 
protection 
Conclusion # 1   
Transparency plays a crucial role for the smooth functioning of financial markets and the 
monitoring of systemic risk. It also ensures the good functioning of the price formation 
process through efficient price discovery mechanisms. However, regulatory actions in 
certain areas are needed, not only as a result of the recent financial crisis but also from the 
experience gained since the transposition of the Directive. Interventions should be 
proportional to the market structure through which investors’ orders find the market-
clearing price. Disproportionate transparency requirements would harm market efficiency in 
some illiquid markets with no increase of investor protection or reduction of systemic risk, as 
the market would become less-liquid and more subject to manipulation and eventually to 
market crashes.  
4.2  Pre-trade transparency for cash equities: benefits and costs  
 
In order to preserve the abovementioned objectives, MiFID designed a two-
level regime of transparency for cash equities, pre-trade and post-trade. This 
structure seems to be well-designed, in particular for OLOBs, which are 
continuous auction markets inherently more transparent than other forms of 
markets (Pagano & Roëll, 1996).  
 
Pre-trade transparency concerns the public disclosure of quotes and 
trading interests. Appropriate and effective pre-trade transparency 
requirements ought to serve investor protection and price efficiency supporting 
price discovery (through real-time quote disclosure) and best execution 
(through smart order routers). These transparency requirements mainly apply 
to the official trading venues under MiFID (RMs, MTFs and Systematic 
Definition 
                                                      
53 The Report will generally refer to ‘non-equity markets’ as markets that are not primary or secondary cash 
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internalisers; Art. 22.2, 27, 29 and 44, MiFID). In an integrated market, more 
pre-trade transparency tends to even levels of information between market 
participants. Overall – as shown below – evidences seem to confirm that pre-
trade transparency may be beneficial if the market is ‘large enough’ (as defined 
by Madhavan, 1996 and Baruch, 2005), i.e. benefits for uninformed investors 
(liquidity demanders) are higher than costs for informed ones (liquidity 
suppliers). Therefore, price discovery seems still to be rewarding, since there is 
sufficient noise trading and space for arbitrage (there is still private information 
that can be rewarded). 
The literature found conflicting evidence on the benefits of pre-trade 
transparency, and results seem to be different in relation to the trading 
mechanisms that underpin the market structure.54 In OLOBs, disclosure of 
quotes and order flow provide uninformed investors and the entire markets 
with visibility of best prices and a part of the order flow (usually first five best 
quotes) on real-time. If market players are able to consolidate quotes across 
trading venues, the positive effects of these requirements may offset the 
potential negative effects of liquidity fragmentation (Glosten 1994, Madhavan 
1995 and O’Hara & Ye, 2009). Bohemer et al. (2005) found beneficial the 
opening-up of a limit order book to pre-trade transparency. As a consequence, 
the new transparency settings impacted on trading strategies: traders manage 
exposure of orders with less market impact (higher cancellation rate and 
shorter time-to-cancellation rate) and there are overall fewer specialists in the 
market (informed traders). These changes improved market quality and more 
specifically ameliorated:  
i)  Informational efficiency (smaller deviations of transaction prices from 
efficient price); and 
ii)  Liquidity (increase of depth and decline in effective spreads).  
The case study of Island in the US (Hendershott & Jones, 2005) shows that 
reducing pre-trade transparency may have negative effects on the trading 
venue. In effect, after Island decided to go dark, it lost half of the market share, 
while effective and realized spreads went up drastically. Other lit markets saw 
their market share increasing and spreads going down, with unclear net overall 
effects. In 2003, Island redisplayed quotes, but market share and spreads did 
not go back to the previous levels (at least not in the short/medium term). 
Other evidence from Eom and Park (2007) suggest that market quality increases 
with the level of pre-trade transparency up to a point, after that the quality 
decreases, in line with the characteristics of a concave function (see figure 
below). Traders adjust their preferences about the real value of the share as 
quote disclosure changes or as other traders’ behaviour changes. However, 
market quality – measured through six parameters55 – would improve up to a 
certain level, where an inflection point signals the reversal of the trend.  
Benefits 
                                                      
54 For an overview of literature on market transparency, see Sabatini and Tarola (2002). 
55 Spread and relative spread; market depth (bid/ask spreads and limit orders size); transitory volatility (from 
liquidity provision); market-to-limit order ratio; full information trade cost (FITC); and 2 components of the trade 
execution costs, implied spread (adverse selection and transitory cost). Eom & Park (2007), p. 323.  38 | VAL
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depth with controls (time dummy variables, etc) and five OTC activity buckets 
(<1%; 1-5%; 5-12%; 12-27%; >27%).59 As a consequence, the existence of non 
pre-trade transparent liquidity – below a certain amount – seems to benefit the 
whole market. This outcome appears to be the result of increased competitive 
pressure by dark venues not only on handling large trades but also on price 
improvements in comparison to those of other trading venues. With inter-
market competition, pre-trade transparency in the main market allows ‘free-
rididing’ and creates new markets. Price discovery should be informative and 
rewarding, so dark pools can free-ride on information about prices due to noise 
trading, i.e. there are still different kinds of traders operating in this market 
(and most of them uninformed). 
However, as previously stated, pre-trade transparency may not be always 
beneficial. Madhavan et al. (2005) found evidences on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange that opening up floor and CATS (Computerised Automated Trading 
System) markets pre-trade transparency to the public (for members it was 
already available) may be harmful, in particular for markets with specialists 
(floor trading). In effect, the results of this action increased gaming risks around 
the opening price, spreads and volatility, and lowered market depth (in 
particular for floor trading). The rationale behind this case study relies on the 
assumption that limit order can be seen as an option at a specified price. 
Therefore, when limit orders are forced to interact with market orders on the 
same pre-trade information level, liquidity providers (informed traders) are 
less willing to provide ‘free options’ to market orders. This situation increases 
adverse selection effects. As a consequence, liquidity decreases, spreads widen, 
and price volatility soars. However, levelling the amount of information 
available to traders should also attract new investors to the table. 
Costs 
Revealing specific trading interests to the public on the limit order book 
may expose traders to unforeseen costs (exposure risk and market impact; 
Madhavan, 1995; Harris, 1997, 2002). Order exposure may be costly if the 
exposure (Harris, 1997): 
1)  Reveals traders’ motives; 
2)  Reveals the potential price impact of future trades; and  
3)  Reveals valuable trading options. 
Firstly, by revealing trader’s motives they will lose proprietary 
information on the real value of the share, so reducing time for defensive 
measures and exposing the trader to squeezers, who will be able to control the 
order flow. 
Secondly, orders exposure may attract parasitic traders,60 who profit 
anticipating large impact orders and taking liquidity on the order book before 
the large order is executed (front-running)61. In this way, large traders pay 
Exposure risk 
                                                      
59 In this the threshold of actual trading that seems tolerable is between 12% and 27%. Also in this case (as Buti et 
al., 2010), authors warn that this threshold may not be accurate and that more and better data should be made 
available to the market in order to further investigate these issues. 
60 Parasitic traders are a category of reactive traders (Harris, 1997), i.e. those who reply with trading in response to 
trading opportunities given by other traders. 
61 This practice is illegal if done by brokers on orders held on own account. In line with Recital 19, Directive 
2006/6/EC on market abuse (MAD). 40 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
more for providing liquidity (they will buy at a higher price).  
Thirdly, private information on exposure on the order book may lead 
traders to set limit orders just above the limit price of the big trader, in order to 
use it as stop loss if prices go down instead of up (they will sell to the large 
trader). The large trader therefore gives a ‘free’ valuable option to other traders 
(with some risk for the last ones, though). In addition, decreasing tick sizes may 
have led more orders to be hidden due to higher exposure risk, since orders 
may be more easily subject to legal front-running through smaller price unit 
changes. 
In conclusion, per-trade disclosure of information on highly illiquid 
products may affect the price formation process of other related financial 
instruments, or disclose private information that parties do not want to disclose 
as part of private negotiations.  
Conclusion # 2   
Pre-trade transparency is fundamental for trading venues and their trading structure, as well 
as for an efficient price discovery and a better implementation of best execution policies. It is 
also important to exempt some trading interests (e.g. block trades) from pre-trade 
transparency requirements, because – as mentioned above – this situation may otherwise 
have a negative impact on the market. The breadth of these exemptions is under debate and 
conflicting views emerge on several aspects, as explained in the following sections.  
 
Box 2. Defensive Strategies  
In order to manage exposure risks and besides the illegality of some of these practices, Harris 
(1997) categorised the potential defensive strategies that traders can pursue to reduce 
adverse effects of exposing trading interests. These strategies may be summarised as: 
a.  Evasive (retaining information); 
b.  Deceptive (confusing through the use of misleading information); and 
c.  Offensive (counter-attacking with opposite orders). 
Evasive strategies may use: i) multiple brokers; ii) anonymous/dark trading; iii) 
counterparty selection strategies (by the trader or the venue where the trader executes 
his/her orders); iv) slice and dice strategies (slicing orders); v) internal matching systems; vi) 
indications of interests (IoIs);62 vii) waiting strategies. 
Secondly, traders may disseminate inaccurate information through legal mechanisms 
such as: i) trading in the opposite direction of the big order that he/she tries to execute; ii) 
trading on a related market in order to divert market attention; iii) introducing and 
cancelling orders in order to create uncertainty around their trading interest; iv) introducing 
orders with lower size in order to create different expectations and get better terms. 
                                                      
62 An Indication of Interest (IoI) “is the name commonly used to refer to a message sent between investment firms 
to convey information about available trading interest. IOIs are also used by dark pools to attract order flow and 
to maximise trading opportunities by enabling investors to find the contra-side of orders. The information 
provided in an IOI can include the symbol of the security, the side (i.e. buy or sell) and volume/price of trading 
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Finally, traders may reduce their exposure by adopting offensive strategies to attack 
front-runners, by trading in the opposite direction and then removing the interest. 
4.2.1  Dark Liquidity 
 
Exposure risks and market depth (as above) may require the use of liquidity 
non pre-trade transparent (dark liquidity)63. In general, all trades are important 
for price formation as they form liquidity, even if they are not displayed. Dark 
liquidity – below a still unclear market share – may bring some beneficial 
effects to the whole market. Recent findings on hidden orders show that some 
opacity in the market improves liquidity in a centralised limit order book with 
no fragmentation (Moinas, 2010). It can be justified by the strong incentive for 
informed traders to sniff out where hidden liquidity sits on the lit book (De 
Winne & D’Hondt, 2007). Hidden orders stimulate informed traders to search 
for liquidity. In addition, if you expose those orders you may generate the 
effect of withdrawing liquidity from the market, so making it more subject to 
manipulation because much lower thickness and depth (‘thinner’). The 
presence of hidden orders, therefore, stimulates greater activity for liquidity 
demanders in order to find trading opportunities within the book. This is a 
major difference with stand-alone dark pools, which do not have direct 
liquidity links with the lit book (they do not hit the displayed limit order book). 
Setting the 
scene 
Why traders engage in dark trading has been already implicitly or 
explicitly mentioned, but the IOSCO (2010c) has recently listed the reasons in a 
consultation paper. They can be summarised as:  
1)  Avoiding private (or proprietary trading) information leakage;  
2)  Minimising market impact costs (information leakage and/or insufficient 
market depth); 
3)  Ensuring better order management (risks of being ‘picked-off’);  
4)  Avoiding also hidden orders as they may be sniffed out by sophisticated 
software;  
5)  Taking advantage of a price improvement; and 
6)  Minimising transaction costs. 
Purposes 
Size of non-pre-trade transparent liquidity is constantly growing across 
Europe (see Table 3) and currently represents 6.76% of total EEA trading (off 
and on-order book; see Table 4) and 10.86% of EEA trading on RMs, MTFs and 
Broker-dealer Crossing Systems (BCSs).  
Size 
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Table 4. Dark liquidity in the EU (% of total EEA trading)* 
  2009  2010 
  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1 
Dark Pools and 
Hidden Orders** 
4.71% 5.68%  5.6%  6.11%  5.26%^ 
Broker-dealer 
Crossing Systems 
0.9%  0.9%  0.9%  1.4%  1.5% 
  5.61% 6.58%  6.5%  7.51%  6.76% 
 
*Trading under waivers, % of EEA total trading. ^It does not include Poland. 
**Estimated market shares as % of EEA total trading, assuming a constant average market share 
of OTC trading of 38% in 2009 and Q1 2010 (CESR 2010b). 
Source: Authors’ calculation from CESR (2010b). 
 
 
Table 5. Dark liquidity in the EU (% of EEA RMs, MTFs and BCNs trading)* 
  2009  2010 
  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1 
Dark Pools and 
Hidden Orders 
7.6% 9.2%  9.0%  9.8%  8.5%^ 
Broker-dealer 
Crossing 
Systems** 
1.43%  1.43%  1.43%  2.21%  2.36% 
  9.03% 10.63% 10.43%  12.01%  10.86% 
 
* Trading under waivers, % of total EEA trading on RMs and MTFs. ^It does not include Poland. 
** Estimated market shares as % of total EEA trading on RMs, MTFs and BCNs, assuming a constant average 
market share of OTC trading of 38% over time (CESR 2010b). 
Source: Authors’ calculation from CESR (2010b). 
Different views emerge on where dark liquidity might be concentrated. 
Some authors argue that stocks with high volumes, high market depth and low 
volatility are mainly traded ‘dark’ (Degryse, et al., 2008; Buti et al., 2010b). 
Others (Ready, 2009) suggest that dark liquidity trading would be converging 
on stocks with high spread, in order to find a better deal on other venues. In 
effect, the idea is that – although high liquid shares may receive easy execution 
on dark pools – liquid shares will receive low execution costs on other venues 
as well, so the opportunity costs of trading on lit pools is very small. There are 
few incentives to look to other venues. With large spreads on lit books, instead, 
traders may search for other venues giving price improvements (Cheuvreux, 
2010). In the EU, this should be even truer as traders get at least the mid-point 
(but also a Volume Weighted Average Price, VWAP)64 from dark pools 
Externalities 
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applying the reference price waiver,65 while lit trading venues may offer very 
high bid/ask spreads on that specific product. Ready (2009) also suggests that 
institutional investors with big average positions and less turnover make more 
use of dark liquidity, in line with the theoretical framework.  
Dark liquidity may also generate negative externalities, in terms of 
liquidity fragmentation and order migration. In effect, adding a dark pool to a 
liquid market with OLOBs may lead orders to migrate towards this new pool 
(‘cream skimming’), which stimulates the arrival of new orders (with liquidity-
externality effects). The new environment seems to benefit institutional 
investors, but it may decrease the price discovery ability of retail ones, as they 
will not be able to see a part of the market (less efficient price discovery, Buti et 
al., 2010a). Authors find that overall the total welfare increases, but the 
distributional effects remain. Moreover, the abovementioned studies – even 
though with limited evidence – seem to convene that an excessive volume of 
dark liquidity may generate negative effects and market operators would not 
have incentives to reduce those effects once materialised. In effect, high 
network externalities and effects on revenues may push players to act as in a 
prisoner’s dilemma (bad equilibrium). There may be no incentive to cooperate 
when a damaging threshold is reached, even though the final outcome may not 
benefit any of the pools in the market. Therefore, regulators may need to 
monitor when the size of these liquidity pools is actually deteriorating market 
quality (mainly price formation and discovery processes). 
 
In order to increase the market quality of the liquidity pool, dark trading 
venues (dark MTFs/RMs) may adopt a non-binding indication of interests 
(IoIs) messaging system. This system is typically designed to attract liquidity, 
through giving access to privileged private information on trading interests, 
including size, price (or a targeted weighted average price), buy or sell, and 
often the symbol of the security. IoIs are typically sent to some traders on a 
discriminatory basis. Therefore, those investors may benefit from the network 
of dark pools without competing for liquidity with other traders.  
Some market operators argue that this might be an elegant way to 
circumvent the public pre-trade disclosure of quotes, discriminating potential 
investors who might be interested. At the same time, disclosure of IoIs does not 
bind the counterparty to conclude the trade. On the one hand, a non-binding 
IoIs messaging system may increase legal uncertainty by stimulating 
expectations (inefficient commitment) about the stipulation of the contract 
(trade). On the other hand, MiFID recognises the importance of non-
discriminatory access to order information on trading venues (RMs/MTFs) in 
addition to the overarching objective for organised trading venues (as defined 
by CESR, 2010g) to comply with pre-trade transparency requirements. 
Therefore, CESR (2010b) considers the provision of private valuable order 
information on a discriminatory basis as a violation of MiFID principles 
(unfair), in line with the SEC (2009). However, the Committee did recognise the 
role of IoIs in the OTC trading if finalised to find selected counterparties to a 
large order waiting for execution. This practice was already widely in use 
before the implementation of MiFID. 
IoIs 
Dark liquidity can sit on official trading venues, both MiFID-compliant  OTC trading 
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and over-the counter. MiFID recognises the importance of OTC trading (Recital 
5366) as part of the general freedom of investors (shareholders) and legal 
entities to trade shares privately – if specific circumstances are met. It also 
acknowledges that OTC trading can promote the smooth operation of financial 
markets by providing in some instances better investment services outside 
MiFID official venues. There are conflicting views on the actual size of OTC 
trading (in terms of price forming trading), which the report will consider in 
the next sections.67 CESR estimated OTC trading as 38% of trading in the EEA. 
However, as CESR itself stated (2010b, p. 35), this data may be inflated by 
double counting and misreporting, hence lack of quality and accuracy urges 
actions to reduce inconsistencies and increase granularity. 
4.2.2  Pre-trade transparency waivers: where do we stand? 
 
Pre-trade transparency obligations are placed on both RMs and MTFs by MiFID 
for shares listed on regulated markets (for SIs a specific system of quotes 
publication applies)68. The Directive, however, acknowledges the risk of market 
impact caused by transparency obligations for certain types of orders and 
trading venues. In response to this, regulators have introduced a list of 
exemptions in specific cases. In particular, MiFID recognises pre-trade 
transparency waivers for market models and for orders of a certain type or size. 
However, dark trading may deteriorate market quality if it reaches an 
undefined overall size. Empirical evidence does not provide a clear answer – 
either on whether a threshold for dark liquidity and waivers would capture the 
critical point – or on where this overall threshold should be placed, whether by 
regulators or the market. Therefore, waivers of pre-trade transparency should 
be constantly monitored and updated as soon as market developments make it 
necessary. CESR (2010b) is thus proposing a more rule-based approach, with 
ESMA defining binding technical standards and ongoing supervision in line 
with the new powers as new European authority.69 
According to MiFID,70 there are four kind of waivers:  
1)  Reference price;71 
2)  Large in-scale orders (LISO);72 
Definition 
                                                      
66 “It is not the intention of this Directive to require the application of pre-trade transparency rules to transactions 
carried out on an OTC basis, the characteristics of which include that they are ad-hoc and irregular and are 
carried out with wholesale counterparties and are part of a business relationship which is itself characterised by 
dealings above standard market size, and where the deals are carried out outside the systems usually used by the 
firm concerned for its business as a systematic internaliser.”, Recital 53, MiFID. For more details about OTC 
trading venues, please see Section 5.4. 
67 For a more detailed discussion, see Section 4.4. 
68 In particular, SIs should publish quotes for liquid shares if executed orders are below the Standard Market Size 
(SMS); Art. 27, MiFID; Art. 21-25, Implementing Regulation. 
69 Art. 6 (1) (a), (2) (a), Art. 7 and 7e, adopted position at first reading by European Parliament on 22 September 
2010, (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2010-0339+0+DOC 
+XML+V0//EN#title3). 
70 For a detailed overview of the MiFID waivers (with examples), see CESR (2010e) and Moloney, N. (2008), pp. 
826-830. 
71 Art. 18.1 (a), Implementing Regulation. This waiver applies to trades that are crossed at a price generated by 
another trading venue. In this case, the trading venue uses prices of more liquid pools of liquidity in order to 
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3)  Negotiated trades;73 and  
4)  Order management facility.74 
Those waivers serve multiple functions:  
i)  Stimulating price competition (improvements) and containing 
information leakage (reference price);  
ii)  Protecting orders from market impact (LISO); and 
iii)  Ensuring the smooth functioning of capital markets and execution 
services (negotiated trades and order management facility).  
Overall, waivers aim at reducing the exposure risks that may affect 
market quality and integrity. Well-functioning financial markets allow the 
efficient allocation of resources and thus the increase of total welfare for all end 
investors. 
The reference price waiver applies to RMs and MTFs given the 
importance of alternative dark trading venues, when it comes to competition 
on trading costs and potential price improvements. Those venues are typically 
MTFs that try to offer protection from information leakage and market impact 
at competing prices, with no price discovery (passive pricing system). 
European trading under reference price waivers has been estimated around €25 
billion in the Q1 of 2010, 5 times more than in the same period of 2009, but only 
accounting for 1% of total trading on RMs and MTFs (see Figure 10). As 
abovementioned, the presence of alternative dark venues can improve market 
quality and stimulates new flows of liquidity with beneficial impact on 
investors’ choice and competitiveness of trading venues. This waiver is 
designed for venues willing to offer lower trading costs and potentially price 
improvements in relation to the ‘referenced’ venue. Orders should be executed 
at mid-point of the bid/ask spread of the primary market or at mid-point or 
best bid or best ask of the European Best Bid and Offer (EBBO), as currently 
established by CESR (2010e). However, market participants have conflicting 
views on this issue. They are split between those who would set a specific 
threshold (individual/aggregated) for orders size that use this waiver or 
capping the volumes regarding trading under waivers), and those who would 
leave to the market the decision on how many trading venues should use this 
waiver with the obligation for these venues to provide price improvements in 
exchange for the waiver. 
Reference price 
The former group, in effect, implicitly proposes to set a threshold (e.g. a 
percent of Large-In-Scale Orders;75 Fleuriot, 2010) that de facto makes this 
Market views 
                                                                                                                                                                      
72 Art. 20, Implementing Regulation. The waiver applies to orders equal or above a minimum size specified in 
Table 2, Annex 2, Implementing Regulation. The calculation of the ‘normal market size’ should be made using the 
average daily turnover, which shall be calculated as defined by Art. 33, Implementing Regulation. CESR (2010e), 
p. 17. 
73 Art. 18.1 (b), Implementing Regulation. Specific conditions apply to negotiated trades that avoid pre-trade 
market transparency as they are subject to different conditions than ones currently offered on public markets. 
CESR (2010e), p. 11. 
74 Art. 18.2, Implementing Regulation. This waiver applies to orders held in an order management facility (or 
‘Reserve’) run by regulated markets or MTFs, which have the potential to be introduced in the order book to be 
executed – for instance – against incoming aggressive orders. CESR (2010e), p. 14. 
75 As defined by Table 2, Annex II, MiFID Implementing Regulation; for the purpose of determining the size of 
large-in-scale orders, the average daily turnover is defined by Art.33, Implementing Regulation. 46 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
waiver available only to a type of orders (large ones) disregarding the type of 
trading system (as also pointed out by some CESR members; CESR 2010b). In 
their view, MiFID foresaw waivers to limit market impact of large orders and 
price hence should be limited to the mid-point as only at that point of the 
spread would justify those orders not to contribute to the price formation 
process. Against this view, other market participants argued that this waiver 
was originally designed to favour competition on explicit and implicit trading 
costs between dark and lit books. In their view, therefore, these venues should 
be allowed to match orders within the spread of primary markets or EBBO, 
with the guarantee of a price improvement. It is important to ensure a price 
improvement when the price comes from another system. A limitation based 
on size of orders – in their view – would harm the market, as no longer small or 
‘child’ orders (of large ‘parent’ orders76) will be traded ‘dark’, with no 
protection from information leakage and so exposure risks. In addition, this 
waiver currently captures only a small fraction of the market (1%).  
Figure 10. Current use of waivers 
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The Large-In-Scale Order (LISO) waiver applies to orders that are bigger 
than special thresholds set by MiFID for each defined liquidity band (average 
daily order book turnover, ‘ADT’).77 It tries to soften the exposure risk of large 
orders, which may generate market impact. It is largely used by MTFs and RMs 
(for their hidden orders pools). As suggested by the literature review above, 
hidden orders increase the quality of lit books as they attract liquidity from 
large traders and informed traders, who try to act more aggressively in order to 
capture this new liquidity flow. Therefore, in order to ensure high market 
q u a l i t y ,  t h e  L I S O  w a i v e r  s h o u l d  w o r k  p r o p e r l y  a n d  b e  a b l e  t o  c a p t u r e  
fundamental liquidity in capital markets.  
LISO 
Market participants’ views are here again conflicting, and include those 
who would reduce the threshold given that the average size of orders is 
Market 
views 
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constantly dropping78 and those who fear inflating ‘dark markets’ at the benefit 
of a small part of the market that makes large use of this waiver, while 
eventually deteriorating market quality. The former group claims the 
importance of applying the waiver in a consistent and efficient manner. As 
recently estimated on the UK market (LSE Group, 2010), the difference between 
the standard market size (SMS)79 and the LISO thresholds is on average 44 
times larger (with high volatility within the basket of most liquid stocks). In 
addition, from these calculations emerge that by reducing the LISO size on the 
FTSE 100 by 75% instead of the 25% proposed by CESR, the capacity of the 
value of orders that may qualify for the LISO waiver would reach almost 2% 
(circa 17% for the small and mid cap index). Data show how the high 
variability of the LIS threshold generally depends on the trading venue 
characteristics and size. This would suggest that deciding the LIS size by 
liquidity bands may be correct but the current thresholds set by each bands 
may not reflect the changes in the standard market size, which has been 
gradually going down in the last years (in particular, with the introduction of 
MiFID). Therefore, this part of the market is asking for a review of the LIS 
thresholds and a consistent reduction in order to allow lit order books (in 
particular, those ones using hidden orders facilities) to compete more 
efficiently especially with dark MTFs.  
The latter group, instead, believes that current thresholds are sufficient 
and that a reduction would increase the size of non-displayed trading and 
liquidity fragmentation, ultimately hampering the price discovery process. 
Small investors claim that the reduction of the average size of orders has been 
mainly caused by trading methodologies of intermediaries, so a reduction of 
the LIS may only benefit them, with unclear effects on end investors. In their 
view, the size of small end investors’ orders has not decreased; therefore the 
way how intermediaries handle them should not affect in any case the way 
how end investors decide their investments.  
CESR also discussed the treatment of residual LIS orders (so-called 
‘stubs’), with no final answer but a majority of its members agreed that stubs 
may need to become lit to avoid distorting price formation (CESR, 2010b). In 
their view, this will not have the same market impact. However, other 
members of CESR and some market participants have highlighted that the 
immediate publication of stubs may reveal the original size of the large order or 
leak private information on the handling of these trades (especially if the 
execution is not completed yet), leading to stubs not being executed at all. If a 
stub is modified by the trader, market participants generally agree that the LIS 
waiver should not apply. 
Stubs 
The negotiated trade waiver is typically used for transactions bilaterally 
negotiated with other parties, so not accessible to other members on RMs and 
MTFs. A protection from pre-trade transparency would here enable 
intermediaries to provide best execution (CESR, 2010b) and give the 
opportunity to investors to exercise their contractual power. Applying pre-
trade transparency requirements to these trades may deceive price discovery 
Negoti
ated trades 
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processes since economic terms of the execution are the result of specific 
conditions that do not reflect current market prices. Moreover, the waiver aims 
at avoiding some trades destabilising displayed continuous trading systems 
due to their systemic importance. In Q1 2010, those trades were 3.7% of EEA 
trading on RMs and MTFs, with a stable trend from 2008. From an economic 
and financial standpoint, negotiated trades are very similar to OTC trades, as 
‘upstairs trading’.80 The main difference is that an OTC trade carries best 
execution duties, since it is executed through a broker-dealer (execution on 
behalf of the client), while negotiated trades do not benefit of best execution 
duties since they are the result of ‘face-to-face’ or ‘back-to-back’ transactions.  
There is widespread agreement that this waiver should be retained. It 
plays a crucial role in reducing systemic risk of OTC trades that cannot be 
executed on a central trading mechanism. It is also used when principal 
transactions (back-to-back) are not subject to current market price but to a 
principal Volume Weighted Average Price (VWAP; CESR, 2010b). Some market 
participants believe that this waiver should be extended also to RMs and MTFs 
that do not offer a displayed order book or continuous trading.  
Market 
views 
Turning onto the order management facility waiver, there is widespread 
agreement that this waiver should be kept with no major changes. It allows 
better management of orders kept in ‘reserves’ (e.g. iceberg orders) in order to 
be used whenever the market would be under stress due to several aggressive 
orders hitting the book at that moment. The waiver therefore allows a more 
efficient execution service, attracting more liquidity through brokers. CESR 
(2010b) clarified that differences between RMs/MTFs and brokers applying this 
waiver should remain, as they perform two different functions in financial 
markets.  
 
Conclusion # 3   
Under certain conditions, pre-trade transparency may impair market liquidity. Hence, 
MiFID introduced waivers, which should be retained. A move towards a more rule-based 
approach should be balanced with flexible application and ongoing supervision in order to 
meet market needs. However, conflicting views between Members emerge when discussing 
the breadth of these exemptions. In effect, thresholds may need to be revised regularly, in 
line with latest market developments. However, conflicting views between members emerge 
when discussing the breadth of these exemptions. More specifically, regulators need to carve 
out a new set of rules that promote the smooth functioning of capital markets and meet 
investors’ needs with no adverse impact on market structure, which may ultimately affect 
market liquidity, efficiency and investor confidence. Consistent and uniform application 
across Europe should be ensured.  
4.2.3  A consolidated quote system 
 
The market entry of several trading venues in the last three years raised 
concerns around the availability of pre-trade transparency data across venues. 
The difficulty faced by investors, retail in particular, to access pre-trade 
consolidated data solutions and a pan-European best bid and offer (EBBO) may 
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pose a potential obstacle to the creation of a competitive pan-European market. 
The provision of consolidated quote solutions would improve investors’ choice 
and increase competition between trading venues on spreads, with the 
possibility for liquidity providers to compete in a truly transparent 
environment. In effect, if investors are able to see the best price across trading 
venues, they may be able to push intermediaries to bridge links with these 
infrastructures offering better deals. Obstacles to cheaper and more easily 
accessible consolidated quote solutions are in general the same as currently 
experienced by the post-trade transparency space (see next section). Once these 
barriers are removed, markets would be able to offer new data consolidation 
services and to meet investors’ needs.  
Conclusion # 4   
Despite the importance of a consolidated quotation system, priority should be given to the 
removal of relevant impediments to widespread use of consolidated post-trade data 
solutions. In particular, it is important to improve investors’ access to both pre- and post-
trade data solutions, in order to transform fragmentation into beneficial competition for end 
investors. Data accessibility to regulated and OTC venues is key for data consolidation. 
4.3  What pre-trade transparency for non-equity instruments? 
 
Recital 46, MiFID, gives the faculty to member states to broaden the 
transparency regime to financial instruments other than shares. Only two 
member states have exercised this option and extended this regime to bond 
markets (Italy and Sweden).  
There are two main reasons why this option has not been widely 
exercised: i) non-equity markets81 have a different market microstructure from 
equity markets and trading mechanisms are designed to enhance resilience in 
case of liquidity issues; ii) A general possibility to opt in may not give enough 
incentives for member states to exercise the option, thereby pushing them to 
behave strategically. In effect, the latter represents a typical prisoner’s dilemma. 
Member states have no incentives to ‘behave cooperatively’. If they deviate 
from their current application of MiFID, they may put their markets at a 
disadvantage, in particular if they impose stricter requirements for non-equity 
instruments. 
Recital 46 
Non-equity markets, moreover, have different trading mechanisms. 
Trades are typically dealt with a quote-driven dealer system or bilateral 
negotiations with the support of an intermediary. Most transactions are 
arranged via a dealer. Trading can be continuous or periodic and dealers 
typically have an informational advantage over investors as intermediaries. 
Accordingly, market-makers move first and propose price schedules. 
Therefore, equilibrium may be found in dealer markets (with one specialist or 
Dealer markets 
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derivatives; e) Equity derivatives; f) Foreign exchange derivatives; g) Commodity derivatives. Other non-equity 
financial instruments that should be considered are sovereign and local authorities bonds, and equity-like 
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competing market-makers), since they are more resilient and efficient as long as 
the market is not too big and the information asymmetry not too large (Glosten, 
1989; O’Hara, 1995). Dealer markets are hence designed to deal with less-liquid 
markets, only if this ‘low liquidity condition’ is verified. Dealer markets, in 
general, can:  
1)  Provide stronger protection against exposure risks (Pagano-Roell, 1993);  
2)  Reduce information leakage; 
3)  Reduce costs for uninformed traders (if they have contractual power due 
to the market illiquidity or competition in the dealer market); and 
4)  Better price if dealers can exploit private information and investors can 
control their fair use (Madhavan, 1995). 
There are other two specific reasons why most non-equity products, even 
less complex ones, are currently traded in quote-driven markets, with a strong 
dealership: 
i)  Structure of the demand; and 
ii)  Structure of the intermediation. 
Firstly, demand for such products comes mainly from institutional 
investors and other dealers, since retail participation remains highly costly in 
terms of cost and lack of sufficient knowledge. The nature of clients, and the 
complexity, heterogeneity and large size of non-equity financial instruments 
affect market structure and thus the prices of financial instruments. In dealer 
markets, institutional investors can exploit their contractual power and 
customise their transactions more than in a non-discriminatory and open 
market setting (Biais & Green, 2007). Moreover, dealers can have more control 
of their risk positions when they deal with few market operators and 
exposures. 
Secondly, the structure of the intermediation favours certain market 
developments. In effect, the amount of capital committed to intermediation by 
dealers may affect per se the choice of a specific level of transparency. If dealers 
act as a principal in the transaction, on the one hand, there is more chance to 
create a market for illiquid products by selling them direct to investors, but – 
on the other hand – financial products will sit on dealers’ balance sheets, with 
inventory positions that need some protection from market impact through less 
public disclosure, in order to be still able to act as intermediary. Then, if dealers 
only act as broker-agents, on the one side, there will be less capital committed 
a n d  t h u s  l e s s  n e e d  f o r  p r o t e c t i o n  f r o m  m a r k e t  i m p a c t  a n d  m o r e  p u b l i c  
disclosure. But, on the other side, illiquid products may not receive execution 
due to insufficient demand. The complex nature of modern financial markets 
and economies requires intermediaries to provide clients with more tailored 
and sophisticated products and services, which may often be traded only in 
specific market settings and with limited public disclosure. The use of 
electronic multi-dealer platforms has surely increased competition between 
dealers, who compete with executable quotes, and extended market 
accessibility to a wider set of investors who qualify as ‘members’ (typically only 
brokers or institutional investors). A strong push towards pre-trade public 
disclosure may require a rethinking of current market structure and 
intermediation of less-liquid asset classes (such as some categories of bonds, 
OTC derivatives and structured products), which may anyway lack price 
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(CESR, 2009).  
Greater pre-trade transparency can indeed reduce search costs and 
enhance price discovery processes as long as all relevant investors can easily 
access these markets and dealers are not damaged by information revelation. 
Flood et al. (1999) found that in a dealer market opening spreads would be 
wider and trading volume lower, but price discovery should be faster since 
traders would behave more aggressively in order to find liquidity. Other 
authors therefore find a negative trade-off between liquidity and price 
efficiency if transparency varies. Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999) did not find any 
relevant impact of pre-trade transparency requirements on dealer markets. 
Greater transparency, on the one side, may reduce the informational advantage 
that dealers exploit in exchange for the provision of liquidity and introduce 
uncertainty in bilateral negotiations. The nature of the counterparty, for 
instance, is usually included in the calculation of the price offered by dealers, 
which cannot usually be estimated without an explicit request from the client. 
On the other hand, however, the absence of pre-trade information may keep 
the price discovery process for non-equity products very costly and therefore 
inefficient, and it may promote a market setting with low competition. 
For all these reasons, a pre-trade transparency regime for non-equity 
financial instruments should be designed in a different way from auction 
order-driven markets or quote-driven dealer markets (duly adapted and 
proportionate). In this regard, MiFID pre-trade transparency requirements 
cannot be transposed as they now stand in order to prevent unintended 
consequences on the incentives of dealers to provide liquidity through the use 
of private information. In effect, pre-trade transparency may improve search 
liquidity, since pre-trade information is asset-specific and helps to reduce 
search costs and uncertainty around them, even in dealer markets (Laganá et 
al., 2006). However, a pre-trade transparency regime could be effective, 
depending on the number of potential counterparties that can offer that 
tailored product and on the level of exposure of dealers’ inventory positions to 
the market, since trade size is typically far higher than the retail one. This leads 
dealers to offer executable quotes only on electronic platforms where liquidity 
is selected and accessible to members meeting certain requirements. On 
platforms where traded products are commonly accessed by retail investors, it 
would be easier to implement general pre-trade transparency requirements as 
long as the demand is very high, which may not be the case for complex non-
equity products. Current market microstructure makes public disclosure of 
executable quotes difficult and costly (Biais et al., 2006). Also, many non-equity 
products are highly customised, so pre-trade transparency might be of little 
help. The greater concern is liquidity, which is to find a dealer that can tailor a 
transaction around the client’s needs. If transparency requirements reduce 
market makers’ returns, they may ultimately confine their activities to those 
products that are inherently more liquid, exiting markets for less-liquid ones. 
Pre-trade transparency for complex non-equity products could only work by 
changing the way how these instruments are actually traded towards open 
limit order books. To achieve this, the nature of the demand needs to be 
constant and sufficiently high over time. 
Benefits and 
costs 
The Commission (2010b, p. 28) has finally proposed that investment firms 
willing to quote or receive a request for quote (RFQ, probably run on organised 
trading facilities) would be requested to publish price and volume available to 
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the public, and eventually commit to it for sizes below a certain threshold 
(retail size). The threshold will be specified per asset class. 
Conclusion # 5   
A strong push towards more pre-trade public disclosure would require, in some cases, 
a rethink of the current market structure for less-liquid asset classes, and a shift from its 
mainly institutional demand to a more retail and smaller professional one. Conflicting views 
in this area emerge around what should be the most efficient market structure for these 
products. Liquidity in non-equity markets, such as markets for bonds, derivatives and 
structured products, is currently handled through quote-driven auction markets, inter-dealer 
platforms or bilateral negotiations led by dealers’ capital commitment. For auction markets, 
whether led by dealers/market-makers (quote-driven) or directly by demand (order-driven), 
pre-trade transparency is urgently needed. For inter-dealer platforms (request-for-quotes 
model) or bilateral negotiations, where dealers commit capital by being non-neutral 
counterparty, less pre-trade transparency than order-driven ones (e.g. equity) is needed to 
function properly. Executable prices might thus not always be consistently available. The 
alternative to a shift in market structure and in demand, which may not necessarily occur, is 
to design a different transparency regime from the one applied to equities. In general, pre-
trade transparency may not be of any help to the market if it does not serve price discovery 
of investors. For markets in which the demand is more retail-driven, the need to have greater 
pre-trade transparency will be higher as it will noticeably reduce search costs. However, an 
appropriate level of pre-trade transparency may be beneficial for non-auction markets as 
well, as it may reduce investors’ search costs and promote greater competition between 
dealers. Some market participants consider that currently available pre-trade data is 
sufficient and legal requirements are not needed, since non-equity markets do not 
necessarily function as equity markets and current transparency have not limited 
participation to these markets.82 Others instead (and CESR, 2010f) believe, however, that an 
ad hoc pre-trade transparency regime (with waivers) should apply for non-equity products 
(in particular, bonds) listed on RMs or MTFs. Access to this information should be made 
easier for retail investors.  
Conflicting views also emerge as to how to design the transparency regime. Many 
believe that preference should be given to the nature of the market rather than the nature of 
investors (retail versus wholesale). For financial instruments mainly traded over-the-counter 
on a bilateral basis, the introduction of any pre-trade transparency regime must prioritise the 
avoidance of adverse liquidity consequences for involved counterparties and systemic risk. 
4.4  Post-trade transparency regime: Fixing ‘bugs’ and extending 
scope 
 
Transparency may take on different forms and dimensions, according to the 
mechanisms underpinning market microstructure and investors’ needs. In 
conjunction with a pre-trade transparency regime, MiFID established a regime 
of post-trade transparency, which applies to all shares admitted to trading on a 
Definition 
                                                      
82 For instance, AFME’s www.investinginbondseurope.org provides pre-trade non-executable price on more than 
1,500 bonds (government, sub-government and corporate), which may help end-investors find the best price for 
the financial product they are willing to purchase. Regarding OTC derivatives, Markit publishes intraday 
indicative CDS prices for instance (http://www.markit.com/cds/cds-page.html) and Bloomberg, Reuters, and 
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regulated market, wherever they are actually traded.  
Post-trade transparency is particularly important to preserve market 
integrity through the indirect control of market participants upon competing 
investors (discouraging insider trading). The regime also supports price 
formation processes since it reduces informational gaps and investors’ search 
costs, with overall price efficiency gains, also for quote-driven markets (Flood 
et al., 1997; Bloomfield & O’Hara, 1999). Accordingly, trade disclosure may 
reduce adverse selection and increase the market’s reputational capital, as the 
market will be less open to manipulation (Chowdry & Nanda, 1991). Market 
participants may thus develop better services and provide best execution at a 
lower transaction cost, in particular 
Benefits 
However, while transparency is certainly instrumental to promoting 
liquidity in order-driven markets (e.g. cash equities) if calibrated with delays 
for large transactions, quote-driven and dealership markets may suffer from a 
strict trade disclosure regime (e.g. OTC derivatives). Dealers may no longer 
benefit from their informational advantage and may thus be subject to 
exposure risks83 and inventory risks,84 since they need to manage large amounts 
of their own capital in related instruments. Therefore, they may commit less 
capital to the market and reduce their willingness to bear risk, thereby reducing 
liquidity (Madhavan, 1995, 1996; Hendershott et al., 2007). Increased exposure 
risk also means that uninformed investors may benefit from greater 
transparency, with potential effects on market liquidity, however (Pagano & 
Roëll, 1996). Moreover, the disclosure of trade information (e.g. price) under 
specific bilateral agreements may deceive the price formation mechanisms and 
asset price valuation, as the price is the result of non-replicable market 
conditions. Finally, Kovtunenko (2002) argues that – with full post-trade 
transparency, that is signalling the size of the uninformed demand and 
observing other dealers’ quotes – dealers can act strategically to control the 
level of spreads as the size of uninformed demand varies, and punish those 
who deviate from a collusive equilibrium (through a price war).  
Costs 
Overall, transparency does not necessarily smooth liquidity issues away, 
especially in quote-driven markets. Strict transparency requirements may 
create a shift in market microstructure towards a trading mechanism with less 
active participation of dealers and without necessarily setting off a more active 
participation of other investors. In effect, the literature has tried to shed light on 
the role of transparency in micro-structural processes, but without success. For 
instance, there is no clear answer as to the cause of past changes in the bond 
market microstructure; it is uncertain whether lower transparency was the 
cause or the effect of that structural change (Biais & Green, 2007). In coming 
years, aware of potential side effects, policy-makers will need to decide 
whether they want stricter transparency requirements to promote access by 
small professional and retail investors or more complex (not necessarily riskier) 
financial instruments. There is a trade-off between enhancing investor 
confidence and disclosure costs. Changes here may modify the market 
structure, not always with beneficial effects. 
Microstructure 
The recent financial crisis has added a further dimension to transparency,  Systemic risk 
                                                      
83 As illustrated in Section 4.2. 
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which refers to monitoring and controlling macro-prudential risks by 
competent authorities in specific markets for financial stability purposes (e.g. 
OTC derivatives) through the use of aggregate data on exposures in single or 
multiple financial instruments (FSB, 2010). These data are increasingly 
available, typically through the establishment of dedicated trade repositories 
per asset class. The need to control systemic risk (and minimise spill-over 
effects) by macro regulators has exercised some pressure to increase the overall 
transparency of financial markets. This has occurred even in segments where 
transparency was previously limited, due to a microstructure based on the role 
of dealers and bilateral over-the-counter transactions.  
Box 3. Transaction reporting: current regime and CESR’s proposals 
Post-trade disclosure enables regulators to preserve market integrity and surveillance across 
several trading venues by detecting transactions that may breach market abuse rules, or 
represent other breaches of MiFID requirements. MiFID introduced a regime of transaction 
reporting (Art. 25)85 and cooperation between major financial authorities (Art. 58) that allows 
regulators to confidentially access information concerning transactions executed in any 
financial instrument admitted to trading on regulated markets. Both CESR and the 
Commission proposed to extend the scope to also cover financial instruments admitted to 
trading only on MTFs and organised trading facilities (OTFs; Commission, 2010b, p. 46). The 
report can be sent to the competent authority by the investment firms, by a third party on 
their behalf, by an approved trade-reporting system or by the regulated market or MTF; and 
it shall be delivered by the close of business the following day. The competent authority may 
request additional requirements in ‘exceptional circumstances’.86 Data on transactions should 
be stored for at least five years and ongoing reporting should meet specific criteria, including 
details on names, dates, times, quantity, prices and codes to identify parties and venues.87 
Reports should be sent to the competent authority no later than the following working day 
after the execution of the transaction. Transaction refers to ‘any agreement concluded with a 
counterparty to buy or sell one or more financial instruments’ (EU COM, 2010b, p. 47).  
CESR has currently proposed amendments to the transaction reporting regime.88 First, 
the Committee has proposed to add a third trading capacity to transaction reports (in 
addition to ‘principal on own account’ and ‘agent’), the so-called ‘risk-less principal’, which 
consists of the investment firm acting on its own account and on behalf of the client (client 
facilitator). This scenario would simplify the harmonisation of current transaction reporting 
standards across Europe.89 The immediate implementation of this proposal raises some 
concerns since automated reporting systems would need to be changed accordingly. 
Secondly, CESR advanced a proposal to mandate the collection of client identifiers by 
competent authorities, increase their standardisation, and include client IDs when 
investment firms transmit orders for execution.90 On the latter, the Directive requires 
reporting of executed transactions, which may not necessarily require the disclosure of the 
                                                      
85 In conjunction with Art. 9-16, Implementing Regulation. 
86 Art. 4, Implementing Directive. 
87 Art. 13 & Table 1 Annex I, Implementing Directive. 
88 See, in general, CESR (2010a). 
89 For instance, in some countries (such as the UK) the category of riskless principal is already present in the 
transaction reporting regime. 
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clients’ ID if the order is executed by an investment firm other than the one that received the 
order execution.91  
The Committee then suggested extending transaction reporting to members of RMs, 
MTFs and OTFs that are not authorised as investment firms (e.g. market-makers) since they 
fall outside MiFID (assuming they do not provide investment services). Trading activities of 
non-members also contribute to price formation and leaving them out of the sight of 
regulators’ may undermine the market monitoring function of national competent 
authorities. Alternatively, transaction reporting obligations could be imposed on RMs, MTFs 
or OTFs which have admitted these firms as a member, but these obligations would just shift 
the reporting responsibility on subjects that do not have direct control of this confidential 
information. Reporting may thus be inaccurate for supervisory purposes.  
In conclusion, the Commission (2010b, p. 49) to modify the reporting channels as 
defined by MiFID, in line with the CESR advice. In particular, the Commission will assess: 1) 
the viability of a consolidated European reporting mechanism to which investment firms will 
report directly and competent authorities will have direct access; 2) third party reporting 
firm should be approved as ‘Approved Reporting Mechanisms’ (ARM); 3) waiving reporting 
transactions if they have already been reported to trade repositories or approved by a 
competent authority, such as ARM. In line with the trade reporting system of consolidation, 
the proposal would establish a European consolidator run most probably by ESMA, which 
will work across asset classes. For trade reporting (public disclosure), instead, the system of 
data consolidation will need to treat different asset classes with separate tapes. Investors, 
therefore, will be able to subscribe to the data solution that fits their needs at competitive 
costs.  
 
Conclusion # 6   
Overall, post-trade transparency serves various important functions in financial markets, 
such as improving price formation and market integrity. In effect, trade disclosure may 
stimulate self-designed market surveillance and increase visibility at the same time as market 
liquidity, thus increasing investors’ confidence and promoting price discovery. However – as 
illustrated in the following sections – there is a need for regulatory actions in certain areas, 
not only as a result of the recent financial crisis but also of the experience gained since the 
transposition of the Directive. Transparency is not panacea for market failure, though, and 
interventions should be proportional to the market structure and dynamics through which 
investors’ orders find their market-clearing price. Ill-defined transparency requirements 
would harm market efficiency in less-liquid markets with no increase of investor protection 
or reduction of systemic risk, as the market would become less-liquid and more volatile.  
Finally – in order to reduce the risk of manipulation on less-liquid ‘thinner’ markets 
and improve market integrity and surveillance – it would be appropriate to extend the scope 
of the transaction reporting regime run by regulators to all financial instruments admitted to 
trading on MiFID-official venues, with no distinction between instruments listed on 
regulated markets, multilateral trading facilities or organised trading facilities. Nevertheless, 
this work needs to be coordinated with other initiatives at EU level, such as the review of the 
Market Abuse Directive, and with a thorough cost-benefit analysis. In effect, the extension 
                                                      
91 Following Art. 5, Implementing Regulation - for the purpose of the transaction regime – ‘transaction’ represents 
“the purchase securities financing transactions, the exercise of options or of covered warrants, and primary 
market transactions (such as issuance, allotment or subscription) in financial instruments falling within Article 
4(1)(18)(a) and (b) of Directive 2004/39/EC.”  56 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
would help the harmonisation of transaction reporting regimes and supervisory practices 
across Europe.  
4.4.1  The trade reporting regime for shares 
 
MiFID set out a trade disclosure regime (Art. 28-30 and 45, MiFID) that covers 
all shares admitted to trading on RMs, irrespective of where those shares are 
actually traded (in RMs themselves, MTFs, SIs or OTC). Therefore, MiFID 
extended post-trade transparency requirements to shares traded on new 
trading platforms and for the first time over-the-counter. Some member states 
had no transparency requirements for OTC trades in shares before the Directive 
came into force (e.g. Germany). In terms of scope, while for ‘equity-like’ 
instruments an extension of the current regime for shares is broadly favoured, 
the picture is less clear for instruments other than shares (CESR, 2010b).  
Scope 
Reports of completed trades should include information on trading day, 
time, instrument identification, price, quantity and venue.92 Publication should 
be made “as close to real time as possible”, but “in any case within three 
minutes of the relevant transaction”.93 Deferral to official time publication can 
be granted for large transactions,94 as a waiver to pre-trade transparency, in 
particular to afford liquidity providers enough time to unwind inventory 
positions before investors become aware of them. In this regard, CESR has 
proposed to raise the thresholds for delayed publication and reduce the 
maximum granted delay to the end of the trading day. The latter is currently 
set to three trading days after the trade execution (Table 4, Annex II, Impl. 
Reg.).95 
Content and 
publication 
time 
Conclusion # 7   
The extension of public disclosure requirements (trade reporting) to equity-like instruments 
and to shares admitted to trading only on MTFs or organised trading facilities would help 
harmonise requirements among financial instruments that serve similar purposes. For 
financial instruments other than shares and equity-like instruments, the mere extension 
would most likely generate inconsistencies with the very nature of these financial 
instruments (see following sections). 
In terms of time limits for trade reporting, new technologies can help reduce delays. 
The industry is working to make all market data that are not subject to delays freely 
available after 15 minutes, in line with ESMA’s recommendation. However, reducing the 
maximum allowed delay from three minutes to one may prove immaterial since this delay 
cannot be exploited by trading platforms in favour of their members. In addition, trades may 
be affected by technical delays (latency issues) that ultimately affect all market participants. 
In any case, the legal obligation is to report ‘as close to real time as possible’ and should be 
duly enforced. Delays should be allowed in specific circumstances, with appropriate 
calibration for trades done at the end of the day. Current proposals should be further 
                                                      
92 Art. 27, Annex I Table 1, Implementing Regulation. 
93 Art. 29, Implementing Regulation. The three-minute buffer, however, should be only used if it is not technically 
possible to publish this data in real time. See Recital 18, Implementing regulation. CESR has recently proposed to 
reduce this buffer to 1 minute. 
94 Art. 28 and Table 4 in Annex II, Implementing Regulation. 
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evaluated since they may affect risk positions, with potential adverse consequences on the 
market.96 
4.4.2  Challenges with data consolidation 
 
New trading venues have entered the market to offer execution services on 
shares across Europe, increasing market fragmentation. MiFID’s strategy for 
achieving a truly pan-European equity market lies in stimulating a more 
competitive environment. However, this strategy currently strives to deliver. 
Despite the industry’s commitment to make consolidated data solutions more 
accessible (both tape and quote)97 and provide data on a non-discriminatory 
basis, data remain costly, in particular for retail and small professional 
investors. In addition, quality and granularity of trade reports (e.g. OTC) is 
sometimes insufficient to generate cost-effective consolidation.  
Pre and post-trade data on equity can be consolidated in two ways:98 
1)  through direct access to market sources99 
2)  through solutions offered by data vendors.100 
Market data sources offer real-time information for shares traded on their 
systems. These data have been typically offered by incumbents (RMs) with 
different levels of granularity101 at a cost to final users, while new comers 
(MTFs) currently offer this service for free as part of their strategy to increase 
market share. Fees vary according to the type of user and the use they make of 
these data. There are currently three types of fees that are flexibly applied by 
trading venues (ESME, 2009a):  
i)  a license distribution fee, 
ii)  a license non-display fee, and  
iii)  a data fee.  
The first type of fee is designed for data vendors that resell data with 
special features or together with data on other asset classes. The second one 
refers to the fee typically charged to investment banks and buy-side firms that 
directly access the market feed for their own use, typically associated with 
other services (co-location,102 etc.). Those fees are designed in particular for 
Data 
accessibility 
                                                      
96 The LSE Group (2010) has calculated that – for off-book securities admitted to trading in their regulated market 
and traded under their rules – reducing the deferred publication time to the end of the day (with no exception) 
would mean that 27.2% of overall trade value in that market (1.4% as number of trades) would be pushed to 
disclose positions by the end of the day. This may create unforeseen consequences and push liquidity providers 
to reduce the amount of capital committed to these markets. 
97 A consolidated tape solution refers to the aggregation in one virtual basket of all post-trade data of competing 
trading platforms in a specific market (in this case, the European Economic Area, EEA). A consolidated quote 
solution should potentially offer pre-trade data of all EEA trading platforms.  
98 For an overview of the market for market data, please see ESME (2009a).  
99 Market sources are regulated markets, MTFs and SIs that provide static pre- and post-trade data of shares 
admitted to trading on their systems, or investment firms publishing data with proprietary arrangements. 
100 Data vendors are providers of data that typically collect a vast amount of information from several market 
sources and rearrange them in order to make them more easily accessible to retail and professional final users.  
101 There are in general two levels of granularity: level 1 (which only includes the ‘touch price’) and level 2 (which 
gives a view over the order book, typically the first five best and bid offers). 
102 Co-location services allow members of the trading platform to install their desks close to the central data 
storage of the platform in order to reduce latency and receive data at the lowest time physically possible. 58 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
algorithmic traders or investment firms that systematically use high-frequency 
trading tools. Finally, data fees are those charged to retail or small professional 
investors to access pre and/or post-trade data directly from their computers. If 
not freely accessible in real-time, post-trade data are typically offered for free 
with a delay of 15 minutes, in line with CESR’s recommendation (CESR, 2010b). 
Despite the fact that the average fee charged by regulated markets has partially 
decreased,103 the full cost (including data vendors fees and IT costs, where 
applicable) of access to pre- and post-trade data (full level 1 data only) remains 
fairly high (CESR, 2010b), in particular for small professional and retail 
investors. However, regulated markets freely distribute post-trade data after 15 
minutes. Moreover, CESR has also recommended the full unbundling of pre- 
and post-trade data transparency information, which exchanges have partially 
implemented in recent months by splitting post-trade from pre-trade data.104 
Revenues from market data are an important item of the total revenues of 
exchanges (see 0). A drastic cut of fees might not be manageable for them in the 
short term, since the collection and disclosure of data is a service that normally 
comes at cost for market sources. 
The second way to access consolidated post- or pre-trade data is through 
data vendors, which pay distribution fees to exchanges and resell data in a 
consolidated fashion. Since the costs of accessing several trading venues are 
high, end investors may opt for one-stop-shop solution, even though it may not 
offer the same depth and quality as the direct market feed. However, the costs 
of one-stop data vending solution seem to be high as well. Unbundling of 
services in this market may substantially reduce costs for end users, however. 
In effect, a right to access single offered services on a non-discriminatory basis 
may reduce costs for non-sophisticated end users and allow data vendors to 
generate significant economies of scale and scope by aggregating data from 
several asset classes. This change would stimulate further competition105 and 
potentially drive overall costs down further over the long term. In effect, 
concentration is rather high in the current market setting. Two players, 
Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters, capture two-thirds of the demand taking 
into account the whole market, including data from asset classes other than 
equity (see Figure 11). The market share of these two players is higher if only 
equity market data is considered. The whole market for equity data sales and 
trading is roughly $4.45 billion, of which $1.8 billion in Europe (Burton-Taylor, 
2010). Also in this market, the offer is typically done through cross-selling 
practices (bundling or tying)106, which allow partial market segmentation. In 
 
                                                      
103 The fee for the ‘last trade’ price charged by major exchanges (95% of EEA lit books current volumes, but not as 
% of listed shares) is currently €75 per month. The full cost to access a consolidated tape and quote solution in the 
US is roughly €70 per month. However, the US data solution does not only offer ‘last trade’ prices, but complete 
pre- and post-trade data (levels 1 and 2), including the Best and Bid Offer (BBO), and covers 100% of listed shares. 
To have only the level 1 pre- and post-trade data service in Europe for all EEA markets, the price is around €409 
per month (Atradia, 2010). 
104 See FESE press release, http://www.fese.be/en/?inc=news&id=141. 
105 Bundling increases the specificity of the product, reducing its homogeneity. Competitors will ultimately find it 
more difficult to compete with a bundle of several data services, with no possibility to compete with single data 
services.  
106 Tying is a widespread business practice that occurs when two or more products are sold together in a package 
and at least one of these products is not sold separately. In this case, the end user would be able to buy the tied 
product alone, but not the tying product without the tied one. Bundling occurs when none of the components of 
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addition, a lack of standardisation of data formats between data vendors 
impedes interaction and does not allow users to access separate services of data 
providers from the same IT platform. 
Figure 11. Data vendors’ market shares (all asset classes) 
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Source: Atradia (2010). 
The combined effects of unbundling data services and fees for exchanges 
and data vendors may reduce overall costs for final users that seek pan-
European consolidated data solutions. 
 
Although MiFID harmonised transparency requirements among member 
states, the quality of market data has partially deteriorated in some areas, 
mainly due to the combined effect of market fragmentation and incomplete 
specification and implementation of reporting requirements (CESR, 2010b; see 
0). Several aspects, however, affect the quality of data and its eligibility for 
consolidation (ESME, 2009a): 
1)  quotes should be executable and not indicative only, 
2)  data should be delivered on real-time, with no delay (except where 
waivers and calibration apply), 
3)  data should refer to liquid markets, and 
4)  data formats and flags should be sufficiently standardised. 
In particular, the use of diverse trade flags107 does not allow an easy 
consolidation of data. The objective should be the reduction of flags to less than 
10 across all European trading venues. Moreover, on the one hand, the 
insufficient granularity and monitoring of OTC reporting increases the risk of 
misreporting and the uncertainty around quality of price formation and of best 
execution (see Section 5.4.1). On the other hand, trade reporting obligations 
Data quality 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the package is sold separately, and components are offered in fixed proportions. It is the simultaneous sale of two 
or more products as a package, with no possibility to purchase both or one of them individually. For a more 
detailed analysis, see CEPS and Van Djik Consultants (2009), “Tying and other potentially unfair commercial 
practices in the retail financial service sector”, a study submitted to the European Commission, 24 November 
(http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/tying/report_en.pdf). 
107 A ‘flag’ is a code attached to the information on a trade that signals its status and/or the venue where the trade 
has been executed. The Report will refer to ‘flags’ more simply as codes for venue identification.  60 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
under MiFID create a serious issue of duplicative reporting (see example in 0), 
which impedes an assessment of the actual size and shape of the market. 
In order to improve data accessibility and reliability, CESR proposed to 
publish post-trade information through Approved Publication Arrangements 
(APAs), which can be RMs, MTFs, organised trading facilities (OTFs) or other 
operators (but not an investment firm itself). In this way, trading venues would 
compete with data vendors for the provision of market data to consolidators.108 
In order to facilitate data consolidation, APAs should define stricter 
requirements, approved and monitored by competent authorities. However, it 
is fundamental that APAs are designed around harmonised standards109 in 
order to reduce differences in the definition and implementation of APAs 
across the EEA. These requirements should minimise issues of double-counting 
and misreporting. The Commission (2010b, pp. 31-32) proposed to introduce 
criteria such as: high data security standards; access to data at a ‘reasonable’ 
cost and on a non-discriminatory basis; procedures to identify erroneous trade 
reports; adequate resources and contingency arrangements; and conflicts of 
interest procedures.  
In addition, CESR (2010g) proposed two options: 
i)  To prescribe only standards that data sources (RMs, MTFs, APAs) would 
need to use to disseminate post-trade data to end users and 
ii)  To prescribe not only those standards, but also a common message 
protocol for the transfer of post-trade data by RMs, MTFs and APAs. 
The second option carries higher costs for data sources, which may need 
to be further assessed. In any case, full harmonisation would make data 
consolidation easier, since there would be “no requirement for data 
consolidators to map the data they receive into their own standard” (CESR, 
2010g, p. 6). 
APAs 
Whether or not a new APA regime is effectively implemented, CESR 
believes that a set of requirements should be inserted in MiFID in order to 
provide easily accessible and less costly consolidated market data solutions in 
the EEA. This proposal is called ‘EU Mandatory Consolidated Tape’ (MCT). 
Consolidated tapes should be designed by the industry and disclose post-trade 
information on shares admitted to trading on RMs or MTFs in the EEA, 
wherever the execution of the trade takes place. All information should come 
from RMs, MTFs or APA real-time and fully unbundled. Data will be then 
consolidated and sold at a ‘competitive price’ by a given operator, who will 
meet strict requirements and be responsible for the detection of multiple 
publications (double reporting or counting). Only if the industry does not 
Mandatory 
Consolidated 
Tape 
                                                      
108 NYSE Euronext has recently announced the intention to introduce a consolidated tape with real-time post-
trade data of all regulated markets, MTFs and OTC markets. See, http://www.euronext.com/news/ 
press_release/press_release-1731-FR.html?docid=929763.  
109 In order to reduce inconsistencies in trade and transaction reporting across asset classes, free international 
open (i.e, non-proprietary) industry standards – such as those developed by the industry in line with the ISO 
20022 standard (Universal financial industry message scheme) – may offer a high degree of reliability, 
transparency and standardisation to ultimately enable data comparability and analysis by authorities with the 
possibility – if needed – to adapt them to the characteristics of the market. Moreover, the introduction of universal 
standards may reduce the risk of market segmentation and ensure a more competitive and harmonised 
environment. CESR (2010g) has proposed the introduction of ISO standards for post-trade publication fields. 
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deliver this solution by itself, should ESMA adopt the necessary arrangements 
to set a US-style consolidated tape in the EU, run by a non-profit entity. MiFID 
should give enough powers to ESMA to act accordingly. The Commission 
(2010b, p. 34) proposed that a European MCT could be structured in different 
ways, under variable degrees of regulatory intervention. The proposal favours 
the creation of a consolidated tape for all financial instruments – instead of only 
equities – admitted to trading in the EEA, wherever the execution takes place. It 
should be noted however that building a tape for assets other than shares 
would be difficult to achieve in the short term, since a consistent and 
harmonised regime of post-trade transparency for non-equity financial 
instruments does not exist yet. MiFID should ensure that data consolidators 
would be able to collect all tapes and provide one access point to end investors. 
A market-led solution would probably be the least costly and most efficient 
option (Option C). Competition among data providers would be the best way 
to spur the creation of consolidated data solutions outside equity markets. The 
Commission is concerned about the cost of data, which it wants to keep under 
‘reasonable’ bounds. However, what constitutes reasonable pricing is difficult, 
if not impossible, to define in practice. Instead, the Commission should aim at 
ensuring ‘competitive’ pricing. Only real competition between data providers 
would keep costs at a ‘reasonable’ level. The Commission’s attempt (2010b, p. 
34) to impose a single no-profit or for-profit entity (Options A and B) for the 
provision of the consolidated tape would not lead to ‘competitive’ pricing, but 
would only impose a risky price regulation. Rather, it would ultimately define 
costs for end investors by splitting revenues among trading platforms and 
APAs, which could create inefficiencies and distort trading incentives (as 
showed by the US experience, see Box 4 below). Furthermore, the 
Commission’s proposal to require APA’s to be expressly authorised for the 
provision of consolidated tapes would slow down the whole process and 
ultimately reduce incentives to compete. In sum, achieving minimum 
consistency though industry cooperation would probably be more efficient 
than strong regulatory intervention. In this regard, ESMA should rather 
support current industry-led initiatives to major impediments to cheaper and 
more efficient solutions. However, either the Commission or ESMA should be 
able to impose consistency if commercial initiatives do not lead to a satisfactory 
solution in a reasonable time frame. 
Box 4. The US consolidated tape and quote 
The US consolidated tape system was officially created in 1976 by the National Market 
System in an effort to promote economic efficiency and allow brokers to deliver best 
execution (Caglio & Mayhew, 2009). Three networks (A, B and C) - respectively run by 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ – display real-time trade reports (Consolidated Tape System) 
and market quotes (Consolidated Quotation System). The published information refers to 
securities traded on all exchanges, regional markets, electronic crossing networks (ECNs) 
and broker-dealer crossing networks and collected through three different networks by 
dividing shares listed on national and regional exchanges (Networks A and B) and NASDAQ 
National Market and Small Cap (Network C). Networks A and B are governed by the 
Consolidated Tape Association Plan (CTA) and the Consolidated Quotation Plan (CQ), while 
network C is governed by the OTC/UTP Plan. These plans collect fees charged for the access 
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line with a defined allocation formula.  
Prior to 2007, at least half of the revenues from network A and B were distributed in 
proportion to the number of reported trades, while Network C redistributed half of its 
revenues in relation to the number of trades and half as a proportion of the volume of trades 
in those shares. The allocation formula boosted a widespread rebate programme through 
which exchanges pushed their members to split their orders even though there was no risk 
of market impact. In effect, this system created strong incentives to generate volumes, to 
print trades. The implementation of RegNMS110 in April 2007 modified this allocation 
formula by splitting revenues as follows: 25% depending on the number of shares, 25% on 
the number of trades, and 50% on quote aggressiveness, i.e. frequently displaying better 
prices and thereby helping to narrow quoted spreads, while distinguishing manually 
displayed quotation systems. The introduction of this formula was followed by the SEC 
requesting the exchanges to adopt a rule against tape shredding.111 Both these policies have 
helped to partially increase the average trade size (Caglio & Mayhew, 2009), which proves 
that the allocation formula does influence current trading activities and raises a trade-off 
between control over data consolidation and indirect incentives on trading. Moreover, since 
the introduction of this formula, the average number of quotes displayed every minute has 
constantly increased (see figure below). Soaring trading volumes and algorithmic trading 
(Angel et. al., 2010) may not be the only explanation for this later effect. Hence, the impact of 
this new allocation rule deserves further investigation. 
Figure 12. Average quotes per minute 
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Source: Angel et al. (2010). 
In addition to these networks, – in March 2007 – the SEC established Trade Reporting 
Facilities (TRF), which report directly to the consolidated tape any trades executed on venues 
other than national and regional exchanges. 
 
 
 
                                                      
110 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Release No. 34-51808; File No. S7-10-04, April 2007, Rule 601 and 
603. 
111 Members of exchanges can break up their customers’ orders into smaller trades only for compliance with best 
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Conclusion # 8   
In the post-MiFID era, several aspects have reduced the quality of data and hindered 
consolidation. In order to improve this situation, the MiFID Review should look both at the 
standardisation of data formats (code identifiers, etc.) and data granularity through flags. 
The relevance of trade flags comes from the support they offer to liquidity discovery 
mechanisms across trading venues. Market initiatives should reduce the number of trade 
flags, currently around 50, to fewer than 10 across Europe. On the proliferation of data 
formats, sources and vendors are working to reduce their number and bridge 
inconsistencies. Achieving minimum consistency though industry cooperation would 
probably be more efficient than strong regulatory intervention. In this regard, ESMA should 
rather support current industry-led initiatives on standardisation. However, either the 
Commission or ESMA should be able to impose consistency if commercial initiatives do not 
lead to a satisfactory solution in a reasonable time frame. 
Consolidated data solutions promote best execution and help to mitigate the 
potentially negative effects of liquidity fragmentation. More accessible consolidated data 
solutions should be delivered, in particular to retail and small professional investors. 
Formats would need to be standardised and granularity increased, which would curb costs 
for users and increase accessibility. Already some market participants have committed to 
reduce costs for final users by unbundling fees for pre- and post-trade data; a step in the 
right direction that data vendors and distributors should follow. When lower data collection 
costs are realised, they should be passed on to final users. Regulators and competition 
authorities should draw attention to potentially unfair market practices and anticompetitive 
market conditions that impede markets from offering data solutions at a ‘reasonable’ cost, 
rather than attempting to define when a cost is actually ‘reasonable’. 
The US experience with the unintended consequences of a consolidated tape run by a 
public entity should suggest alternative solutions. Consolidated tapes can be designed and 
offered by competing data operators (so-called Approved Public Arrangements or APAs), 
once the rules of the game have been clearly defined and duly enforced. These tapes could 
cover not only shares but also other financial instruments admitted to trading on RMs, MTFs 
or organised trading facilities, as long as a sound regime has been put in place.  
Regulators should set the conditions to facilitate the consolidation and timely delivery 
of data to investors in real time and fully unbundled through APAs. Operators would have 
to meet strict requirements and be responsible for the detection of multiple publications 
(misreporting or double-counting). Only if the industry does not deliver with these 
conditions, should ESMA adopt the necessary arrangements to set a single consolidated tape 
in the EU. 
4.4.3  Bond markets 
 
Public trade disclosure of financial instruments other than shares has been 
typically left to the market, in particular given the different market structures 
that shape trading mechanisms for corporate and sovereign bonds. In recent 
years, certain initiatives have been taken to offer public access to partial pre-
trade and post-trade data, such as non-executable prices available through 
AFME112 and Xtraker.113 Despite initial scepticism about post-trade 
Context 
                                                      
112 See: www.investinginbondseurope.org 
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transparency for bonds (CESR, 2008; EU COM, 2008), problems posed by 
liquidity during the financial crisis – for instance the evaluation of illiquid 
products – have led regulators to claim a post-trade transparency regime, 
even though no other significant market failures have been detected (CESR, 
2009b). Moreover, the growing interest of retail investors in these markets 
(IOSCO, 2004) has drawn the regulators’ attention to allowing their needs to 
coexist with those of wholesale and institutional investors.  
Bond markets (corporate, sovereign and other public bonds)114 are 
typically quote-driven markets or OTC bilateral negotiations, in which 
intermediation plays a critical role. On the buy-side, the demand for these 
financial instruments is overwhelmingly institutional, with very limited retail 
participation (CESR, 2008). The vast majority of bonds are listed on regulated 
markets, and, if traded there, they are typically pre- and post-trade 
transparent, like shares. However, this situation refers to a very limited 
number of securities; only those where there is enough liquidity to allow 
trading on a regulated market. Typically, opacity prevails as intermediaries 
are rewarded by their informational advantage in less-liquid products. Portes 
et. al. (2006) listed the characteristics of bond markets, which explains their 
typical low liquidity. In effect, bonds (Biais & Declerk, 2007): 
1)  attract long-term investors (hold and buy strategies), 
2)  are difficult to short sell (at least in the same market) and so to manage 
inventory risks, 
3)  have few differences between each other (predictable returns), and 
4)  are less concentrated than stocks (each issuer have several bond 
issuances outstanding). 
In addition, transaction costs for bonds usually decrease with high 
ratings, short maturity and size (Edwards et al., 2007). Investing in short 
maturity and bigger sizes may only provide incentives for a part of the 
demand, which may ultimately affect liquidity in the market. 
These characteristics have boosted institutional demand, which has 
reciprocally influenced market microstructure. For instance, bond markets in 
the US were typically order-driven markets with strong retail participation in 
the 1920s. In a few years – without relevant changes in the role of bonds in 
financing the economy – the weight of institutions reached a turning point in 
which small trades were led towards a market equilibrium designed for large 
investors (Biais & Green, 2007). Where dealers commit capital on illiquid 
products, they will only do this in exchange of less disclosure, since this is the 
equilibrium that rewards their informational advantage (Madhavan, 1995). 
The use of big amounts of capital to maintain and develop trading activities 
implies high fixed costs (especially, opportunity costs), which requires a 
proper system of incentives for the firms committing those resources.  
Bonds 
characteristics 
                                                      
114 This report considers sovereign bonds as part of the wider ‘public bonds category’, which has been defined by 
CESR (2010f), p. 12. In particular, it includes bonds issued by governments, governmental authorities and 
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Box 5. Investing in bonds 
Bonds are usually associated with the idea of a ‘safe’ investment since they are meant to 
provide stable payoffs (fixed interest/income) until maturity. In effect, bonds are products 
that can be considered ‘safer’ than more ‘aggressive’ instruments (such as equity and some 
derivatives), in particular when investors buy them at issuance and hold the product until 
maturity. This strategy is mostly followed through plain ‘vanilla’ bonds, which typically give 
no options for the issuer and can be designed as ‘straight’ (‘zero coupon’, ‘bullet’; interest is 
paid at maturity) or ‘coupon’ (interest is paid in each specified period), linked or not to the 
inflation rate. In this case, risks would be limited to: 
•  default or restructuring risks (the probability that the institution will default or 
restructure its own debt); 
•  inflation rate risks (the probability that the inflation rate is higher at maturity than at 
the time of purchase, which reduces the cash flow value); 
•  exchange rate risk (when payments are made in another currency, the probability that 
the exchange rate makes the value of the cash flow lower in comparison to the original 
investment); 
•  exogenous risks (the probability that external unforeseeable events would delay 
payments of interests, principal, or lead to a debt restructuring). 
However, where investors dispose of a bond before maturity the level of risk 
dramatically increases. In this scenario, the final outcome of the transaction (specifically, the 
bond price on the secondary market) can be affected by these additional factors (Fabozzi, 
2007): 
•  Interest rate risk (the probability that the bondholder will bear opportunity costs– and 
expressed in the decline of the bond price – when the official market interest rate 
increases); 
•  Floating rate risk (the probability that the interest rate paid to the bondholder would be 
lower than the prevailing fixed interest rate paid for bullet bonds); 
•  Yield curve risk (the probability of a shift in the long-term yield curve due to changes 
of the general market conditions); 
•  Reinvestment risk (for bonds that periodically pay interest and principal, which may 
need to be reinvested at least with the same return); 
•  Downgrade risk (as mentioned above, the probability that the rating on the issuer’s 
credit risk worsens, making the bond price decline); 
•  Credit spread risk (the probability that the premium over a default-free benchmark – 
typically 10y US Treasury or 10y German Bund – can increase due to movements in 
related markets, as credit default swaps); 
•  Liquidity risk (the probability that the market does not have enough liquidity to price 
bonds at their theoretical level); 
•  Volatility risk (the probability that the yield would follow an unexpected and highly 
volatile pattern); 
•  Call and prepayment risk (where the bond – in exchange for a higher return – includes 
a provision that allows the issuer to call back the bond before the maturity date by 
repurchasing it at market price or an pre-established one); 
•  Sovereign risk (where the issuer is a government or government-funded institution, 
the probability that the government exercises the sovereign powers to unilaterally 66 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
decide to default or restructure its debt). 
As a result, investing in bonds may involve a high level of complexity, which 
ultimately requires a carefully designed transparency regime. Ill-defined transparency 
requirements may have unintended consequences for market liquidity and investors’ 
participation in the bond market.    
Proposals to increase transparency in dealer markets usually generate 
conflicting views in terms of their benefits and costs. Legislative proposals 
will need to strike the right balance of requirements concerning public 
disclosure. On the one hand, transparency is a public good and its optimal 
level may not emerge spontaneously in the market. On the other hand, 
opacity is not a market failure in itself and, to a certain extent, should be well 
calibrated, especially when it comes to dealer markets. 
A transparent market setting may improve price formation and investor 
protection by reducing information asymmetries and thus adverse selection 
and moral hazard. A more transparent (post-trade) market setting can 
promote:  
i)  a more efficient price formation process by reducing search costs for 
end investors (Bloomfield & O’Hara, 1999; Edwards et al., 2007);  
ii)  greater competition among dealers and market-makers on risk-sharing 
(Naik et al., 1999); and 
iii)  a fairer environment as long as information is publicly available to all to 
increase their knowledge about the market (level playing field; Casey, 
2006).  
A more competitive environment – due to more willingness to take on 
risk, knowing the position of other dealers (risk-sharing) – may reduce 
informational advantages and ultimately lower transaction costs and bid/ask 
spreads (Goldstein et al., 2007). Lower search costs may stimulate efficient 
pricing, greater use of electronic multi-dealer platforms to diffuse quotes, and 
more interconnection between current venues. This may push inter-dealer 
platforms to expand their reach towards small professional investors or small 
intermediaries that struggle to receive best execution with the current 
regulatory gap, including retail investors (Ferrarini, 2009). Moreover, bond 
prices are often used to calculate default probabilities and as a benchmark for 
the valuation of illiquid bonds or other illiquid instruments/assets (e.g. 
pricing matrix). Efficient pricing mechanisms engender positive liquidity 
externalities (Amihud et al., 1997; Bessembinder et al., 2006; Cici et al., 2008), 
which spread benefits to the whole market. Finally, aggregate disclosure of 
bond holdings may increase systemic liquidity115 (Laganá et al., 2006), 
reducing uncertainty around exposure in times of uncertainty.  
In terms of costs, in a multi-stage transaction process, Naik et al. (1999) 
have showed that big inventory positions may suffer price revision risk, 
despite greater transparency reducing information asymmetries between 
dealers and hence improving inventory risk-sharing. In effect, in following 
Benefits and 
costs 
                                                      
115 Systemic liquidity is the market liquidity in ‘stressed times’, when liquidity is typically driven by the 
homogeneous herd behaviours of investors (e.g. ‘panic’ or ‘euphoria’). It is specifically related to market 
participants’ behaviour. It is the opposite of ‘search liquidity’, which is the liquidity in ‘normal times’ when 
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periods, prices will reflect private information fully, minimising the 
informational advantage and reducing the capital committed to a sub-optimal 
level. Therefore, the commitment of dealers may be affected in the first place. 
In effect, it would become more costly to manage inventories given the 
potential opportunistic behaviours of a typical prisoner’s dilemma.116 
Opportunistic behaviours may be also pursued through parallel exploitative 
actions in linked markets (such as swap or CDS). Excessive transparency can 
also damage liquidity, as informed traders will act knowing their competitors’ 
positions and vice versa. Strict transparency requirements may give them 
enough information to be able to enforce the artificial price of the oligopolistic 
market equilibrium (Kovtunenko, 2003). Disproportionate information about 
securities’ payoffs may reduce informational advantages for informed 
investors with respect to dealers, thus pushing part of this liquidity out of the 
market. 
Finally, greater trade disclosure may also have an unclear impact on 
systemic liquidity by increasing homogeneity of valuation and risk 
management tools on the one hand, which may be put under critical pressure 
when market conditions in the linked market worsen (cascade effects), and, 
on the other hand improving asset valuation tools.  
Due to the reasons mentioned above, speed, breadth (granularity) and 
depth of information should be designed around ‘dynamic’ liquidity 
measures, which may apply to some related asset classes (such as liquid 
structured products and CDSs). Post-trade information useful for price 
discovery purposes117 is generally information about the characteristics of the 
bond (price, volume and identifiers), frequency of trading, credit ratings at 
the issue, and whether bonds are listed and/or traded off-exchange (flags). 
Data should be consolidated across trading platforms where possible (IOSCO, 
2004). To preserve systemic liquidity and to monitor systemic risk, some 
aggregate information about notional value and current holdings should be 
provided to regulators, even on a confidential basis.  
The Commission confirmed that, while transparency requirements will 
be differentiated by asset class, the new regime will cover all bonds with a 
prospectus or admitted to trading on a RM or MTF (even if traded OTC; EU 
COM, 2010b, p. 27). The extension does not cover bonds that may be traded 
only OTC, as a result of a private placement. CESR (2010f), proposed the 
introduction of a post-trade transparency regime for corporate and ‘public’ 
bonds, which are defined as “transferable debt securities [...] with a maturity 
of at least 12 months”. However, both CESR and the Commission only took 
into account the size of transactions as a valid liquidity measure to set 
thresholds and delays for post-trade transparency. Liquidity measures 
typically encompass a wide array of measures (not only size) that may need 
to be considered altogether. CESR did not consider the frequency of trades to 
set the threshold but the possibility to delay publication by 15 minutes in 
Disclosure and 
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116 The prisoner’s dilemma is a situation in which parties behave opportunistically in order to maximise their 
outcome. By acting uncooperatively, parties will end up in a worse position than if they had coordinated their 
actions. 
117 The report does not consider information requested for transaction reporting purposes at this stage, which is 
covered by current MiFID text and in the earlier section of the report. 68 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
exceptional circumstances can eventually help where products are 
infrequently traded. To give an example, on Xtrakter,118 almost 75% of the 
43,000 corporate bond issuances are traded mainly wholesale and less than 10 
times a month (orders can be up to 15% of all the bond issuance). In October 
2010, the highest average daily number of trades for a single bond was 129 
times. Moreover, while 80% of government bonds are traded electronically 
(50-60% of volumes), only roughly 30% of corporate bonds is traded on 
electronic platforms. This setting may drastically affect the level of data that 
can be obtained in the 15 minutes buffer defined by CESR and the 
Commission. 
However, bonds infrequently traded may need some protection from 
full or partial post-trade transparency, especially when traded in big 
‘wholesale’ sizes. In effect, full disclosure of these trades may stimulate 
actions against the holder in other related markets (as CDS market), in order 
to exploit the private information. Nevertheless, this issue may be tackled 
with a specific scheme of delays (as done for equities). This scheme could also 
take into account the frequency of trades. Delays calibrated by the initial 
issuance, the frequency of transactions and their size may be indispensable 
for these markets to function well. It would also play a key role in winding up 
and unwinding big inventory positions.  
Finally, it is fundamental to make sure that standards of publication 
(e.g. identifiers, condition codes, transaction definition, etc) are clearly 
defined and implemented across trading venues. This would eventually 
stimulate data consolidation, which may be difficult to implement where 
publicly available quotes are not executable. In any case, even partial 
coverage would increase the attractiveness of these markets and, potentially, 
overall liquidity. 
Box 6. The TRACE experience 
With the introduction of a Trade Reporting And Compliance Engine (TRACE), on 1st July 
2002, the US officially introduced a trade reporting system for corporate bonds, a ‘big-bang’ 
for US corporate bond markets which covers agency debt from March 2010 and asset-backed 
securities since 2011. This system reports post-trade information – within 15 minutes – of 
transactions below $5 million at par value. It consolidates the time of execution, price, yield 
and volume for 100% of OTC transactions in over 43,000 securities, representing 99% of the 
corporate bond and agency debt market activity.  
Despite concerns of the industry due to the loose protection of inventory positions and 
large trades, regulators have implemented this solution in a relatively short timeframe for 
the entire market. On the one side, it is extremely difficult to measure any unintended long-
t e r m  e f f e c t s  o f  T R A C E  o n  l i q u i d i t y  a n d  m a r k e t  innovation. In particular, it is unclear 
whether lower costs are not offset at the expense of promoting sub-optimal market 
                                                      
118 As mentioned above, Xtrakter publishes some information about bonds, available on 
www.bondmarketprices.com. Xtrakter runs an approved reporting mechanism to the FSA in London, which has 
processed 578 million transactions in 2009. It offers bid/offer quotations and transaction reporting (through 
TRAX) for equities, fixed income securities (a vast majority) and OTC derivatives. Xtrakter produces bond 
liquidity data on a monthly basis that includes 28,000 to 35,000 securities per month; its database contains nearly 
400,000 documents. Published data is only on fixed income securities. Overall, Xtrakter already captures at least 
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equilibrium in the long term, by impairing dealers’ capital commitment. However, some 
academic studies have provided empirical evidence on the effects of TRACE. The system 
has: 
•  reduced trade execution costs (Bessembinder et al., 2006; Edwards et al., 2007), 
•  reduced spreads on more liquid bonds (Goldstein et al., 2007) and 
•  improved corporate bond valuation (Cici et al., 2008). 
These studies suggest that the impact of TRACE has been very positive on trading 
costs and corporate bond valuation, while less so on liquidity over the longterm.  
Finally, the nature of the US system – where dealers operate rather as broker-agents, 
with low capital commitment –makes the implementation of a regime such as TRACE easier 
than in Europe. In effect, in Europe dealers typically act as principals to the transaction, 
competing with other dealers to buy bonds that may sit on their balance sheets afterwards. 
Bonds are then sold to investors by offering executable prices on a platform or bilaterally. In 
this respect, in order to keep liquidity in the market, the introduction of a transparency 
regime should be gradual, to preserve large trades and relevant inventory positions in the 
market. Moreover, European and US bond markets also have other differences (Biais & 
Declerk, 2007): 
1)  European markets are more competitive, since national banks compete with dealers to 
offer bonds to wholesale and retail investors. 
2)  Frequency of trades is higher in Europe than the US. 
3)  Effective spreads post-TRACE are not lower than European ones. 
This situation does not imply that TRACE has not generated positive effects in the US 
and it does not preclude a similar regime in Europe from having a positive impact on 
European markets as well. A more competitive market setting plays a crucial role in 
reducing or increasing these differences.  
 
Conclusion # 9   
A transparency regime for bond markets should provide meaningful information to 
stimulate price discovery. The speed, breadth, and depth of information should be designed 
around ‘dynamic’ liquidity measures. Since there is not a single measure of liquidity readily 
available, transparency requirements should be developed on an instrument-by-instrument 
basis. This task should rather be left to secondary legislation, such as Level 2 implementing 
measures or binding technical standards. 
Liquidity is a dynamic aspect, which may take different forms according to the 
characteristics of the financial instrument and the trading mechanism. This reality should be 
taken into account where allowing exemptions or deferred publication in order to preserve 
an efficient and sound price formation process. Dynamic measures of liquidity can be 
designed around aspects such as frequency of trades, overall turnover or prospective 
liquidity, product standardisation, or transaction size. Finally, since data is fragmented, data 
formats and flags may need to be further standardised for the purpose of pre-trade 
transparency. 
Promoting structural market changes in non-equity markets to give easier access to 
retail investors may raise conflicting issues. For some market participants, the market for 
fixed income securities should remain wholesale dealer-driven. In their view – even though a 
commendable objective – direct retail access to non-equity instruments may destabilise 
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These effects would ultimately heighten risks for retail investors, given the increasing 
complexity of fixed income securities. Other stakeholders, however, firmly support the 
opening of bond markets to retail investors. Greater transparency may be a liquidity driver 
for these markets. Under proper delays and exemptions, the impact of retail trading activities 
would be fairly limited. 
4.4.4  Structured Financial Products  
 
Structured financial products (SFPs) are securities whose cash flow payments 
come from a pool of assets. Securities are typically issued by an independent 
legal entity, so-called ‘special purpose vehicle’ (SPV). Credit enhancements, 
which are different levels of credit seniority, give them the possibility to reach 
a wide range of investors (retail and institutional). SFPs can be divided into 
three major categories (CESR, 2008): 
i)  Asset-backed securities (ABSs), 
ii)  Collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) and 
iii)  Asset-backed commercial paper (ABCPs). 
ABSs are securities issued and financed by the sale of specific assets. In 
effect, there are several sub-categories, named after the underlying asset. 
Some of them are: residential mortgage backed securities (RMBSs); 
commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBSs); and other securities backed 
by other assets/receivables (as loans, auto loans, etc). 
CDOs are securities typically ‘collateralised’ with a portfolio of other 
fixed income securities. The income generated by these securities actually 
feeds the cash flows generated by CDOs over time.  
ABCPs are commercial notes collateralised by other assets that have a 
short maturity (180 days maximum). 
SFPs often are very illiquid, in particular during times of financial 
distress. In effect, the size of the SFPs market was drastically reduced as a 
result of the crisis. Banks heavily involved in securitisation and SFPs 
issuances suffered important losses and, in extreme cases, defaulted. The 
crisis highlighted relevant market failures, such as distorted system of 
incentives and lack of reliable information in the market. While the demand 
for these products gradually recovers, 90% of new issuances are still done 
only for ‘repo’ purposes (with no private placement). It is highly unlikely that 
the market will revert to 2006-7 levels, at least in the short term. As fixed 
income securities, SFPs have many similarities with bonds and in theory are 
designed to reproduce a similar payoff structure. However, the financial 
design of SFPs is often more complicated and is in general not directly linked 
to the credit risk of a legal entity, but to a pool of assets whose information 
may not be publicly available or not meaningful for investment purposes. 
Limited information about SFPs can be accessed by a limited number of 
investors. This information suffers from a lack of completeness and dispersion 
in memoranda (a sort of prospectus), rating agency reports, issuer’s 
presentations, and pool reports. The complexity of these documents often 
makes it difficult to extract meaningful information for investment purposes 
(IOSCO, 2009b).  
CESR (2010f) and the Commission (2010b, p. 27) have finally opined 
that the transparency regime for structured products should cover all asset-
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eventually harmful, especially if the financial instrument acts as a benchmark 
for evaluating similar products. Therefore, exemptions and delays for these 
financial instruments should be on average wider than for bonds and 
primarily based on the size and frequency of trades. Nevertheless, SFPs and 
OTC derivatives typically lack price transparency, given the use of 
proprietary valuation models to price complex products (CESR, 2009b). In 
this case, aggregate price indexes should be publicly available in realtime, 
whenever possible. In effect, given  the low number of transactions in these 
products, a continuous flow of information may not necessarily be available 
to support the pricing of these products by competing binding indication of 
interests from end investors (as OLOBs). Therefore, proprietary pricing 
models become indispensable tools. 
Securitisation and OTC derivatives may be formidable tools to free 
capital back to the real economy and promote better allocation of risk and 
resources. They contribute to transfer credit risk and spread it in the markets 
to those who are more able to bear it. However, the experience of the financial 
crisis has taught us that spreading risk among many counterparties through 
complex financial instruments does not ultimately cancel it. Information 
about the underlying assets and net exposures should always be publicly 
available in order to monitor systemic risk. Competent regulators should have 
access to data via reporting, especially through trade repositories. During 
stress time, aggregated information on net exposures could help contain herd 
behaviours set off by market opacity. It is thought that this form of 
transparency can improve systemic liquidity (Lagana et al., 2006). Investment 
firms would have to provide this information, which would subsequently be 
aggregated by trade repositories (TRs), with sufficient skills and capabilities 
to collect and aggregate this information (EU COM, 2010b, p. 13). However, 
aggregated information on net exposures might not be readily available; 
hence financial institutions could explore the possibility to modify their data 
management system in order to collect information on net exposures in a way 
that does not compromise the confidentiality of sensitive information. Trade 
repositories would then be able to aggregate this information and offer a 
global picture. Trade repositories would therefore play a double function: a) 
disclosing aggregate data on net exposures (trade reporting); and b) 
providing specific data on transactions to regulators on a confidential basis 
(transaction reporting). The transparency regime should cover all derivatives 
centrally cleared and those reported to trade repositories (Art. 6.1, EMIR). 
Aggregate data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trade 
repositories 
 
 
Conclusion # 10   
A post-trade transparency regime for derivatives and structured products should be more 
detailed and tailored to the nature of these products. Where listed on RMs and/or MTFs, the 
regime could be designed with the same methodology employed for bonds, but its 
implementation should follow a phased approach.  
Exemptions and due calibrations should be allowed in order to preserve efficient price 
formation and guarantee the effective monitoring of systemic risk. Calibrations should take 
into account the nature of these markets and of each financial instrument, rather than a 
division into broader categories (e.g. by asset classes). A mere application of post-trade 
transparency to a general list of instruments would definitely hamper market liquidity. As 
for bond markets, measurements of liquidity should be taken into account with due care to 74 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
avoid adverse consequences in terms of liquidity for wholesale participants.  
The extension of trade and transaction reporting to non-equity markets can be 
facilitated by current infrastructures, thereby reducing costs.  
Finally, harmonising the scope of ‘eligibility’ for clearing purposes with the legal duty 
to be pre- and post-trade transparent would leave big gaps in the actual implementation of 
the transparency regime. In addition, it may also distort trading activities and redirect them 
towards non-centrally cleared products, since – on top of the costs of centralised clearing – 
firms would bear the risk coming from pre- and post-trade transparency with no assessment 
of size and frequency of transactions. Extension of post-trade and transaction reporting to 
non-equity markets can be facilitated by current infrastructures (reducing costs) but it is 
critical that transparency requirements remain independent from trading and clearing 
eligibility requirements. In effect, the requirements to access a central counterparty clearing 
(CCP) are not only based on liquidity itself but also on the standardisation of technical and 
legal aspects, and therefore the mere eligibility for clearing of an instrument should not be 
considered to be a proper test of liquidity and frequency of trading for transparency 
purposes. For instance, as shown above, CDS contracts are quite standardised and over 75% 
of trades are confirmed on the same day. Dealers expect as much as 90% of these contracts to 
be cleared on CCPs.122 While expectation about eligibility to central clearing are high, this 
choice does not necessarily consider market liquidity, which remains still very low with less 
than 20% of CDS contracts traded more than 10 times a day and less than once for the vast 
majority of them. Potential delays and issues affecting the process of centralisation of 
clearing on CCPs may ultimately affect the implementation of disclosure requirements in 
these markets.  
5.  Reshaping market structure  
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
The structure of financial markets changed dramatically over the last decade. 
New trading technologies and growing volumes have generated important 
network externalities, which have ultimately reshaped the original market 
design based on natural monopolies. These developments, together with 
innovative policy decisions, have also favoured changes in three areas: 
competition and market fragmentation micro-structure and infrastructure. In 
this framework, MiFID has managed to provide a comprehensive regulatory 
framework that boosted the aforementioned developments and minimised 
potential unintended consequences for market quality and investor 
protection. This report does not address the issue of what market structure 
works best. For this question, there is, in principle, no final answer. The best 
market structure is the one “in which a market-clearing price can always be 
found” (O’Hara, 1995, p. 269). 
 
5.2  Securities markets as network industry 
 
A network is a market setting in which the output is the result of the 
interaction of several inputs (so-called ‘nodes’) that generate externalities 
when combined in a certain way. Three aspects characterise a network 
Definition 
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industry (Economides, 1993): 
1)  Complementarity, 
2)  Compatibility, and 
3)  Coordination. 
The output of a network infrastructure is typically a composite good, 
which ‘mixes and matches’ inputs that are complementary.123 For instance, a 
phone call is the result of a network that links the caller with the receiver. The 
link between the caller and the adapter/switch is complementary to the link 
between the adapter or switch and the receiver, which at the end compose a 
phone call. For the formation of the composite output of the network, the 
relationship among the nodes, their complementarity and their compatibility, 
is essential. In this sense, complementarity only exists if the inputs composing 
the final good are compatible, i.e. both follow the same standards and appear 
coordinated in time and space.  
The network output can generate two kinds of externalities: i) direct 
and ii) indirect. An externality is ‘direct’, when any additional customer/node 
increases the size of the whole network by 2*n potential new goods. The 
overall number of complementary goods is n*(n-1). This externality is also 
called production externality and is generated by the economies of scope 
produced by an additional node. An externality is ‘indirect’, when an extra 
customer does not necessarily represent 2*n potential goods, but only 
increases the size of the network and the possibility of finding a good 
matching. It is also called consumption externality or size externality, i.e. the 
value of a unit of the good increases with the ‘expected’ number of units sold 
(Economides, 1996). This kind of externality relies upon the presence of 
economies of scale and represents the inverse of the ‘classic’ law of the 
demand since the value of the good increases with the number of units sold 
(or produced).  
Network 
externalities 
Networks can have two ‘basic’ market settings or a combined one: 
1)  One-way, 
2)  Two-way, and 
3)  Mixed. 
A one-way network (e.g. TV broadcasting) is a network where the 
output is function of n consumers and m developers/suppliers of products. 
Producers develop the product and make it available through the ‘grid’. This 
generates indirect network externalities: more users will increase the number 
of developers and viceversa. However, there is no strict complementarity 
between consumer and developer. One extra customer does not necessarily 
add 2*n potential complementary goods, but it will ‘indirectly’ increase the 
overall value of the network since it will be more likely that an exchange will 
take place at its best value (consumption or size externality). 
A two-way network is a network where n consumers interact with n‐1 
other consumers over the ‘switch’, that is the product that allow consumers to 
access different suppliers. This network setting generates direct network 
externalities: one additional consumer equals n new combined products or 
Network settings 
                                                      
123 A and B are two complementary products when an increase in the price of A also reduces the quantity of B. 76 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
2*n complementary nodes (due to its different nature). As mentioned above, a 
market for local or international phone calls is a typical two-way network 
setting. The externality effect of having one more customer ‘directly’ affects 
the utility function of the other consumers/investors (direct or production 
externality). 
Finally, the two ‘basic’ settings may interact according to the level of 
complementarity between groups of users/platforms/goods. Interactions 
allow for combinations of goods or consumers/investors whose willingness 
to trade generate both one-way and two-way network externalities. This 
network setting will occur more frequently in multi-sided markets, whereby 
the interaction of types of users/goods/platforms takes place. 
5.2.1  Markets Multi-sidedness and Securities Markets   
Networks can be classified according to their pricing structure, i.e. the 
possibility that platforms can charge different prices to different groups of 
users. The market would be considered as ‘two-sided’ or more generally 
‘multi-sided’ when the pricing structure of respectively one or multiple 
platforms is based on:  
i)  The interaction of groups of users-only (Rochet‐Tirole, 2003) in which n 
receivers interact with m senders through a platform; often the platform 
subsidizes the entrance of n receivers on the one‐side with the interest 
of m to get in contact with n on the other side;124 and 
ii)  The interaction of both groups of users and platforms (Armstrong, 2006) 
n users can interact with m other users; the value of the network is the 
possibility that you can interact through different platforms, so-called 
‘multi-homing’125). 
Both interactions may generate direct or indirect externalities as 
characteristic of one-way or two-way networks. 
Multi-sided 
markets 
Securities markets can be considered as ‘networks’, whose output is the 
exchange of the financial instrument at the ‘best’ available terms (a 
combination of complementary goods, i.e.  investors’ bid and offer). The 
structure of markets for financial instruments is a combination of different 
network settings that allow the interaction of liquidity demanders and 
suppliers through buying and selling securities. Through this interaction of 
bids and offers, resources will have more chances to find their best allocation 
in the economy. In effect, transaction costs would be prohibitive in a world 
with no exchange platforms; investors or issuers would have to bear the full 
Securities 
markets 
                                                      
124 The videogame industry (e.g. Microsoft Xbox 360, Sony Playstation, etc.) epitomises a good example of a two-
sided market, in which the value of the network will increase by stimulating the interaction between users of the 
platform (gamers) and developers of game software. The platform will therefore charge a more modest fee to 
developers (typically free access or sometimes even paying them) in order to attract more users and generate size 
externalities. The balance between the two fees (pricing skewness) will change as the platform gains more users 
and increases its value or from the potential intensity of network externalities that attracting a group of user may 
generate. 
125 B2B exchanges (e.g. Alibaba.com, etc.) are platforms that link business buyers and sellers. Sellers are charged 
for posting their products, while buyers typically access those platforms for free. The possibility to offer the 
content in multi-homing – i.e. on multiple platforms –increases the value of the overall network as it increases the 
potential reach of sellers’ proposals, whether or not both sides of users are both multi-home. Users wish to reap 
the benefits of network externalities in an environment of non-interconnected platforms (Rochet & Tirole, 2006). MIFID 2.0: CASTING NEW LIGHT ON EUROPE’S CAPITAL MARKETS | 77 
 
cost of finding the counterparty who best values their securities, which would 
ultimately lead to resources being inefficiently allocated. Markets can reduce 
transaction costs (by facilitating transactions on agreeable terms) and allow 
more efficient allocation of resources, but not all market designs reduce costs 
to the same extent (Coase, 1960; Demsetz, 1968). 
Securities markets (in particular for shares) can be divided into primary 
and secondary markets.126 Although they both match liquidity demand and 
supply, their network settings may be different since they might be based on 
the interaction of groups of users, on multiple platforms or both. In primary 
markets, securities are sold by issuers for the first time, as a combination of 
issuers’ offer and a set of buyers’ bids. These markets may be extremely 
volatile before the security is sold at the market-clearing price. Volatility 
occurs at the time where the security is proposed to potential buyers at a 
theoretical value, which will change according to their willingness to buy (the 
number of offers). 
Primary markets 
Figure 15. Primary securities markets 
 
Source: Authors. 
As shown in the figure above, primary markets gather investors and 
issuers in the same place. It is a single-home market, since issuers list their 
shares in the market of their choice, which typically coincides with the main 
national regulated market for both legal (official listing) and economic 
reasons (most liquid primary markets). In this case, the national regulated 
market will be the only place where buyers can purchase those shares when 
the issue begins. Cross-border listing is possible but generally occurs at 
different terms. The pricing structure of primary markets is two-sided; issuers 
are willing to pay for accessing the platform (listing fees), while members of 
the market get access to those executable quotes at more favourable terms (or 
within the membership access fee they actually pays) when the security is 
issued. The platform subsidizes the interaction of n investors with the interest 
 
                                                      
126 The report discusses the interaction of investors’ interests in trading platforms. Little attention is actually given 
to the network settings of the post-trade industry, which typically take a different shape from the one of trading 
platforms. 78 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
of m issuers to offer them their securities (Rochet & Tirole, 2003). For listing of 
SMEs – which typically represent a less mature market with lower liquidity 
(so size externalities) – issuers may get more favourable terms to access the 
trading platform to place their instruments. 
Figure 16. Secondary securities markets 
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Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
Secondary markets allow the interaction between investors’ bids and 
offers (the ‘complementary goods’) in order to achieve the exchange of a 
financial instrument (liquidity). Investors can access the platform through a 
switch (intermediaries, e.g. brokers or dealers) or directly through Direct 
Market Access (DMA) if the firm has enough expertise, but under the 
supervision of an intermediary.  
Two pricing structures are usually charged in this network industry 
setting. Firstly, both bids and offers pay a fee for every executed order, which 
is generally the same for bids and offers. Commissions typically vary 
according to the number and size of orders, thereby promoting more volumes 
and revenues, to increase the value of the entire network (Economides, 1993) 
and reach the critical mass through size externalities (Pagano, 1989). The 
nature and pricing structure of the network at this stage is thus one-sided 
with ‘indirect’ size externalities (as a one-way network). In addition, access 
fees are passed on to final investors by intermediaries (spreads) if the investor 
does not directly access the market. 
Secondary 
markets 
Secondly, trading platforms generally charge a membership fee to grant 
access to the venue (see Figure 16). For investors who do not meet the 
admission criteria, fees are embedded in the intermediaries’ executable 
bid/ask spread (e.g. retail investors). The same occurs for investors who 
prefer to access markets through intermediaries (brokers/dealers) because 
they deal with several trading venues and find it inconvenient to pay multiple 
membership fees. In effect, there are several categories of traders/investors, 
Two-sided 
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who may need to access multiple platforms to execute their orders to get best 
execution (Harris, 2002). Markets with automated continuous auction systems 
(called ‘broker-dealer crossing networks’) have a pricing structure that is 
typically two-sided (‘non-neutrality’ of access fees127). This pricing also exists 
in markets where dealers commit own capital or provide crossing services 
with or without fiduciary duties (or quote-driven dealer markets). Fees in 
these two markets are designed to stimulate the interaction between 
uninformed and informed investors, thus generating strong network 
externalities (of the indirect type).  
In effect, four conditions help us to define secondary securities markets 
as ‘two-sided’: 
1)  Both groups of users (bids and offers) gain from accessing the platform. 
2)  Too high transaction costs would not allow private bilateral agreements 
on how to deal with externalities (Coase, 1960). 
3)  Users pay access fees. 
4)  Access fees are ‘non-neutral’. 
Despite strong size externalities (economies of scale), securities markets 
– here two-sided markets – have shown the ability to support competing 
trading venues (‘multi-homing’; Armstrong, 2006) where at least one group of 
users needs to access multiple platforms, as a reflection of the diverse needs 
of market participants beyond simple price factors. Advanced technologies 
(smart order routing systems, etc.) have provided investors with tools to 
exploit direct network externalities (economies of scope) coming from the 
interaction of competing (trading) platforms, in particular if complementary 
(Van Cayseele & Reynaerts, 2010).128 The value of the network derives not 
only from its size externality and its ability to reach a ‘critical mass’ of 
liquidity – as originally perceived by markets and policy-makers. It also 
comes from the interaction of competing trading venues with different market 
designs to meet multi-faceted investors’ needs. In effect, today an investor can 
pursue different strategies (e.g. price improvements and speed) by executing 
simultaneously two different orders on multiple platforms.  
                                                      
127 The ‘non-neutrality’ of access fees is the primary condition of two-sided markets (Rochet & Tirole, 2004). This 
means that the overall volume of transactions depends on the allocation of fees between groups of users. The 
platform can influence the overall number of transactions by modifying the membership for a group of users, 
keeping the other fees constant. In effect, members acting in different capacities may get (in relative terms) a 
lower fee (as they bring uninformed and low-risk investors to the market) than a firm requesting membership in 
its own capacity only. 
128 The role of economies of scale and scope in the post-trading infrastructure have been discussed at length, in 
particular for settlement services. Some recent studies (Schmiedel, 2002; Schmiedel et al., 2006; Van Cayseele & 
Wuyts, 2006) suggest that there are potentially strong economies of scale in the EU post-trading landscape, which 
may lead to further alliances and mergers between incumbents. Divergent views arise around the policy 
implications that these authors suggest. On the one hand, some authors (Schmiedel et al., 2006) argue that to fully 
exploit the economies of scale of network infrastructures, mergers and further integration in the post-trade 
industry should be promoted. On these theoretical rationales, for instance, the ECB decided to go ahead with 
Target2Securities (T2S), which is a project to create a pan-European platform for securities settlement accounts in 
central bank money. On the other side, others (Van Cayseele & Wuyts, 2007; Van Cayseele & Reynaerts, 2010) 
noted that economies of scale are limited and are typically exhausted before the pan-European scale is achieved. 
In addition, ‘bridges’ and multi-homing services suggest that economies of scope may be significant. Hence, they 
suggest that regulators should carry on further investigation before unbundling services or creating monopolies 
in any part of the value chain. 80 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
Conclusion # 11   
Today’s markets benefit from the interaction of groups of users and platforms, as well as 
competition/interaction between platforms (including dealers’ networks). Being a vital part 
of the network, competition lives if markets are contestable, not only from a technological 
standpoint (sunk costs), but also in terms of fair market practices and an evenly applied 
market regulation (dynamic view). This implies the need to abate barriers to entry and exit 
and monitor adopted market practices. Competition authorities should play an increasingly 
important role in this regard. 
5.3  Competition and fragmentation 
 
The structure of financial markets has remarkably evolved in the last decade. 
Most notably, equity markets have experienced unprecedented changes that 
have redefined the interaction between investors and trading platforms. The 
tension between reaching ‘critical mass’ (with its self-reinforcing network 
effects) and meeting investors’ need for diversified execution services (as a 
result of their multi-form nature; Harris 2002) has generated a conflict 
between consolidation and fragmentation. Prior to the introduction of MiFID, 
stock exchanges benefited from the application of concentration rules, which 
forced intermediaries and investors to carry out any transactions in listed 
shares on their main national market. The aim was to preserve price 
formation and market integrity by concentrating trading activities in one 
consolidated limit order book, even though the primary economic objective 
and nature of a trading network is the reduction of transaction costs to 
increase volumes. Infrastructures for order execution (exchanges) have been 
widely considered as a natural monopoly until the widespread diffusion of 
new technologies and internet. This conception was based on two premises, 
firstly, that amassing liquidity in one place would generate positive 
externalities and, secondly, that liquidity would gravitate around the most 
liquid market (Pagano, 1989). However, technology has transformed 
securities markets into networks where users and platforms interact. 
Interaction reduces transaction costs (marginal costs129) close to zero by 
generating positive externalities, given economies of scale and scope. In effect, 
the rationale of a natural monopoly lies in the basic condition that only one 
firm can produce the output (here the exchange of financial instruments) at 
the lowest marginal costs and at the minimum efficient scale (Varian, 2006). 
Under this assumption, costs would be declining with a growing number of 
users (size externalities, see Figure 17 A below) as opposed to an ordinary 
cost structure (Figure 17 B). Regulation must set prices equal to marginal cost 
(that is the price of a perfectly competitive market). Otherwise, the 
monopolist would produce or generate a sub-optimal volume of trading. 
However, defining the price of perfect competition (price equal to marginal 
costs) notably is not a perfect science.  
Concentration 
rules 
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Figure 17. Cost structures with (A) and without (B) size externalities  
Price Price
Quantity Quantity
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ATC
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Note: MC = Marginal Costs) and ATC = Average Total Costs. 
Source: Authors.  
If at least one market participant could replicate the cost structure of the 
monopolist (A), the market should no longer be considered a natural 
monopoly (it would not be naturally designed for one market participant 
since a monopolistic equilibrium would be sub-optimal in terms of prices and 
volumes). As shown below, many studies in the last two decades suggest that 
competition between trading venues is possible and somehow beneficial, 
thereby discarding the presence of a natural monopoly in the market for 
securities (for a review, see Lee, 2002, amongst others, and Economides, 1996).  
In effect, transaction costs (implicit and explicit) have plummeted across 
European and US markets after the abolition of the concentration rule in both 
jurisdictions, which has contributed to fragment the trading landscape 
(Lannoo & Valiante, 2010). In Europe, the abolition de facto  took place in 
2007-08 when member states fully transposed MiFID rules in their national 
legal systems, while in the US Rule 390 had been already abolished by the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in December 1999. 
 
The contestability130 of financial markets has been increasing since the 
1980s, when automation of trading (and computers) has gradually become 
widespread, allowing the dematerialisation of securities and new forms of 
trading for investors as well as higher speed and capacity for trading venues. 
Technology made the dematerialisation of securities possible, together with 
new forms of trading for investors and higher speed and capacity for trading 
venues. Automation of trading, in effect, has drastically reduced entry 
barriers in terms of sunk (fixed) costs since technologies have become 
commoditised and easy to customise (Domowitz & Steil, 1999). However, 
only with the commercial diffusion of the internet in the mid-1990s, securities 
markets became widely contestable, given the abating of geographical 
barriers. Floor trading specialists have been replaced by sophisticated 
algorithms executed from only a few locations around the globe, as they are 
more able to deal with market impact (Domowitz, 1990). Nowadays, retail 
investors can potentially access every market in the world from their home 
Contestability 
and 
fragmentation 
                                                      
130 A perfectly contestable market is a market in which barriers to entry and exit are low enough to give 
newcomers enough incentives to enter the market and compete with the incumbents (Baumol, 1982).    82 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
PC. Hence, in the last decade new demand for securities has flowed into 
financial markets and volumes have been constantly increasing across the 
planet (see regional and global indicators in Annex I). The number of 
uninformed investors has grown and become less rare than it used to be. 
Overall, soaring volumes have promoted important changes in the structure 
of the market, and as a result open limit order books (OLOBs) have become a 
stable institution (Glosten, 1994). 
Increased contestability means more possibilities for newcomers to 
enter the market for order execution and matching services. Market 
fragmentation – to be distinguished from liquidity fragmentation131 – became 
a recurring aspect across European and US markets after the abolition of 
concentration rules. Incumbent exchanges have been demutualised by 
becoming for-profit firms (for a review, Levin, 2003) and put in competition 
with alternative trading platforms (so-called ‘Multilateral Trading 
Facilities’132), internalisers and crossing networks run by brokers/dealers (see 
next section).  
Fragmentation has positive and negative implications, due to two 
potential effects:  
1)  Order creation; 
2)  Order diversion 
The interaction between these forces determine the impact of co-existing 
trading systems and the optimal degree of transparency, in particular for a 
dealer market setting with low probabilities of trade execution and 
experiencing the potential entry of a competing venue (Degryse et al., 2009).  
On the one hand, fragmentation fosters competition between trading 
venues on access and execution fees (or bid/ask spreads), as well as 
competition on execution services between brokers/dealers. Competing 
trading venues also provide competing execution and matching services (e.g. 
dark order books, crossing systems, internalisation, etc.). As long as investors 
can access consolidated data (through mandatory disclosure) and use 
technologies to split up orders (Madhavan, 1995), trading venues may be able 
to offer diversified services to meet multi-faceted investors’ needs and to 
produce strong economies of scope (interaction of many users and liquidity 
pools and between pools). Those needs are very diverse (Harris, 2002) but can 
be perhaps summarised as: 
•  Handling big size orders (hedging, inventory, etc.); 
•  Investing in information (arbitrageurs, informed traders, etc.); 
•  Closing a position as fast as technically possible (close to real-time); and 
•  Minimising costs. 
For all these reasons, the market will most likely not coalesce in a single 
pool of liquidity. The provision of new services and competitive fees may 
then increase volumes even further (order creation). Several empirical studies 
Benefits and 
costs 
                                                      
131 Market fragmentation concerns the co-existence of several trading platforms in the same marketplace. This 
does not necessarily mean that this market setting favours the fragmentation of liquidity by reducing 
interconnection and thus hampering price discovery processes and market quality. This report uses the terms 
‘fragmentation’ and ‘market fragmentation’ interchangeably.  
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have shown so far that competition/fragmentation has produced beneficial 
effects on market structure by reducing spreads, fees and attracting new 
liquidity in some markets (Glosten, 1994; McInish & Wood, 1996; Battalio et 
al., 1997; Boehmer, 2005; Foucault & Menkveld, 2008; for a review, see O’Hara 
& Ye, 2009; Riordan et al., 2009; Angel et al., 2010; Gresse, 2010). 
On the other hand, market fragmentation may have some drawbacks 
for liquidity as it reduces beneficial liquidity externalities (economies of 
scale). Orders will be diverted on other venues and not consolidated in a 
single order book, with implications for the likelihood of execution and 
potential unintended consequences on liquidity (Mendelson, 1987). 
Furthermore, orders will stop competing on the same order book with 
potential ‘cream-skimming’ effect. In effect, conflict between order creation 
and diversion may push intermediaries and trading venues to select part of 
the demand (typically the uninformed one, since less risky), leaving 
remaining order flows to deal with informed investors. The cream-skimming 
activities of intermediaries (outside the electronic order books) and some 
venues can spread orders in the market with strong adverse selection 
problems for markets that suffer from discrimination (in particular, if it is a 
quote-driven dealer market; Hagerty & McDonald, 1996; Easley et. al., 1996; 
Battalio, 1997; Gajewsky & Gresse, 2007). The impact of these potential 
distorting effects will depend on the overall size of the market, if the market is 
big enough the effects of cream-skimming activities will be fairly limited for 
liquid shares, while effects on less-liquid markets may need to be assessed 
case-by-case. Finally, fragmented markets have to deal with fragmented 
surveillance systems and rules. Author i t i e s  n e e d  t o  m a k e  s u r e  t h a t  
organisational and surveillance requirements are fully and uniformly applied 
across all trading venues. Ongoing supervision should then make sure that 
practices are sufficiently implemented.  
Cream-skimming 
Figure 18. Market fragmentation versus liquidity fragmentation 
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Source: Authors. 
The graph above explores the market structure dynamics. B and C are 
respectively functions of benefits and costs for all market participants (e.g. 
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investors). Their value varies as a function of the number of users and 
competing platforms. Two potential equilibria may be found (Y and X). 
The benefit function B is a concave function that represents the 
evolution of benefits for all market participants associated with an increase of 
users and platforms. The first equilibrium Y refers to the market setting 
before new technologies and the abolition of concentration rules unleashed 
platform competition. Before reaching Y and immediately afterwards, the cost 
function is very steep given big economies of scale (due to a few disconnected 
platforms that have reached the ‘critical’ volumes in Y). Similarly, benefits 
increase fast, as – on the one side – investors can access a trading platform to 
match other interests and avoid expensive bilateral negotiations and – on the 
other side – trading platforms can gradually reach their profitability and 
benefit from a combination of economies of scale and scope from Y onwards.  
In effect, the development of advanced technologies (e.g. automated 
trading and internet) have lowered sunk and access costs, thus the thesis that 
national exchanges were natural monopolies with limited economies of scale 
was gradually dismissed. This situation led regulators to abolish 
concentration rules, which had protected that market equilibrium (Y). 
The combination of regulatory and technological breakthroughs (more 
recently in Europe than in the US) has promoted market fragmentation and 
competition between platforms. As a result, costs for setting up trading 
platforms (sunk costs) and trading costs for final investors have further gone 
down. Beneficial effects due to a greater number of users (economies of scale) 
and multiple platforms (economies of scope) have increased benefits for final 
investors – who can access better-tailored execution services – and for trading 
platforms – which benefit from a potentially higher range of investors and 
services to compete on. This situation has created a highly competitive 
landscape around costs of trading and offered diversified ‘bundled’ execution 
services (e.g. direct electronic access services)133 in order to gain a bigger part 
of the surplus. 
As a result of these competitive forces among trading platforms and 
investors on the order flow (informed versus uninformed), market 
fragmentation/competition may generate costs, such as market impact for 
larger size orders and costs for routing orders across several trading venues. 
Therefore, once passed the equilibrium Y and after reducing costs, greater 
benefits await market participants due to the combined effects of economies 
of scale and scope. Costs (e.g. costs of interconnection) and lower benefits 
(such as reduced profits for trading platforms) for market participants will 
push the two functions towards another equilibrium (X). This point is at a 
higher level than Y, where the market absorbs the entire surplus, regardless of 
its distribution. The stability of this equilibrium is unknown, since it is up to 
the market (and regulators) to understand that a greater number of competing 
platforms may cause greater costs than benefits, even if the number of users 
would increase. Hence, the strategic behaviour of market competitors – which 
fragmentation 
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Case COMP/M.2220, General Electric/Honeywell, Commission decision of 3 July 2001 and Evans & Salinger 
(2002).  MIFID 2.0: CASTING NEW LIGHT ON EUROPE’S CAPITAL MARKETS | 85 
 
look for an opportunity to seize a bigger part of that surplus – may result in 
liquidity fragmentation and strong negative externalities. Empirical studies 
are not conclusive about the ‘optimal market capacity’ for trading platforms 
that financial markets can currently bear. Economides (2008) argues that 
perfect competition (with zero marginal costs) would provide a network that 
is smaller than the socially optimum. Hence, the second equilibrium (X) 
implies a non-perfectly contestable market.134 
Box 7. A case study of national stock exchanges: Next steps after the demutualisation 
In the last two decades, national stock exchanges have undergone evolutionary changes in 
their governance and business models. Three major trends happened to be part of these 
changes: 
1)  Demutualisation; 
2)  Consolidation; and  
3)  Diversification. 
The demutualisation of European national stock exchanges started in the early 1990s 
and had been ongoing for more than a decade (for a review, see Levin, 2003). Nowadays, the 
once nationalised and user-governed stock exchanges are for-profit entities facing fierce 
competition from new trading platforms, but they still keep part of their institutional role in 
financial markets (Lee, 1998). For instance, they still provide primary markets (listings) and 
‘junior’ markets for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). 
National stock exchanges have been leading the process of consolidation, since the 
process of demutualisation started, and in reaction to the prospects of abolishing the 
concentration rule and opening up execution services to competition.  Exchanges have been 
working to increase their economies of scale in order to compensate the drop in trading 
revenues. This situation brought a period of intense talks around potential mergers and 
some important ones eventually took place. For instance, the merger in 2000 between Paris, 
Amsterdam and Brussels (‘Euronext’), followed then by Lisbon (2003). The merger between 
the London Stock Exchange and Borsa Italiana was part of this process too. In addition, a 
final act (for the moment) was the merger between the NYSE and Euronext in 2007 that 
created the world’s biggest exchange. 
Currently, exchanges are important players that are redesigning their business models 
to keep pace with changes in market structure. In effect, consolidation has also been driven 
by the importance of acquiring sufficient know-how and economies of scale to develop their 
business model in other parts of the value chain or to reinforce their original vertical (silo) 
models (see Figure 19.).  
 
 
 
                                                      
134 A perfectly contestable market is a market in which barriers to entry and exit are absent (Baumol et al., 1982). 
The threat of potential ‘hit-and-run’ strategies keeps markets highly competitive. Besides other critical 
assumptions, an important one behind this theory is the absence of sunk costs. In the case of financial markets, 
those network infrastructures suffer fairly high sunk costs that are going down thanks to technologies. 
Accordingly, even though the market becomes more and more ‘contestable’ due to shrinking sunk costs (thanks 
to new technologies), these costs will not be zero; therefore competitors may need to benefit from a quasi-
perfectly competitive and contestable market in order to have enough incentives to set up a competing network 
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Figure 19. 2009 Exchanges revenues by activity (main European markets) 
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Source: FESE. 
‘Diversification’ is the word that better identifies current market developments in the 
business of exchanges. These firms have massively invested in strategic mergers and new 
trading platforms, in particular by successfully acquiring new MTFs (such as Turquoise, 
Smartpool and NYFIX Euro-Millennium) or running their own (see Table 6) in order to build 
know-how on new trading mechanisms (e.g. automated dark order books or HFT). Investing 
in technologies to increase speed and capacity of infrastructures is key for their future. For 
instance, NYSE Euronext recently launched its new universal trading platform (for all 
markets) and LSE Group will soon launch the new Millennium platform for the main UK 
markets (after the start of Turquoise with this system). 
Business diversification has also been pursued by developing trade execution services 
for assets other than equities. For instance, for Deutsche Börse (through Eurex) and NYSE 
Euronext (after the acquisition of LIFFE in 2001), such services are already profitable. The 
proposed merger between NYSE Euronext and Deutsche Börse is aimed at giving a boost to 
diversification135. 
Table 6. MTFs run/owned by exchanges 
2008  2009  2010 
16  19  26 
Source: CESR MiFID Database (accessed on July 1st). 
Furthermore, regulatory changes have effectively promoted greater use of organised 
trading platforms for non-equity products, together with advanced data services to keep up 
with competing post-trading services and market fragmentation (by consolidating data 
across asset classes). Exchanges will have to give more emphasis to their expertise in these 
areas in order to compete with incumbent dealer markets and other actors.136 
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5.4  Classification and obligations of trading venues: A ‘new’ role 
for internalisation? 
 
Trading platforms bring together buyers’ and sellers’ interests in financial 
instruments to promote best allocation of capital in financial markets. Besides 
MiFID rules, trading platforms can be classified as either neutral or non-
neutral.  
A ‘neutral’ trading platform allows matching and public dissemination 
of executable bids and offers (or asks), which are typically consolidated in an 
open limit order book (displaying best bid/ask offers) that may or may not be 
pre-trade transparent. Binding manifestations of interest are sent to the 
platforms by investors, typically through their intermediaries or dealers, who 
can also trade on their own capacity. Access to the platform is defined on a 
non-discretionary basis and the company running the platform does not trade 
on own account or act on behalf of investors either as a principal, agent or 
‘riskless counterparty’.137 This is the main characteristic of so-called 
‘multilateral trading mechanisms’. MTFs contribute to price discovery by 
publishing meaningful pre-trade information (executable quotes), which 
allows traders to execute their orders almost in real-time.  Furthermore, 
liquidity providers may commit capital to support continuous trading.138 An 
‘undiscriminating’ platform has three main characteristics (Madhavan, 1992; 
Glosten, 1994): 
i)  It will breakdown with high asymmetry of information (adverse 
selection and moral hazard); 
ii)  It lowers spreads for small quantities (cheaper and more accessible for 
retail and small professional investors; ‘fairer’ markets); and 
iii)  It invites competition between trading platforms as lower execution fees 
will attract more investors. 
A ‘non-neutral’ trading platform brings together buyers’ and sellers’ 
orders that are already on its own books (‘own account’) or are part of 
dealings carried out by wholesale counterparties (e.g. asset management 
companies). Therefore, execution services are provided as part of activities to 
handle in-house orders (internalisation) or to cross them on internal crossing 
networks (over-the-counter, OTC). Both activities can be considered 
‘preferencing’ activities (Lee, 2002) developed by banks and brokers/dealers 
in order to promote best execution outside MiFID official venues (RMs, MTFs 
and SIs), as well as to increase competition on pricing with main markets. 
These forms of trading present a trade-off between the risks of market 
fragmentation and ‘cream skimming’ on the one side, and better prices and 
lower dealing costs (in particular, for the institutional demand) on the other. 
A ‘discriminating’ platform (Glosten, 1994), finally, makes markets: 
1)  Less likely to breakdown (it selects liquidity); and 
2)  Unresponsive to competitive reactions (liquidity is typically ‘locked-in’ 
by switching costs and competition may not be profitable as liquidity is 
Trading 
platforms 
                                                      
137 Recital (6), MiFID. By contrast, “‘Dealing on own account’ means trading against proprietary capital resulting 
in the conclusion of transactions in one or more financial instruments”; Art. 4, MiFID. 
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limited139). 
Figure 20. Trading platforms and MiFID 
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Source: Authors. 
MiFID designed a set of official trading venues operating as trading 
systems for shares admitted to trading on RMs. On the one hand, there are 
two major categories of ‘neutral’ and non-discretionary trading venues 
providing order execution services under MiFID: regulated markets (RMs; 
Arts. 4.14 and 42), and multilateral trading facilities (MTFs; Art. 4.15). The 
Commission is consulting on the proposal to introduce a new category of 
trading venue for OTC derivatives, the so-called organised trading facility 
(OTF, see 0), which represents the evolution of current inter-dealer platforms 
currently classified as MTFs. The definition propounded by the Commission 
does not clarify yet if the platform will be a discretionary or non-discretionary 
trading system.  
 
As trading venues, RMs and MTFs perform order execution services 
with the ‘same organised trading functionality’ (Recital 6, MiFID). However, 
RMs have more stringent requirements for admission to listing and trading, 
higher disclosure costs for issuers and obligations to monitor potentially 
abusive practices and preserve orderly trading.140 Specifically, securities 
regulation has always recognised an important role of RMs for investor 
protection; this may have affected the way in which MTFs have been 
sometimes treated by national authorities.141 CESR (2010b), in this respect, has 
formally proposed to level these rules, which will oblige MTFs:  
i)  To have the same arrangements as RMs for conflicts of interest in their 
operations;  
ii)  To be equipped with adequate mechanisms to manage the risks to 
which they are exposed; and  
RMs and MTFs 
                                                      
139 However, technologies have brought down switching costs and introduced new trading methodologies. This is 
actually increasing competitive reactions also on these platforms for the provision of execution services. 
140 These other requirements are mainly coming from Art. 43 MiFID, the Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC) 
and the Prospectus Directive (2003/71/EC).  
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iii)  To set arrangements for the sound management of technical operations 
(e.g. risks of system disruptions).  
The third requirement will need to be extended also to OTFs (European 
Commission, 2010b, p. 19). 
Finally, in order to trade a share admitted to trading in another 
regulated market, regulated markets have to wait 18 months from the original 
admission, plus the publication of a summary note to the prospectus by the 
issuer, while MTFs run by investment firms are not requested to follow this 
procedure. As explicitly stated by MiFID (Recital 6), these players operate 
with the same business model and thus should be subject to the same set of 
rules. 
On the other hand, the Directive also established a new trading venue, 
the so-called ‘systematic internaliser’ (SI). This venue executes trades on own 
account on an ‘organised, frequent and systematic basis’ (Art. 4.1.7, MiFID), 
outside RMs and MTFs. It applies non-discretionary rules in handling trades 
and pre-trade transparency for client orders on liquid shares (for illiquid ones, 
only on request) below the standard market size (SMS).142 However, besides 
publication issues, pre-trade transparency is not meaningful since quotes are 
not executable because execution happens at the discretion of the SI. The 
contribution to price discovery is therefore minimal. 
SI 
Conclusion # 12   
Competition between trading venues on prices and execution services and between 
investment firms on the provision of other investment services has generated some positive 
effects, in terms of promoting investments in trading platforms and reducing trading costs 
for shares. Competition needs, however, to be fair and based on a level playing field between 
MiFID-official trading venues and their structural characteristics. 
In this respect, this report acknowledges the importance of ensuring a harmonised 
approach across national supervisory authorities in the application of MiFID requirements 
for official trading venues. This may require a further alignment of the remaining differences 
in the legal obligations (and supervisory practices) applied to regulated markets (RMs) and 
multilateral trading facilities (MTFs). This alignment of legal obligations already exists in 
some European countries (e.g. the UK). 
 
Box 8. The regime for systematic internalisers 
The low number of firms currently registered as systematic internalisers (only 12) has 
suggested that the current regime may not be a great success. Along with CESR’s advice 
(2010b), the SI regime does contain some ambiguities in its text. In particular, Art. 21.1 
(Implementing Regulation) sets the conditions to be considered where trading venues 
execute trades on an “organised, frequent and systematic” basis on own account (bilateral 
trading mechanism). These conditions – to be considered all together – are: 
1)  The application of non-discretionary rules and procedures and the activity has a 
material commercial role; 
                                                      
142 Art. 27, MiFID; Arts. 21-25, Implementing Regulation. The Standard Market Size (SMS) is defined in Annex II, 
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2)  The development of activities through personnel or automated technical systems, with 
no consideration if they are also used for other purposes; and 
3)  The continuity and regularity of the activity. 
Condition 1, in particular, has raised doubts about the term ‘non-discretionary’ having 
the same meaning as for RMs and MTFs. CESR (2010b) suggests keeping this reference but 
clarifying that it was originally intended only to avoid non-systematic trading (including this 
clause in their commercial policies).‘Dealing on own account’ is by definition a discretionary 
activity, so the requirement cannot refer to the trading system itself. Furthermore, by 
assessing whether the activity is a significant source of revenue, competent authorities 
should be able to determine the materiality of the commercial role covered by the firm. CESR 
suggests setting a threshold for the activity to be considered ‘significant’. By contrast, the 
Commission (2010b, p. 17) proposed to replace the more vague condition of ‘material 
commercial relevance’ with a quantitative threshold above which, if the firm also meets the 
other two conditions, it will be required to register as SI to the competent authority. 
Condition 3, finally, does not explicitly clarify what is the meaning of a continuous and 
regular activity, besides what common sense would suggest. 
In addition, some pre-trade information (quotes) displayed by SIs is not meaningful 
since it is often one-sided and in a very low size (even one share). Therefore, de facto the 
market does not see liquidity and activities on the venue. In order to keep the level playing 
field even for retail traders in RMs and MTFs, CESR suggested to fix a minimum quote size 
(10% of SMS of any liquid share in which the firm is SI). Quotes then need to be two-sided 
and periodic trading data reports should be published more regularly (e.g. monthly; CESR, 
2010b). Finally, SIs are not properly flagged in the post-trade disclosure, which has 
prompted CESR to propose a flag for trades executed by internalisers (ISO 9362). CESR’s 
proposal on quotes, flagging and trade reports has been also endorsed by the Commission’s 
recent consultation report. 
5.4.1  Shedding light on over-the-counter equity trading 
Besides internalisation, another form of ‘preferencing’ activity has been 
historically offered by brokers, and known as ‘internal crossing’. Part of the 
liquidity in the market – even for liquid equity markets – has always followed 
a different way of execution, generally called ‘upstairs trading’ (Madhavan, 
2000). Those services provided on a discretionary basis have been evolving 
with time and are currently offered through sophisticated internal crossing 
engines. These engines utilise complex algorithms to achieve best execution, 
by either matching internally or executing on MiFID official venues (RMs and 
MTFs). These internal crossing systems are also more commonly defined as 
broker-dealer crossing systems (BCSs, or broker-dealer crossing networks 
BCNs if several BCSs interact in one or more pools of liquidity). In addition, 
‘crossing’ activities are also subject to fiduciary duties and conduct of 
business rules (Arts. 19, 20, 21, MiFID; OTC) as well as arrangements to 
disclose conflicts of interests. While post-trade transparency obligations apply 
to them, they are not affected by pre-trade transparency or organisational 
requirements (CESR, 2010b).  
MiFID captures internal matching activities offered by brokers/dealers 
through the definition of ‘transactions carried out on an OTC basis’. Three 
conditions should be met for trades to fall under the definition of OTC equity 
trade (Recital 53, MiFID): 
i)  Transactions must be ad hoc and irregular; 
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ii)  Dealings take place with a wholesale counterparty; and 
iii)  Dealings must be above the standard market size (SMS). 
The interpretation around the implementation of these conditions is 
currently different across the industry. Market views consistently diverge 
around the business nature of BCNs, which for some perform the same 
business as RMs and MTFs and therefore should be classified as such.  
One side of the market believes that there is part of OTC trading that 
should be traded on RMs/MTFs and SIs and are therefore subject to strict pre-
trade transparency requirements and more effective post-trade reporting, 
while they acknowledge the importance of OTC trading in the MiFID text. 
Most will agree that all trading happening in Europe, including the one 
taking place under the OTC label, should be properly classified in order to 
preserve market quality and prevent any significant part of the market from 
escaping pre-trade transparency without any economic justification (see 
below) and other MTFs rules on access, discretion and surveillance. This part 
of the market argues that OTC performs the same function as RMs and MTFs, 
and if not properly classified, could increase liquidity fragmentation and 
weaken investor protection.  
Moving from the assumption that the OTC trade reports used were 
meaningful and mostly accurate, a recent study tries to shed more light on 
OTC trading (Gomber & Pierron, 2010). Using current data on OTC trades, 
the authors show that about 39% of OTC trades are below retail size, 48% are 
below standard market size, 87% are below large-in-scale and 73% are too 
small to have a market impact according to their proprietary methodology. 
According to them, this should be enough to clarify that these networks deal 
with trades below the standard market size, even though orders are partially 
sent to regulated markets and MTFs. In addition, crossing systems are 
designed as ‘multilateral’ trading mechanisms that match trades, acting as 
‘riskless counterparties’. Hence, 87% of trades could potentially escape the 
size-related pre-trade transparency waiver imposed on RM and MTF trades 
(Gomber & Pierron, 2010). These findings imply that the MiFID conditions to 
be considered ‘OTC trading’ are not met and therefore there should be a 
proper classification for these trades under current MiFID-official trading 
venues (see below). 
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Figure 21. Transparency obligations for venues under MiFID 
 
Source: Gomber & Pierron (2010, p. 11). 
 
This first position concludes that, even if OTC trades would be 
considered bilateral, 52% of them seem to be escaping MiFID rules of pre-
trade transparency for SIs. In any case, they see BCSs as multilateral trading 
systems, that are systems managed by firms not operating on own account or 
taking any risk in the transaction (recital 44, MiFID). As a result multilateral 
trading systems should be classified as RMs and MTFs.  
 
A countering view contests the abovementioned interpretation of recital 
53. In their view, broker-dealer crossing systems (BCSs) are fully compliant 
with MiFID, which recognised their role in financial markets. However, those 
platforms should be better classified in the new MiFID text.  
According to this second position (see graph below), the advanced 
brokerage services offered to clients (wholesale counterparties) through the 
use of BCNs meet the MiFID conditions for trades ‘carried out on an OTC 
basis’, since they are:  
•  Dealings with wholesale counterparties (e.g. asset management 
companies); 
•  Dealings (‘parent’ orders) above the standard market size; and  
•  Dealings irregularly transacted with brokers/dealers. 
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Figure 22. Broker-dealer crossing system 
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Source: Authors. 
They note that trades may be below the standard market size only after 
the broker/dealer has accepted to execute the trade and split the ‘parent’ 
order into ‘child’ orders, eventually routing them to several trading venues to 
minimise market impact (including internal crossing systems, as BCSs or 
BCNs, but also RMs and MTFs). They argue that the Directive refers to 
‘parent’ orders since fiduciary duties and business conduct rules apply to the 
‘parent’ order as a whole and not separately to each ‘child’ order. 
Nevertheless, in their view, most trades are sent to regulated markets and 
MTFs for execution, while usually less than 1/3 is ‘internally’ crossed. They 
argue that advanced brokerage services need to interact with internal crossing 
systems, which allow a smoother handling and execution of big orders. The 
general rationale for trading OTC is best execution of trades outside official 
markets. Moreover – besides the exemption of recital 53 – this position also 
argues that BCSs cannot be considered ‘multilateral’ since they do not act as 
‘riskless counterparties’ since the ‘riskless’ position is part of the execution 
they carry on behalf of their clients. Since MiFID obliges them to provide best 
execution and apply other conduct of business arrangements, they should not 
be considered acting as ‘riskless counterparties’. In addition, recital 44 says 
that RMs and MTFs should be managed with non-discretionary rules, which 
is not the case for BCSs. Most of all, they claim that internalisation is 
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gradually becoming an indispensable complementary execution service to 
those offered by official markets, rather than a competing service as originally 
feared. 
Finally, some players claim that imposing a trading threshold may 
represent a threat for the provision of complex and tailored brokerage 
services, as it needs to be accurately and constantly updated. Clarifications of 
the defining criteria of ‘OTC trades’ under MiFID and availability of data for 
full assessment and enforcement of best execution, and other conduct of 
business rules are needed. Once these aspects are defined, the burdens of the 
obligations would set a ‘natural’ threshold to the development of these 
trading systems with no threat to price formation processes in the open 
markets, since it would become highly costly to carry them out on a broad 
scale.  
The European Commission (2010b, p. 11) has proposed a ‘new sub-
regime for BCSs, which will de facto assign a new classification to these venues 
under MiFID organised trading facilities (see next box). This classification will 
work by setting two boundaries: i) if third parties will enter orders in the 
crossing system, the BCS would transform the system in an MTF; ii) if the 
broker/dealer executes internally against its own capital, the system would 
change in a SI.  
Commission’s 
proposal 
Figure 23. Proposal for broker dealer crossing system (BCSs) 
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Source: European Commission (2010b). 
This proposal tries to accommodate conflicting views and it may 
represent a radical change for the definition of SI and MTF. For instance, if 
third parties enter orders in the system, it does not necessarily mean that the 
system is based on non-discretionary rules (such as an MTF). Therefore, this 
proposal will de facto modify incentives to provide discretionary execution 
services (e.g. upstairs trading) under MiFID, with unclear broader 
implications. 
Being a sub-category of OTF, the broker/dealer running the BCS may 
also need to add an identifier for post-trade transparency requirements and 
report the daily number, value and volume of transactions. It will also add an 
identifier to transaction reports, to show when the transaction is executed on 
the system. 
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Box 9. Organised trading for OTC derivatives: EU and US discussions 
Following the G20 commitments,143 the European Commission has proposed that “where 
appropriate, trading in standardised144 OTC derivatives145 [will] move to exchanges or 
electronic trading platforms” (EU COM, 2010b, p.12). Besides the fact that some trading on 
fixed income products (bonds and structured products) and OTC derivatives takes already 
place through platforms registered as MTFs across Europe, the Commission – taking up the 
positions of the European Parliament (Langen, 2010) and CESR (2010g) – has proposed to 
introduce a new category of venue, the so-called ‘organised trading facilities’ (OTFs; EU 
COM, 2010b, p. 13). The Commission suggests that OTFs should meet the following 
conditions: 
1)  Non-discriminatory146 multilateral access; 
2)  Support pre- and post-trade transparency obligations; 
3)  Report transactions to trade repositories; and 
4)  Have a dedicated facility for execution of trades. 
For the consultation document, ESMA would set requirements to determine when a 
derivative is sufficiently liquid to be traded exclusively on OTFs or other organised venues. 
The decision could be based on liquidity measures such as frequency of trades and average 
size of transactions, as well as additional criteria such as the degree of investors’ 
participation. Ideally, requirements may need to coordinate with rules proposed for swap 
execution facilities (SEFs) in the US. Since the market for OTC derivatives is global, 
uncoordinated responses could create regulatory arbitrages.  
Furthermore, rule-making should take into account that non-equity products (in 
particular, OTC derivatives) usually have a different market structure than equity markets 
(limit order books), with dealers posting executable quotes at investors’ request (Request For 
Quotes model; RFQ) or through bilateral transactions. The RFQ model is required by the 
nature of the transaction that is essentially bilateral, and by the nature of the demand that is 
mostly institutional and require a certain degree of customisation. A greater push towards 
standardisation and organised trading should balance benefits of a more transparent and 
orderly setting with costs entailed by lower availability of customised derivatives and so 
greater possibility to leave in the system some risk not properly hedged (Valiante, 2010, p. 
45).147 
Trading in bonds and structured products is already partially done on organised 
trading venues like MTFs, but transparency obligations do not necessarily apply to them, 
due to the exemption in MiFID (Recital 46). In effect, there is a risk that the requirements for 
                                                      
143 In particular, G 20, “Declaration on strengthening the financial system”, London Summit, 2 April 2009 
(http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/resources/en/PDF/annex-strengthening-fin-sysm) and G 20, “Leaders’ 
Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit”, Pittsburgh Summit, 24-25 September 2009. 
144 Standardisation is a multifaceted concept. It “refers to specific technical processes, economic and legal terms of 
a financial product that allow a straight-through processing (STP) of a derivative transaction” (Valiante, 2010, p. 
11). A product is standardised when the interaction between those aspects does allow an STP of the transaction. 
The use of electronic means is only one aspect of standardisation. Other relevant aspects are uniform contractual 
agreements and the use of plain vanilla terms, where possible. 
145 For a definition, please see Section 4.4.5.  
146 The Commission does not clarify if ‘non-discriminatory’ should have the same meaning as ‘non-discretionary’, 
as currently defined by MiFID for RMs and MTFs (recital 44). 
147 CESR (2010g) believes that trading of standardised derivative products on organised trading venues is to be 
encouraged by regulators, even though not mandated at this stage. 96 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
OTFs may overlap with those for MTFs, as they provide a execution service. The border 
between being qualified as a MTF rather than an OTF should be clearly spelled out. In order 
to promote more organised and transparent trading for non-equity asset classes, the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has proposed148 that those systems should 
have robust risk controls and should display either indicative or executable quotes from 
members. In order to avoid unintended consequences for market structure, trading venues 
should be able to deploy both RFQ and electronic order book trading systems. In effect – for 
US regulators – this solution would allow a gradual shift from currently bilateral trading to 
SEFs by enhancing the opportunity for dealers to compete on executable quotes whenever 
possible, without necessarily undermining the management of their huge inventory 
positions (by publishing an indicative quote or falling under a large-in-scale waiver). The US 
proposal, at the moment, does not clarify whether these venues will have non-discriminatory 
access and pre-trade public transparency obligations, such as EU OTFs. The RFQ model 
under SEFs should have at least five market participants from which other participants can 
simultaneously request quotes. The order book model, if chosen by market participants, 
should develop a platform in which all of them can post bids and offers for other participants 
and decide with which of the displayed bids and offers transact. 
Finally, in Europe, some trading platforms – registered as MTFs – have already started 
to bring together, through organised trading on order books, executable quotes and interests 
of dealers and other market participants that have chosen to stream their quotes on these 
platforms. Public pre-trade disclosure is limited to non-executable quotes, such as the mid-
price.  
Besides specific positions on market structure and how equity trading 
on an OTC basis currently occurs, there is a consensus that the quality of OTC 
data needs to be effectively improved, reducing inconsistencies (duplicative 
reporting) and increasing granularity (in particular, through the use of 
specific flags). Post-trade transparency requirements for OTC trading have 
been introduced by MiFID for the first time in many countries. According to 
CESR (2010b), up to 38% of EEA trades occur on an OTC basis, but it also 
recognises serious risks of misreporting and double-counting. These data are 
collected by Thomson Reuters from market data sources that collect 
themselves data as defined by MiFID. At such levels, OTC trading may raise 
doubts about its beneficial role in European capital markets. Some argue that 
this size – despite being historically high for Europe – contradicts the MiFID 
concept of OTC being an exceptional type of execution. Separately, since all 
OTC trading is by definition ‘pre-trade dark’, if this figure is correct, such 
level of non- pre-trade transparent trade may undermine market quality and 
price formation mechanisms. 
However, there are two important caveats to the interpretation of this 
data. First of all, given the poor consistency and quality of OTC data, the 
publicly reported OTC may not be the same as what is actually traded OTC. 
Secondly, and even more importantly from the perspective of either of the 
two positions outlined above, CESR’s data only include the market share of 
OTC as reported through Markit BOAT or national exchanges. In effect, these 
data do not permit a trade-by-trade analysis or break down the overall 38% 
figure without assuming that no double-counting or misreporting exists (see 
OTC trade 
disclosure 
                                                      
148 Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), “Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap 
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0). These issues contribute to increasing uncertainty and opaqueness in the 
market. Without such an analysis, it is impossible to draw from the market 
share of the OTC alone any definitive conclusions about whether the OTC 
classification is being correct and whether, as a consequence, there is 
sufficient transparency and market quality in the market.  
In this respect, a recent study (Nomura, 2010) reports an earlier 
investigation made by the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) that 
estimates the share of reported OTC trades affected by double counting.  
OTC breakdown 
Figure 24. OTC ‘printed’ vs ‘actual’ equity trading 
 
Source: FSA (from Nomura, 2010). 
Since some trading venues are not officially recognised by MiFID and 
divergences exist between the regulatory and economic definition of trade, 
what the Directive considers as trade to be made transparent does not 
necessarily match the definition of trades that contribute to price formation. 
Therefore, there is a difference between what is ‘printed’ as defined by MiFID 
and what really contributes to price formation (‘actual trading’).  
As suggested by the figure above, in the UK market, roughly 35-40% of 
OTC trading represents ‘give-ups’ from brokers,149 plus other categories of 
trades that may not be considered as real liquidity, either price forming or 
informing. In addition, CESR (2010g) investigated other cases of double-
counting or misreporting (see box below).  
 
                                                      
149 Give-up trades are orders executed by a broker (A) on behalf of another one (B), who is officially executing it 
on behalf of a client. Since the order should be made by the broker B on behalf of the client, broker A should give 
up the trade (once executed) to broker B. In this way, the trade is printed when broker A buy shares on behalf of 
broker B and when the trades are given up and bought/sold by broker B in order to justify his/her execution to 
the client. 98 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
Box 10. OTC equity transaction type standards 
In order to improve the quality of OTC trade reporting, CESR (2010g) has proposed the 
introduction of transaction type standards.150 These standards should increase granularity 
and help at the same time to breakdown OTC trades into data that should be reconsolidated 
as either price forming or informing data, while avoiding double counting or misreporting. 
Hence, CESR proposed a flag for each type of transaction below: 
i)  Benchmark trades (when price is calculated over time, as result of different variables, 
e.g. VWAP (volume-weighted average price); 
ii)  Agency cross trades;151 
iii)  Give-up/in trades; 
iv)  Ex/cum dividend trades; and 
v)  Technical trades.152 
In addition, in order to avoid double reporting due to the complex application of Art. 
27.4 (implementing regulation), CESR clarifies that it should generally be the ‘executing 
broker’ that makes the report. If it is unclear who the ‘executing broker’ is, it should be the 
‘selling investment firm’ to provide the report. 
Therefore, the Committee has highlighted three potential sources of double-counted or 
misreported trades: 
i)  Riskless principal (the investment firm buying and selling on own account 
simultaneously to make the report); 
ii)  Agency cross (the investment firm ‘crossing’ the two trades should make the report); 
and 
iii)  Single/Multiple OTC transaction on behalf of a client (only the ‘selling’ investment 
firm or the trading platform where the trade has been sent should make the trade 
report, if not agreed otherwise). 
An example of double reporting is when a client orders to buy 10 million shares at a 
guaranteed 2 hour VWAP. The investment firm decides then to split it into child orders of 6 
million shares on the main RM, 3 million on a MTF and 1 million on another MTF. The 
investment firm will adjust the average price to the actual VWAP for client booking. The 
uncertainty surrounding who should report in this case obliges the investment firm – under 
MiFID I – to report as OTC the client booking of 10 million (client-leg). However, the market 
also sees 6 million + 3 million + 1 million as traded shares (market leg). Therefore, trade 
reporting will show 10 million as execution on MiFID-official trading venues and 10 million 
as OTC, even though the real trading volume was 50% of what has been reported and none 
of it ‘over-the-counter’. 
The CESR proposal clarifies that only the market-leg should be reported either by the 
selling investment firm or by the RMs or MTFs (if orders are sent to the market). In the 
abovementioned example, all 10 million shares would be trade reported by the RM and the 
two MTFs. In the case of BCNs, the trades that are matched in the internal crossing system 
would be trade reported by the executing (crossing) investment firm, while other trades sent 
                                                      
150 To amend Arts. 3 and 27(1)(b), Implementing Regulation. 
151 When a broker brings together clients’ orders to buy and sell, both transactions conducted as one transaction. 
152 ‘Technical trades’ is a generic category that includes ‘non-addressable liquidity’ or ‘exchange of shares […] 
determined by factors other than the current market valuation of the share’ (CESR, 2010g, p.11). This category 
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to the market would be reported by the trading venue where orders have been sent for 
execution.  
Conclusion # 13   
It is within the scope of this report to clarify the different views around the classification of 
trading venues and OTC trading (BCNs). However, this report does not challenge the role 
that OTC equity trading plays in financial markets, but rather acknowledges it, in particular 
where it comes to guaranteeing effective best execution for complex institutional orders. 
Therefore, the review of MiFID should not ban these trading activities but rather recognise 
their relevance by properly classifying them.  
This report also acknowledges the importance of ensuring a harmonised approach 
across national supervisory authorities in the application of MiFID requirements to official 
trading venues. This may require a further alignment of the legal provisions and supervisory 
practices applied to regulated markets (RMs) and multilateral trading facilities (MTFs). This 
alignment already does exist in some European countries, such as the UK where the 
remaining differences have been levelled.  
Data employed in the run-up to the MiFID review by the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators (CESR) to ascertain the size of OTC equity trading are inadequate. 
Analysis based on this data cannot be considered conclusive and has probably led to 
overestimates of the size of this market. More effort needs to be made to accurately assess 
market quality in Europe and clarify the actual size of OTC equity trading, its origin and its 
impact on price formation processes. There is a compelling need to improve the quality of 
market data by reducing inconsistencies and increasing granularity through the use of 
harmonised flags.  
 
Box 11. The role of issuers 
Issuers play a crucial function in financial markets, as they promote innovation and a more 
efficient allocation of resources in our economies. Through the access to capital markets, they 
favour a better allocation of resources by bringing together those who need them with those 
who have a surplus of capital and wish to allocate it in the best way possible. Issuers 
represent the direct link between financial markets and the high street, in particular for small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) that have limited possibilities to access alternative funding 
channels. After a single or multiple listing, it actually matters where financial instruments 
are traded in secondary markets (Amihud & Mendelson, 1996; Di Noia, 2001). On the one 
side, fragmentation may discourage issuers’ participation if they do not keep control over the 
value of their shares over time. Some believe that a right for the issuer to decide to go public 
and where securities should be traded in secondary markets should apply. Such a proposal 
would entail the right of issuers to, at least, be duly informed and asked for acquiescence in 
relation to their issued securities in order to be traded in venues different to that/those of 
issuance. The proposal would not be claiming for the ban of multi-market trading, but rather 
the need for issuer to be informed and in agreement to such fact. On the other side, assuming 
interconnection between trading venues, multimarket trading may allow more efficient 
pricing, lower costs and greater investor protection (those who provide liquidity to issuers). 
In this sense, competing flows of information may also generate prices more akin to the 
firms’ fundamental value. It is highly controversial that once the issuer has placed financial 
instruments (mainly shares) and collected capitals at relatively low cost, the management of 
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instruments are traded in secondary markets, even though they are not the company’s 
property anymore. Conflicts of interests between issuer and trading venues or their members 
may impose additional costs. A proposal that would allow issuers to decide in which 
secondary markets their shares should traded, however, has been historically challenged by 
both market and policy-makers (e.g. the SEC153).  
It is also relevant, in particular, to ensure that the interconnection among venues is 
effective and does not permit the formation of ‘inferior prices’ or market abuses due to 
potential arbitrages with main markets or proper supervision cannot occur (extreme case). 
Finally, the possibility to trade instruments freely across trading venues is a crucial aspect for 
market liquidity; it broadens both the appetite of investors and competition between trading 
venues, although venues may ultimately suffer from any competitive constraint set by the 
issuer. For SMEs, finally, the Commission (2010b, p. 20) proposed a special regime in order 
to facilitate a cheaper access to capital, as well as to enhance inter-linkages between 
markets.154 A set of requirements would apply to firms with market capitalisation below 35% 
of the average market capitalisation. In this respect, the regime proposed does not seem 
necessarily to rely on a set of lighter requirements but rather on adapting current rules 
applying to trading venues and their members to SMEs’ size and nature. The framework of 
rules will be defined in the framework Directive, which will leave space to member states to 
tighten or loosen the regime in line with the specific market conditions. This set of principles 
may boost a race among member states to increase the level of standards, as long as the 
market recognises these aspects as a further incentive to provide capital to SMEs. Otherwise, 
as it seems to be in this case, the incentive for member states would be to lower regulatory 
barriers in order to further reduce costs of access for SMEs and end investors, as long as 
appropriate protection for both parties will still be in place. 
5.5  Some aspects of market microstructure for organised trading 
The microstructure of financial markets has been deeply researched in the last 
decades. However, technological developments bring rapid and sweeping 
changes to the structure of markets, which may need further investigation. 
This section will look at the following topics: 
i)  Market settings (e.g. auction versus dealer markets); 
ii)  Trading tools (high-frequency trading, algorithmic trading, direct 
electronic access); and 
iii)  Other micro-structural issues (e.g. decreasing average size of orders).  
As mentioned above (see Footnote 50), liquidity in financial instruments 
depends on depth, resiliency and breadth of the market. To allow an efficient 
interaction between these variables, the market microstructure needs to be 
designed according to several factors, such as financial stability, the role of 
financial regulation, efficiency, market integrity and investor protection.   
 
                                                      
153 The Unlisted Trading Privileges Act of 1994 made official that no approval from the SEC was needed to trade 
securities (not only shares) in other markets than the market where they were issued. See, Pub. L. No. 103-389, 108 
Stat. 4081 (1994) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 78l (f) (1994)). The US Congress has always expressed its 
favour towards multimarket trading and that “an issuer does not have the right to veto exchange trading of its 
securities”; Release Discussing Exchanges' and NASD's Proposed Rule Changes, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
22,026, 50 Fed. Reg. 20,310, 23,313-14 (1985).  
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5.5.1  Market setting: The role of trading mechanisms 
 
The market structure of capital markets defines the set of rules and 
mechanisms that lead the interaction among different trading interests and 
platforms and the incorporation of information into prices, by minimising 
frictional costs (implicit and explicit trading costs). These rules may involve 
price and quantity discovery (Francioni et al., 2008). Market microstructure is 
generally influenced by two factors: i) the nature of liquidity suppliers and 
demanders (traders’ motives); and ii) external factors, such as technological 
developments. In particular, the automation of trading has produced radical 
changes in order routing, information dissemination and trade execution 
(Domowitz, 1996), which use complex mathematical algorithms. As explained 
below, technological change is a two-way process; technology has influenced 
market structure, which in turn has stimulated investments in technology. 
Similarly, the level of market transparency comes as a result of the design of 
market microstructure, but can also ultimately stimulate changes in the 
structure itself. 
 
The key aspect of a trading mechanism is “transforming the latent 
demands of investors into realized transactions. This transformation is based 
on price discovery, the process of finding market-clearing prices” (Madhavan, 
1992, p. 608), which is to a great extent influenced by the level of market 
transparency. In general, two types of trading mechanisms let markets decide 
transactions’ clearing prices: 
i)  Auction markets; and 
ii)  Dealer markets. 
The former puts investors in competition (e.g. limit orders; see Boehmer 
et al., 2005) to find the best market-clearing price (‘downstream’ competition). 
The latter stimulates ‘upstream’ competition between dealers to offer the best 
bid/ask quotes (e.g. RFQ models). Both trading mechanisms can be 
continuous or periodic. A continuous trading mechanism entails the 
uninterrupted submission and matching of bids and offers, which can be 
submitted by investors (auction markets) or dealers/market-makers (dealer 
markets). A periodic trading mechanism brings together those binding 
interests (typically collected over time) at some point in time. 
Trading 
mechanisms 
Auction markets are widespread in financial markets. There are two 
types of auction markets: 
i)  Batch (call) auctions; and 
ii)  Continuous auctions. 
Batch auctions collect over time bids/offers from investors and execute 
these orders at a particular point in time at a single price (to maximise 
volumes, call auction) or at slightly different simultaneous price. Call auction 
are frequently used in financial markets, especially in the opening of markets 
when liquidity is low and the market needs to find a market-clearing price to 
start its session.  
Continuous auction markets are the most diffused form of trading, 
which allows amassing many transactions in one place and generating 
economies of scale that abate (implicit) transaction costs (Economides & 
Schwartz, 1995). The use of continuous auction markets and their transparent 
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setting has been increasing in the last decades, as the flows of cross-border 
financial transactions have soared. The global interconnection of financial 
markets has been made possible thanks to the development of automated 
forms of trading and to new communication technologies (e.g. the internet), 
which have brought together liquidity demand and supply across markets, 
especially for liquid financial instruments. 
According to this background, open limit-order book (OLOB) – so-
called ‘order-driven market’ – have become a widespread form of auction 
market, since it permits continuous trading in which investors’ public 
reservation prices are submitted simultaneously and consolidated in a single 
order book, which shows the best bids and offers at different price levels. This 
market design has some relevant characteristics: 
i)  The need for high volumes to allow continuous trading (efficient system 
for small trades; Baruch, 2005); 
ii)  A meaningful competition between orders (information reward155 as a 
result of information asymmetry) and a greater flow of information into 
prices; and 
iii)  A sufficient level of transparency (allowing investors to see the order 
flow and make their investment decisions accordingly). 
Auction markets are inherently more transparent than other market 
settings, since the price formation mechanism needs transparency to foster 
competition between investors. The resulting outcome is more information-
efficient prices, which may ultimately reduce volatility (Baruch, 2005). 
Efficient prices also support the evaluation of assets and hence better risk 
management processes. 
Furthermore, alternative ways can promote competition between 
investors and raise the incentives to submit bids/offers, keeping volumes 
high. In particular, the flexibility of the execution system and thus the 
possibility to enter different limit order types allow investors to compete with 
each other on the basis of their information (see next box). In effect, traders 
will submit orders on the basis of the information they consider private and 
will behave strategically156 when it comes to i) liquidity and ii) asset value. 
They submit orders on the basis of information such as potential arbitrages, 
information on the fundamental value of the asset or the need to divest own 
liquidity. 
Box 12. Order types 
Limit order books make possible the interaction between several types of orders. Besides the 
modality and conditions for the execution, orders always include a binding interest to buy or 
sell a financial instrument when certain conditions are met. The set of conditions applicable 
to orders that a trading platform can adopt on its system is potentially unlimited. Therefore, 
below are summarized the most-used types of orders:  
                                                      
155 Investors must receive proper reward from their investment in information (which can assume different forms; 
on fundamentals, rumours, etc). The order flow, therefore, should contain private and public information. 
Traders who act on the belief that they own private information – which in the end is already public and 
embedded into prices – are called ‘noise traders’. 
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•  Unconditional limit157 (when a trader enters an order to trade a number of shares at a 
certain price that is not yet verified); 
•  Market (when a trader enters an order to trade a number of shares at the currently 
displayed price or at the closest value); 
•  Marketable (an order at the limit or better price); 
•  Tick sensitive (an order to sell or buy at an uptick or a downtick); 
•  Stop/Take profit (market or limit-sell or buy order for an open position, respectively 
long and short position, triggered when the price moves through the stop price in 
order to contain losses or take profits from the position held); 
•  Market-not-held (an order to leave the decision of execution to the broker); 
•  At-auction (orders only allowed for the call auction at the end or beginning of the day; 
if not executed, these orders are typically cancelled); 
•  Immediate-or-cancel, IOC (a market order that requests the immediate execution of the 
order; if part of the order is not executed at that market price, it should be cancelled); 
•  Fill-or-kill, FOK (a slightly different IOC order since in this case the order should be 
cancelled in full if it cannot be filled at that immediate price); 
•  Market to limit (another variation of IOC and FOK; if the order is not executed in full at 
the current immediate price, the rest of it will be cancelled and re-entered as limit order 
with price equal to the price of the executed part of the initial order); 
•  Trailing stop (a sell order that sets a stop price at a fixed number of ticks below the 
market price, which will follow the market price where above the executed price; if the 
price is below the execution price the stop price will be the floor that will be triggered 
if the price reaches this value); 
•  Market-if-touched (a buy or sell market order triggered when the price reaches a 
certain level; a combination of a market and limit order); 
•  Box Top (a market order that is automatically changed in a limit if the order is not 
executed at market price).  
These orders are all market or limit orders that may or may not apply detailed 
conditions, in relation to the strategy that the trader wants to achieve (limit risk, speed of 
execution, price improvements, etc). Further, these orders can be pre-trade displayed or 
hidden when waivers apply and combined together to pursue trading strategies. Finally, all 
orders can be seen as orders with a limit price subject to certain conditions. For instance, a 
market order is a limit order in which the limit price is the market price at that specific 
instant. 
Sources: Harris, 2002; Comerton-Forde & Rydge, 2004 (www.interactivebrokers.com). 
To meet investors’ needs, several types of orders interact on the order 
book and get executed in a sequential order. The order flow competition 
between traders through orders has been partially investigated. Many types 
of limit and market orders may create several equilibria between orders that 
have not been researched enough. For instance, Foucault (1999) suggests that 
the volatility of the asset is the main determinant of the equilibrium between 
market and limit orders. In effect, when the volatility of the asset increases 
there is more possibility for limit orders to be picked-off by new information 
and suffer adverse selection (winner’s curse). Market orders will be more 
Order 
flow competition 
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costly in terms of price impact and spread because there will be more 
competition between investors in their use. This situation also explains why 
trading at the end of the day is dominated by market orders, as the 
probability of execution of limit orders decreases.  
As suggested by Parlour (2010), in a world in which information moves 
faster across assets classes due to technological developments and financial 
interconnection, the order flow is intrinsically more informative and the costs 
of adverse selection due to fast-moving information encourages the use of 
market orders, which may be seen as limit orders with price set at the market 
value in the instant of the observation of the order flow. In addition, the 
increasing need to look at shorter time horizons to fill the gap in returns 
caused by the dismal growth of developed economies has further increased 
volatility of asset values, which are affecting the microstructure of financial 
markets. Financial institutions are massively investing in routing technologies 
and speed of execution, since investors need to observe the order flow in real-
time to use market orders. In effect, since volatility has created a strong 
disequilibrium between market and limit orders, the only way to win 
competition between market orders and improve the liquidity of the order 
book is to increase speed and volumes. More speed and higher volume 
ultimately reduce the portion of the price on which non-retail investors can 
compete on and create potential risks in terms of capacity for trading 
platforms. In the past, immediacy of execution was possible through 
specialists acting on the trading floor. Today, the only way to see the order 
f l o w  a n d  r e d u c e  m a r k e t  i m p a c t  b y  investing accordingly is through 
investments in technologies such as smart order routers and direct access 
with high-frequency trading tools. Retail investors were and will always be 
slower than professional investors. However, the typically small size of their 
limit orders protects them from market impact and the reduction of tick sizes 
(see also next section). Finally, order-driven auction markets are designed to 
handle small trades at the lowest transaction costs but only as long as the 
market for that financial instrument is sufficiently liquid.  
Table 7. Auction versus dealer markets 
Auction Markets   Dealer Markets  
PROs 
-  High transparency 
-  Price information efficiency 
-  Order flow competition 
-  Low transaction costs 
(especially for small trades) 
PROs 
-  Handling of illiquid products 
and block sizes 
-  Resilience (to information 
asymmetries) 
-  Execution certainty  
CONs 
-  Market impact  
-  Market breakdown 
(information asymmetries) 
-  Operational risks (capacity) 
CONs 
-  Costs  
-  Opacity (price formation) 
-  Accessibility (if OTC) 
-  Low competitive pressures  
Source: Authors. MIFID 2.0: CASTING NEW LIGHT ON EUROPE’S CAPITAL MARKETS | 105 
 
Another form of trading, which is often complementary to auction 
markets, is the dealer market. In this market setting, trades are typically dealt 
with quote-driven dealer markets or bilateral negotiations with the support of 
an intermediary that submits executable bid/ask quotes. The submission of 
quotes can be: i) bilateral or ii) multilateral.  
Dealer markets 
Figure 25. Dealer markets (trading models) 
Dealer 
Markets
Bilateral (OTC)
RFQ model
Bilateral 
negotiation
Multilateral Quote‐driven 
auction market
 
Source: Authors. 
Bilateral models are usual in bilateral OTC transactions, which are in 
general used in illiquid markets where financial instruments may need 
further customisation. The RFQ model (see Box 9) also represents a bilateral 
dealer market since executable quotes are only available on request by that 
specific counterparty through the use of an inter-dealer platform. RFQ 
markets have been developed for less-liquid products such as corporate 
bonds or structured products, while OTC bilateral contracts are still the main 
negotiation mechanism for many types of derivatives. The latter (multilateral) 
model is called a ‘quote-driven’ market. Dealers submit executable quotes on 
a continuous basis. A dealer competes with other dealers/market-makers on 
the size of the offered bid/ask spread. A quote-driven market is a market 
model used for liquid markets such as stocks or futures (e.g. NASDAQ). 
Given free entry into market-making business, quote-driven systems are 
equivalent to continuous auction mechanisms (Madhavan, 1992). 
 
On the one hand, dealer markets may be beneficial for some asset 
classes. In particular, these markets can ensure order execution with minimal 
exposure risk (market impact; Pagano and Röell, 1993). This effect is achieved 
through a system of competing dealers that exploit their informational 
advantage; namely, the possibility to see the order size and price before it is 
executed, which does not necessarily happen in order-driven markets 
(Malinova and Park, 2008). This informational advantage comes as a reward 
for their investments into capital commitments and advanced technologies. 
The use of capital on own account also ensures that investors can trade 
highly-customised and illiquid financial instruments to better meet their risk 
profiles, by minimising information leakage. Some investors may also get 
better terms if they can exploit a contractual power (institutional investors) or 
bring a kind of liquidity that maximises the possibility of dealers to benefit 
from their market knowledge. The informational advantage of market-makers 
(due to their investments in market knowledge) and their intensive capital 
commitment in the development of bilateral or multilateral platforms, make 
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dealer markets potentially more resilient to information risks than order-
driven markets. Dealers also provide markets with innovative ventures and 
financing, as well as tools to manage particular risks that would be 
prohibitively costly in other market settings. 
On the other hand, the extreme flexibility of these market settings is 
usually offset by fairly high costs to deal with financial products. For instance, 
corporate bonds should be financial instruments with lower trading costs 
than the related stock of the company as they are less risky (Biais & Green, 
2007). However, this is usually not the case because the market for corporate 
bonds is often very illiquid (as explained above) and a market with dealers 
that commit capital seems so far to be the only structure able to deal with this 
constant illiquidity. In addition, the pricing mechanism is not as transparent 
as in OLOBs since it is not based on the reservation price of investors, but on 
the proprietary valuation models of dealers. Bid/ask spreads in dealer 
markets are the outcome of these models and can only be influenced by the 
potential threat of competing market-makers/dealers, which may offer more 
aggressive bid/ask spreads in order to erode rivals’ market shares and 
increase volumes. In effect, another potential drawback of dealer markets is 
the structurally high concentration levels of the dealer industry (capital is 
limited!), which may ultimately determine monopolistic or oligopolistic 
settings. A model with ‘monopolistic/oligopolistic dealers’ may be 
undesirable not only in terms of output and prices –which are typically fixed 
above marginal costs– but also because the assignment of stocks between 
dealers may be arbitrary and lead to a sub-optimal distribution (Stoll, 1978). 
Finally, accessibility for retail investors to some bilateral dealer markets 
may be difficult without the support of intermediaries, who typically pass the 
higher costs on end investors. It may even impossible (as for OTC derivatives 
instruments) because dealers may decide t o  d e a l  o n l y  w i t h  s o m e  s p e c i f i c  
counterparties due to counterparty risk and product complexity.  
The ability to price discriminate – thanks to their information advantage 
– makes this market setting more suitable for discriminating platforms (see 
Section 5.3). Accordingly, market-makers move first and propose price 
schedules. Hence, if the market is less-liquid and the information asymmetry 
fairly large, some authors suggest that dealer markets (with one specialist or 
competing market-makers) may be both more resilient and efficient, thereby 
making it easier to reach equilibrium (Glosten, 1989; O’Hara, 1995). Dealer 
markets are therefore designed to deal with less-liquid markets, as long as 
this ‘low-liquidity condition’ is always verified.  
Capital markets have developed different market microstructures, 
dominated by OLOBs or dealers. In particular, equity markets regularly 
combine auction markets (OLOBs) with the presence of liquidity providers 
(market-makers/dealers) that offer liquidity to the market to ensure the 
continuity of trading. In this way, markets try to combine the benefits of both 
market designs, ensuring a high degree of transparency (with due exemptions 
and delays), market integrity, and investor protection (for uninformed 
traders). This market setting combines the efficient pricing mechanisms of 
auction markets, and greater protection for retail investors, with stronger 
resilience to market shocks (information asymmetry). Stronger resilience 
comes from the capital committed by liquidity providers in order to ensure 
continuity of trading and to always maintain available executable quotes.  
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5.5.2  The evolution of trading: Market efficiency and financial stability  
 
The automation of trading and the introduction of the internet have fostered 
quick developments in capital markets in the last two decades, in particular 
for equity markets, pushing volumes up and making markets in general more 
accessible. The possibility for investors to more easily compete amongst each 
other on a global basis and across asset classes has led them to invest even 
more in advanced technologies for trading with a rapid increase of volumes. 
In particular, current markets are experiencing faster and greater flows of 
information into prices. This situation has made the order flow more 
informative than ever before, but private information embeds many complex 
variables (such as risk exposures, gross positions, macroeconomic outlook, 
and regulatory boundaries) that have increased the complexity of trading 
strategies and ultimately asset volatility (as rationale behind the financial 
system’s bias towards ‘boom and bust’ cycles; Group of Thirty, 2010).  
Easier and cheaper market accessibility has brought a new wave of 
investors and raised volumes, which remains at higher levels than at the 
beginning of the 21st century, despite the recent financial crisis. This situation 
has inevitably promoted a shift in the structure of financial markets. Equity 
markets, in particular, have gradually moved from more opaque quote-driven 
dealer markets to OLOBs run by advanced trading platforms able to process 
millions of trades in the blink of an eye.  
Automation and 
internet 
As a consequence, complex flows of information (e.g. multimarket 
trading, risk exposure, etc) need trading software that can collect and process 
a wide range of variables in order to reach an investment and trading 
decision, as well as route orders across multiple venues (Biais, 2010). The 
introduction of algorithmic trading technologies aims at replacing the human 
trader with machines that overcome cognitive limits of human beings and 
process complex information quicker and completely. Further, algorithmic 
trading reduces search costs and market impact by splitting big size orders 
and automatically executing them on several venues (split & dice strategy; see 
figures below).  
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Figure 26. Average trade size on SETS 
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Source: LSE Group (2010). 
 
Figure 27. Average value of orders executed for most liquid European shares 
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Source: CESR MiFID Database. 
The figures above show the trend in the average size of orders 
respectively for the London Stock Exchange SETS and for some of the most 
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liquid EU shares. The decline should reflect a substantial increase in the use of 
‘split and dice’ strategies, which are based on trading algorithms that route 
orders across markets after the big ‘parent order’ has been split into small 
‘child orders’. The average size of retail orders has not followed the same 
pattern. Nevertheless, the figure above suggests that MiFID has also 
contributed to this decline by perhaps increasing competition in execution 
services, thereby pushing investment firms to invest in new technologies and 
diffuse them at a faster pace. In effect, besides the decline in the average value 
of executed orders from 2007, the second figure also shows that the difference 
between average values of orders among liquid shares is drastically reducing 
to a tiny range (except for Telefonica and Santander). This may be the result 
of a wider use of new trading technologies, which typically treat orders and 
split them in a similar way. On average the market seems to deal only with 
retail orders. Hence, this situation should create more liquidity for small retail 
trades and less liquidity for institutional orders that do not use ‘split and dice’ 
strategies (explaining in part the growth of dark pools of liquidity; see Section 
4.2.1).  
Algorithmic trading (AT) gives more speed and strategic thinking to the 
investment decision. This trading activity, however, may also generate costs. 
Firstly, it raises the asymmetric information between fast and slow traders, 
which may discourage slow traders from investing and create disequilibrium, 
thus volatility. No evidence that AT raises volatility has been found so far 
(Hendershott & Riordan, 2009). Secondly, the increased number of messages 
and potential human errors in defining the most appropriate algorithm 
during the trading day may generate operational risks and ultimately cause 
market crashes (see next Box), with potential spiral effects due to the 
interconnection between orders on the order flow. This situation would 
irremediably harm the investor confidence that keeps global financial markets 
together (in particular OLOBs). 
AT can be: 
1)  Directional (market trend) or market neutral (HFT); 
2)  Short or long; 
3)  Fully or partially hedged; and 
4)  Short-term or overnight. 
Algorithmic trading solutions are typically embedded in proprietary 
software made in-house or outsourced to external IT companies. 
Finally, investing in algorithmic trading presents high fixed costs, 
mitigated by relevant economies of scale. Network effects and the risk for 
slow traders to be easily picked off bring market participants to run to get the 
best algorithmic trading technologies. However, on the one hand, 
overinvestment may not be socially useful but, on the other, trading platforms 
may need to have harmonised monitoring practices to avoid downside spiral 
effects (Biais, 2010). 
Box 13. The US ‘flash crash’: what can be learned? 
On 6 May 2010 – between 2.40pm and 3.00pm – US stock markets experienced a previously 
unseen phenomenon. Within a few minutes, the S&P 500 index plummeted by almost 100 
points (-8.2%) and the Dow Jones Industrial Average by over 1,000 points (-9.2%). Indexes 110 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
then recovered their previous levels almost 20 minutes later, at the end of the so-called ‘flash 
crash’. Some stocks, such as Procter & Gamble, dropped nearly 40% before rebounding. The 
whole market swung within a 10% range down in 10 minutes due to a series of events. The 
SEC report (2010b) split the crash into two major events: i) a liquidity crisis in the E-Mini 
(and SPY) future contracts158 market; and ii) a liquidity crisis in the main stock index market 
(S&P 500). The general market trend on that day was already affected by downward 
pressures from the morning due to the European debt crisis, with high volatility (S&P 
volatility index was above 22%) and an overall sentiment of uncertainty concerning the 
global economic outlook. The e-Mini future contract market was very thin (the traded value 
was around $2.65 billion, 55% less than the early morning). 
The market crash propagated from a liquidity crisis in the e-Mini future contracts. In 
effect, against this background of low liquidity, an investment fund trader submitted an 
aggressive selling algorithmic programme for a big position in e-Mini contracts (75,000, for a 
value of $4.1 billion 159), which was a hedge for an existing position in equity. Only two other 
sell programs of that size were executed in the previous 12 months in that market. In 
addition, those other sell programs took 5 hours to complete the execution, while in this case 
the same number of contracts was executed in 20 minutes. The strong sell pressure, 
according to SEC findings, was initially absorbed by high-frequency traders (‘HFTs’), which 
support previous evidence on the supply of liquidity offered by algo-HFT when the market 
is volatile and fairly thin (Hendershott & Riordan, 2009; Chaboud et al., 2009), together with 
fundamental buyers and cross-market arbitrages, which transferred the selling pressure to 
equity markets. However, HFTs do not hold big positions for a long time so they started to 
sell aggressively in e-Minis, causing an increase of HFT trading in the market, which made 
volumes increase (HFT generally trade high volumes but do not hold inventories bigger than 
4,000-5,000 contracts). The artificial high volumes made the initial ‘sell algorithm’ to feed the 
market with more sell orders. The trader had set this algorithm at 9% of total volumes in the 
previous minute, without considering price and time, which ended up generating 75,000 
contracts that could not be absorbed at once. The human error of the trader was in the 
assumption that higher volumes meant higher liquidity, which is not often the case. HFTs 
began to sell and buy contracts among each other, while the market was going down and the 
buy-side demand dropped to less than 1% of the morning’s levels. In short, the market 
actually dried up because of the uninformed use of advanced trading technologies (see 
graph below). 
Cross-market arbitrageurs transferred the downward pressure to equity markets, 
which fell of 3% like the e-Mini market in 3 minutes. Demand collapsed and the buy-side 
only held 1,050 e-Mini contracts and equity markets lost another 2%, bringing the total to 5%. 
At that moment only 35,000 contracts of the sell algorithm were executed and the market was 
stopped for a few seconds by CME, due to the awkward trading activities and in an attempt 
to reduce selling pressures. When the market resumed, in effect, it started to recover but the 
net imbalance between buyers and sellers was of over 30,000 contracts (for sellers). The sell 
algorithm then completed its sell programme at 2.51pm due to the restored liquidity 
attracted by the quick recovery, with high losses overall for the investment fund since no 
                                                      
158 The ‘E-Mini’ is a stock index instrument traded in electronic future and equity markets. It is a derivative 
product designed to replicate the S&P 500 Index. The number of outstanding contracts is not fixed at any given 
time. This type of product was introduced by CME in the 1997 and trades exclusively on the CME Globex 
electronic trading platform 24h a day (SEC, 2010b). The first liquidity crisis also concerns the S&P 500 SPDR 
exchange-traded fund (SPY), which replicates the S&P 500 index as well. For simplicity, the report only mentions 
the e-Mini market since both markets were affected by the same kind of events. 
159 The value of contracts traded was down from the morning to $2.65 billion. MIFID 2.0: CASTING NEW LIGHT ON EUROPE’S CAPITAL MARKETS | 111 
 
price and time conditions were added to the algorithm. 
Figure 28. Aggregated S&P 500 market depth 
 
Source: SEC (2010b). 
In the equity market, besides the initial fall of the index, the fall and pause of the e-
Mini market sparked fears that there was a more fundamental reason than just human error 
behind the price decline. Therefore, some market-makers and liquidity providers widened 
spreads or withdrew from the market, causing selling pressures to continue their action and 
buying interests to go even lower. As a result, prices started to behave irrationally since 
markets started to match stop-market orders with stub quotes originally set by market-
makers at levels away from current market prices in order to fulfil continuity of two-sided 
quotes obligations, even when a market-maker had withdrawn. As soon as the market 
participants verified the integrity of their data and trading systems, sell-side and buy-side 
interests returned and the market quickly recovered its previous value, but with big losses 
for some market participants. As the SEC reports, after the crash, the exchanges and the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) agreed on the cancellation of orders that 
were clearly a result of ‘errors’ in the trading rules. 
To sum up, the crash was the combination of human error with the use of stop-market 
orders by main US exchanges, which pushed prices to behave irrationally, so generating 
heavy losses not only for the traders that run the algorithm but also for markets. The SEC 
also concluded that pausing trading systems was beneficial and that there should be clear 
and sound procedures to break erroneous trades to ensure certainty and strengthen 
investors’ confidence. In the aftermath of the flash crash, the authority introduced ‘circuit 
breakers’, which are procedures to halt trading across markets when prices swing in the 
previous 5 minutes of a value higher than 10%. According to these rules, systems should be 
paused for 5 minutes. Finally, it is thought unlikely that the same phenomenon would occur 
in Europe, given that, on this side of the Atlantic, there is a more limited use of stop-market 
orders and much less-liquid ETFs markets (low interconnection). However, it would be 
beneficial for Europe to also adopt a set of rules to interrupt price volatility in specific 
extreme circumstances, taking the solution in the US as a benchmark.  
As mentioned above, the general increase of asset volatility has changed 
the equilibrium of order flow competition (for OLOBs), beyond any 
classification by asset class. Greater competition for market orders between 
investors has led market participants to invest hugely in IT services and high-
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frequency trading (HFT) technologies, which allow investors to ‘see’ the order 
flow and execute orders in almost real time, i.e. in microseconds (and soon 
‘nanoseconds’). HFT is gradually becoming indispensable for algorithmic 
trading strategies but it has also supported the emergence of other strategies. 
In particular, as anticipated in Section 3.3, HFT may pursue the following 
three major strategies (AFM, 2010; Chi-X, 2010):  
1)  Market-making, 
2)  Arbitrage and 
3)  Informed trading (or speculation). 
Firstly, HFT may supply liquidity to markets through systems able to 
analyse the order flow at the fastest speed technically possible, reducing risk-
sharing on inventory positions. As suggested in the box above, HFT may 
absorb temporary imbalances between buy and sell orders. HFT has the 
important function of temporarily absorbing market shocks. However, HFT 
positions are usually market-neutral (non-directional), hedged and 
continuously updated (high cancellation rate), and closed-out by the end of 
the day (AFM, 2010). Market-making means that the role of HFT is 
temporary, so in the event of extreme imbalances, markets would need to 
restore fundamental demand to avoid market collapse (for instance, by 
halting trading across markets for a short timeframe). 
Secondly, HFT allows cross-markets and arbitrage across asset classes to 
benefit from price anomalies. Moreover, it also permits so-called ‘statistical 
arbitrage’, which uses historical datasets to find repeating patterns in the 
price trends that can be profitably exploited. 
Thirdly, HFT may use low-latency execution to pursue strategies based 
on investments in information. Three examples are: trading according to 
indicators that try to predict future performance; placing and cancelling 
orders to find hidden liquidity; or screening algorithms to find failures and 
profit from them.  
Both algorithmic and HFT are widely diffused and more often used as 
complementary tools to achieve specific trading strategies. These technologies 
are essential for institutional investors and brokers/dealers, and, as a result, 
new trading strategies are becoming widespread (see Section 3.3). These new 
strategies are often deemed to increase volatility but no empirical evidence 
has been found so far that supports this view (Hendershott & Riordan, 2009; 
Chaboud et al., 2009; Broogard, 2010). 
 
The implementation of trading strategies through algorithms and HFT 
needs trading tools that can operate with the lowest technically possible 
latency (proprietary and roundtrip).160 To reach the highest speed, and 
therefore the lowest latency, several factors need to be considered. Among the 
most important ones are the following (AFM, 2010): 
Latency 
                                                      
160 Latency is the time/delay that occurs for a package of data to be sent/received from one point to another. It is 
the technical delay caused by the inability of the physical network/infrastructure to act/react in real time. 
Latency can be split in round trip and proprietary (AFM, 2010). Roundtrip latency is the technical delay caused by 
the structure of the trading platform, which may take a minimum amount of time to accept, execute and confirm 
orders, besides time taken by the security check done by the firewall. Proprietary latency is the technical delay 
caused by the hardware, software, IT infrastructure, and access arrangements of brokers/dealers, or investment 
firms or investors (direct access) that transmit orders to the platform for execution. MIFID 2.0: CASTING NEW LIGHT ON EUROPE’S CAPITAL MARKETS | 113 
 
1)  Complexity of the trading algorithm (e.g. smart order routing); 
2)  IT infrastructures (computing power); 
3)  Efficient connection (network latency in terms of capacity, speed and 
stability of data); 
4)  Physical distance from the data source (trading platform) and 
5)  Access services to the platform. 
Investment firms and trading platforms are investing in IT 
infrastructures and special services to reduce latency (respectively, 
proprietary and roundtrip latency), such as co-location services,161 connection 
services (e.g. optical fibres, connection capacity) and direct electronic access 
(DEA) services. Several European equity markets (e.g. NYSE Euronext, Oslo 
Börs) are moving their trading systems close to the major European financial 
centre (London) to offer similar advanced execution services and higher 
speed of execution (by reducing physical distance) through proprietary 
trading systems, often provided by third parties. Some investment firms are 
physically relocating in a mid-position among several platforms with the 
support of latest high-speed connections. This solution or multiple co-
locations can ultimately reduce the risks of liquidity fragmentation and 
improve arbitrages across trading venues. 
Amongst advanced trading services, direct electronic access (DEA) 
arrangements can potentially reduce latency, costs, and trade errors (Celent, 
2008); but they may have multi-faceted implications. These services, in 
particular, may have beneficial effects for clients (low entry costs and 
administrative hurdles of membership), sponsoring firms (attracting HFT 
volumes, coupled with volume discounts of trading venues), and trading 
platforms (attraction of new liquidity). DEA arrangements allow firms that 
are not registered intermediaries (or investment firms under MiFID rules162) 
to have direct access to the trading venue through: i) using an intermediary’s 
member status/contract; or ii) becoming direct member or direct access 
(IOSCO, 2010b).  
In the first case, a non-member will be able to directly access the trading 
venue to execute orders by using: 
1)  The intermediary’s infrastructure (Direct Market Access, DMA) or 
2)  Its own infrastructure, but under intermediary’s control and rules 
(Sponsored Access, SA). 
Sponsored access, in particular, lowers the economic barriers to enter a 
platform. It allows direct access to markets for more participants, with their 
own technology, without intermediaries. In both DMA and SA, the 
intermediary is responsible for the customer’s conduct163 and transactions are 
Direct Electronic 
Access 
                                                      
161 Co-location services have de facto substituted the role played by the ‘floor’ trading in the past. Instead of 
bringing together specialists and investment companies’ traders on the floor to get information and execute 
orders faster, today’s main equity markets put together – in the same room, close to the central data server – the 
servers of trading specialists, brokers, dealers, market-makers, and investment firms.  
162 To which apply also rules on regulatory capital, Capital Requirements Directive, Directive 2006/49/EC (Art. 
12, MiFID). 
163 Even though IOSCO (2009a and 2010b) recognises that it may be difficult in certain jurisdictions to act against a 
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flagged with the ID code of the intermediary. Moreover, the intermediary 
monitors customers’ activities (and eventually reports anomalies to 
authorities; FSA, 2008) and typically applies specific requirements to get DEA 
to the trading platform. In addition, trading venues may unilaterally decide to 
restrict access only to certain type of customer. DMA permits the 
intermediary to apply pre-trade filters and post-trade controls, since orders 
are directed to markets through intermediaries’ infrastructure. The 
proportion of trading value done through Direct Market Access is expected to 
grow up to 15% by 2011 (Celent, 2008). 
For SA services, intermediaries typically receive a ‘drop copy’ of the 
order at the same time when it is sent to the market (AFM, 2010). This 
situation makes it difficult to apply pre-trade controls, even though it allows 
faster execution because only pre-trade filters set by the trading venue are 
actually applied. Pre-trade filters are particularly important to detect 
erroneous trades or human errors (‘fat fingers’), rather than for detecting 
market abuses. Ex ante and ex post controls are applied to SA services by the 
trading venue or by third parties on behalf of the intermediary as well. SA is a 
typical service for a small number of highly sophisticated intermediaries and 
their clients. IOSCO (2010b) suggests applying:  
1)  Specific requirements to DEA customers, such as limits to transactions’ 
notional value;  
2)  Pre-trade controls; and  
3)  Post-trade controls.  
In the case of Direct Access (DA), firms that are not investment firms 
under MiFID may be granted membership to the trading platform. In such 
cases, they would apply both their own internal controls and the controls of 
the platform by executing orders directly on the trading venue, using their 
own ID code. As a consequence, in order to avoid credit risk, members should 
apply sound financial requirements and become clearing members of the CCP 
for the purpose of balancing their trading activities with potentially high 
notional values (IOSCO, 2010b). The European Parliament (Swinburne, 2010) 
has recommended a clamp-down – with an explicit ban – on DEA ‘naked’ 
arrangements, which grant market access without filters to intermediaries and 
trading venues (‘unfiltered’ market access). This Report does not find 
evidence that such agreements have been put in place by any European 
trading venue. 
Overall, DEA arrangements create specific challenges: 
1)  Risks of market manipulation and insider dealing if only traditional 
controls apply, for instance, by offering much smaller and not 
harmonised tick sizes that can make supervision more complicated, 
especially if HFT is involved; 
2)  Risks of creating an unlevel playing field (unfairness) by allocating 
limited physical space on a discriminatory basis, as for co-location 
services, or because of the geographical position; 
3)  Risks that the limited capacity of trading venues to receive/send 
messages can restrict access in a discriminatory way; in this regard, the 
adoption of incremental fees for messaging may be a less invasive way 
to keep control of the platform’s capacity constraints; 
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frequently, with devastating effects on investors’ confidence; and 
5)  Risks that members may not be sufficiently capitalised in case they 
would be held responsible for their actions (credit risk; in particular 
with DA).  
In order to face these challenges, the Commission (2010b) is consulting 
market participants on the possibility to amend MiFID as follows:  
1)  Require HFT over a specific threshold to be authorised as investment 
firms;  
2)  Impose new general organisational requirements and non-
discriminatory clauses;  
3)  Set a minimum tick size;  
4)  Impose an obligation on HTFs trading a significant number of shares to 
keep providing liquidity on an ongoing basis (as for market-makers); 
and  
5)  Require to keep (limit) orders on the order book for a limited amount of 
time before cancellation or, alternatively, requiring firms to keep their 
cancellation over execution ratio over a specified level.  
On points 1 and 4, in particular, it should be noted that HFT is difficult 
to define (CESR, 2010b, p. 40)164 and if defined it would not be easily 
identifiable on the order book. It seems that the Commission refers to HFT 
where it pursues market-making strategies, since large positions may boost 
the credit risk of HFT firms. Notwithstanding that credit risk is a potential 
issue for all traders accessing financial markets with insufficient financial 
resources, it is rather the way in which traders access financial markets (in 
which HFT can be more easily identified) that needs to be further scrutinised. 
IOSCO (2010b) suggested setting minimum standards for DEA customers, 
which include ‘appropriate financial resources’ and ‘appropriate procedures’ 
to assess customers’ knowledge and technical proficiency, or setting position 
limit filters that avoid exceeding credit limits and gaining exposure to 
‘unacceptable risks’ (p. 22). Hence, since HFT uses DEA arrangements 
(trading or not on own account), by regulating the three ways how traders 
access markets directly – with no direct intermediaries’ involvement (but 
partial responsibility) – would be an easier-to-handle and more functional 
approach (for instance, by requiring of the DA that their members are 
investment firms and/or clearing members).  
Moreover, point 4 may raise problems of incentives for HFTs to provide 
liquidity, if they are obliged to do so on an ongoing basis. As illustrated 
above, HFT supplies and consumes liquidity in different circumstances, and 
since they are not allowed to offer spreads, it would reduce their incentives to 
trade high volumes if market-making obligations are imposed upon them. 
On point 5, as mentioned, incremental fees based on sent/received 
messages may be a less invasive way and allow trading venues to fine-tune 
fees with the actual capacity of their trading platform. An organisational 
                                                      
164 It is worth noting how the regulatory approach is changing in comparison to the current MiFID text, in which 
regulation imposes obligations on market participants as a result of being the provider of a specific service rather 
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requirement to deal with capacity constraints may stimulate these changes. 
The abovementioned risks (in particular, operational and credit risks) 
may cause disorderly markets and create financial instability if no 
appropriate regulation and supervision has been put in place. The 
Commission (2010b) suggests requiring trading venues to set appropriate 
harmonised procedures to halt trading ‘to mitigate the risk of errors’ (e.g. 
circuit breakers; Swinburne, 2010). Harmonised regulatory obligations to 
ensure fair and orderly trading and to monitor members’ compliance with 
rules (e.g. ‘adequate risk management systems’; FSA, 2008) may need to be 
applied across markets, since otherwise it would create great instability (order 
imbalances). Some market participants also argue that those measures should 
be reserved for critical situations, while solutions that allow trading 
continuity should be by far preferred. CESR has been requested by the level 1 
mandate of the new MiFID to define binding technical standards to ensure 
fair and orderly markets, including DEA arrangements (CESR, 2010b). 
In case markets experience outages/crashes, the FSA (2010b) has 
suggested fairly sound requirements, as follows: 
1)  Maintaining fair and orderly markets (by suspending trading activities 
if the orderly functioning is under threat and requiring sound 
arrangements to deal with technical operations); 
2)  Informing members/participants of trading conditions (e.g. by 
disseminating non-misleading information) and setting order 
management procedures (e.g. by cancelling orders already in the system 
in case of outages or cancelling transactions that come as result of 
erroneous matching due to price anomalies in market crashes); 
3)  Restarting trading with transparent and non-discretionary rules and 
procedures to avoid affecting fair and orderly trading on related 
markets (members should be clearly informed about the status of their 
outstanding orders, sound and transparent rules should apply); 
4)  Setting contingency arrangements for trading venues using the 
reference price of the market where trading has been suspended (also 
for asset classes other than equity markets). Extending these 
arrangements to investment firms in order to ensure continuity in 
meeting best execution obligations in the absence of a reference price (it 
may be desirable for them to have connectivity to multiple venues). 
When the failure does not only pertain to a specific problem of a venue, 
under such market circumstances, any eventual decision by the competent 
authority or corresponding body to halt trading in any given security would 
need to be enforced among all trading venues. In addition, trading venues 
may need to periodically assess their trading capacity and test their systems 
accordingly (stress tests). Other important controls should be falling on 
trading venues: approval of participants; sufficient capacity and resilience to 
cope with high volumes; real-time market supervision; market volatility 
controls (trading suspensions, etc.); erroneous order cancellation (trade bust 
policies); and market abuse monitoring/surveillance. 
 
Disorderly 
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Box 14. Regulatory shift: the ‘growing’ role of macro regulators165 
The link between the international regulatory activities around issues of financial stability 
has brought significant implications for the revision of the MiFID and the work of securities 
regulators. Regulatory activities face three major challenges: 
i)  Global economic vulnerability affects sovereign tolerance for volatility in financial 
markets; 
ii)  Disagreement on economic policies will increase the need for regulation that delivers 
financial stability (macro-prudential regulation); and 
iii)  A possible trade-off between new trading technologies and market stability. 
Securities regulators are not directly represented at G20 level and are more frequently 
compelled to comply with decisions made somewhere else. In effect, the centre of regulation 
has shifted from national technical issues to G20 level (with IMF playing a major role; see 
graph below). In terms of enforcement, however, the centre of gravity is still at national level, 
e v e n  t h o u g h  E u r o p e  i s  t r y i n g  t o  i n c r e a s e  the enforcement powers of the new European 
authorities. These different approaches may create some clashes between new financial 
regulation (which represents the current priority at global and national level) and its concrete 
application at national level. Benefits and costs of macro-prudential financial regulation may 
need to be further investigated. 
Figure 29. Shifting the regulatory centre of gravity. 
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Source: Matthews (2010). 
For instance, exogenous factors brought about by the global regulatory framework are 
influencing the discussion around the functions performed by some market operators (such 
as HFTs and market-makers), i.e. the impact of HFT on volatility and liquidity, or the role of 
market-makers in concentrating risks and interconnections. New regulatory tools – coming 
from the top – are actually at centre of the discussion. For instance, concerning HFT, the 
introduction of circuit breakers or stricter financial requirements. For market-makers and 
financial institutions, exposed to certain macro risks in general, the introduction of trade 
repositories, margin/capital requirements and liquidity requirements are proposed. 
Moreover, several aspects may be deemed to impact volatility and so push regulators 
to rein in new areas of financial markets, with a potential impact on MiFID. These variables 
are: 
1)  Exchange rates (and FX); 
2)  Anaemic growth; 
3)  Persistent unemployment; 
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4)  Latent or lurking inflation; 
5)  Deflation; 
6)  Budget deficits; and  
7)  Unsustainable sovereign debt burdens. 
If new technologies are perceived as a determinant of volatility, they will be subject to 
stricter regulation. Regulators’ attention is gradually turning towards trading networks and 
the implications of regulatory actions on such network infrastructures as financial markets.  
In conclusion, another important aspect is data access, in terms of best execution and 
regulatory/supervisory actions (price, cost, speed, counterparty exposures, etc). Regulation 
may need to define proper mechanisms to launch early warnings and to identify systemic 
risks. Indirect effects of actions in parallel segments of financial markets due to their 
interconnectedness can increase the level of uncertainty in the market and bring tough 
regulatory responses. 
 
Conclusion # 14   
The systemic importance of modern capital markets highlights the inner tensions among 
financial stability, market efficiency and technological innovation. A well-functioning market 
must balance efficiency and safety, since inefficiencies will sooner rather than later raise 
problems of safety and vice versa. The role of technology in the configuration of market 
infrastructure has become ever more important. Markets are redesigning their 
infrastructures thanks to innovative technologies. In short, speed and volumes will likely 
continue to grow but trading venues may have t o  d e a l  w i t h  m o r e  f r e q u e n t  c r i s e s  a n d  
outages. Overall, technological innovation, combined with new trading techniques, has 
brought revolutionary changes to trading platforms. Among these changes, there are major 
benefits, such as better order management and control of market impact; or more efficient 
and faster feed of information into prices, which generate diffused gains in terms of lower 
spreads and better price discovery.  
However, modern trading also presents a number of challenges, such as an increase in 
fundamental market volatility, which in turn has brought speed and volumes to critical 
levels. Advanced execution services like direct-market or sponsored access have radically 
increased speed and volumes for transactions, in an attempt to cope with increasing 
volatility. Yet, limits to infrastructure capacity mean that higher speed and volumes risk 
generating market disorder and financial instability. To overcome these challenges, 
intermediaries and trading venues need to strengthen their own monitoring. A coherent set 
of emergency procedures in case of market disruptions should be designed in consultation 
with market participants (e.g. circuit breakers). There are a several efficient monitoring 
systems already in place, which could serve as model systems. Finally, trading rules should 
be harmonised across markets to avoid instability arising from arbitrage. 
5.6  Access to market infrastructures for equities: What’s next?  
 
Competition among network infrastructures needs a certain degree of 
market contestability in order to bring costs down for final users and avoid 
oligopolistic settings. Current development of competition has led to a 
dramatic cost reduction in trading and post-trading costs, even without 
interoperability. Greater and cheaper market accessibility is a key objective of 
MiFID, to be achieved through competition and greater contestability. MiFID 
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grants to investors/intermediaries non-discretionary market access to trading 
venues (recital 6), to investment firms freedom of access to regulated markets 
in other than their country of origin (Art. 33), and most notably it gives 
freedom to investment firms to decide the infrastructure for clearing and 
settlement (Art. 34). In addition, member states need to ensure incumbent 
infrastructures grant access to newcomers unless a ‘legitimate commercial 
ground’ makes the link unavailable. In this regard, the definition of 
‘legitimate’ seems to leave some space for ambiguity. Incumbents typically 
allege one of the following three reasons to refuse access:  
i)  Efficiency and cost reduction;  
ii)  Not meeting specific requirements or standards set by the infrastructure 
itself; or 
iii)  Technical difficulties.  
‘Efficiency and costs reduction’ has been frequently dismissed by the 
Commission, which wishes to avoid high market concentrations, even if it 
comes at cost (see GE/Honeywell)166. As to ‘technical reasons’, these are 
usually assessed case-by-case by looking at available technologies and 
standards. With regard to the ‘accessibility requirements’ set by the 
infrastructure, these should be clearly defined and applied on a non-
discriminatory basis (see Code of Conduct, 2006, §25-33)167. 
The opening up of competition in the upstream market (trading) has 
also generated some beneficial effects in terms of market accessibility for end 
investors. However, in the post-trading segment accessibility remains 
somehow limited, also affecting the overall costs of trading. Looking only at 
costs however, does not reflect the redistributive effects that a different 
market structure can generate. As a result, it is unclear how current markets 
can balance efficiency and competition with market integrity and stability. 
Excluding any ideal world of ‘perfect competition’, there are three possible 
scenarios:  
1)  Open architecture;  
2)  Closed architecture; and  
3)  Semi-open (or semi-closed) architecture.  
The first scenario would require unleashing competition at every stage 
of the post-trading architecture, imposing painful unbundling obligations 
(disregarding potential economies of scope) and interoperability 
arrangements. The second scenario entails the creation of a ‘closed’ 
architecture, whereby market players and regulators work for further 
integration disregarding potential economies of scope. This market design 
tends to maximise economies of scale only and ignores beneficial portfolio 
effects and interoperability in favour of quasi-monopolies or monopolies at 
various stages of the post-trading value chain. Finally, there is an 
intermediate formula that does not seek to impose a specific market design 
but rather to interpret market trends and reap the benefits of scale and scope 
Market 
architecture 
                                                      
166 See Case No. COMP/M2220 – General Electric/Honeywell, Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 – Merger Procedure, 
Article 8(3), (http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2220_en.pdf).   
167 See Code of Conduct for Clearing and Settlement, (http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-markets/ 
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economies. For instance, this approach does not judge bundling or mergers as 
harmful as long as they generate important economies of scope (‘efficiency 
defence’), are replicable (together with the infrastructure), and do not create a 
big concentration in the market. In effect, according to this approach, the post-
trading infrastructure should be evaluated under the ‘essential facility 
doctrine’,168 i.e. the infrastructure should not be forced to open the access to 
its infrastructure as long as it does not meet all the following requirements: 
1)  The facility controlled by one market player is the only way to access 
the relevant market; 
2)  The facility is not replicable at a reasonable cost; 
3)  The monopolist refuses access to the facility or offers it at unbearable 
costs or under unfair conditions and 
4)  The absence of a valid economic justification. 
On the other hand, this third approach would minimise barriers to entry 
and exit by promoting interoperability agreements between incumbent 
infrastructures and newcomers (in line with Art. 34, MiFID and forthcoming 
European Market Infrastructure Regulation), and minimising the presence of 
monopolies at any stage of the post-trading architecture, if no ‘natural 
monopoly’ conditions are verified. 
To favour a more open post-trading architecture and to promote a full 
application of the principle originally set in MiFID (Art. 34), in November 
2006, the European Commission endorsed the Code of Conduct for Clearing 
and Settlement, which was signed by the Federation of European Securities 
Exchanges (FESE), the European Association of Clearing Houses (EACH), and 
the European Central Securities Depositories Association (ECSDA). The Code 
represents the last self-regulatory effort by the industry to meet high-level 
objectives, before the financial crisis promoted a more interventionist 
approach through regulation. In effect, the Code was a valuable explorative 
work to achieve three goals: 
1)  Transparency of prices and services; 
2)  Access and interoperability; and 
3)  Unbundling of services and accounting separation. 
Code of Conduct 
After three years, the Commission (EU COM, 2009b) made an 
assessment of the progress achieved so far, which highlighted how the Code 
of Conduct had positively contributed to price transparency. However, 
conflicting evidence was found with regard to ‘access and interoperability’ 
and ‘unbundling of services and accounting separation’ (Lannoo and 
Valiante, 2009). In effect, despite the Code promoting basic principles (such as 
‘right of standard access’ and ‘reciprocity’) and some additional competition 
between infrastructures, commercial and technical barriers to cross-border 
access to infrastructures remain fairly high (EU COM, 2009b), in addition to 
 
                                                      
168 The ‘essential facility doctrine’ is a theory that was originally elaborated in the US antitrust case law; see, U.S. 
v. Terminal Railroad Association, 244 U.S. 383, 1912. An extension of this doctrine was elaborated in Europe too in 
several cases, in particular, European Commission, Magill TV guide/ITP, BBC and RTE, in GUCE 1989, L 78/43; 
Court of Justice, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG vs Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, 
Mediaprint Zeitungsvertriebsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and Mediaprint Anzeigengesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, C-7/97, p. 
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other legal, economic, fiscal and social barriers that still impede the full 
development of a European post-trading architecture in particular for 
settlement services (Giovannini Group, 2001, 2003; CESAME, 2008). More 
competitive clearing services, however, have been effectively delivered in 
some markets, including silo market models (e.g. Swiss equity market), even 
though the situation seems to have stalled for interoperability agreements in 
other markets (see table in Annex II and figure below).  
Figure 30. Equity landscape before and after MiFID and the Code of Conduct 
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Source: FESE. 
 
Note (from the presentation): In green the interoperability agreements in place and in 
yellow those on hold due to review by the regulators or to discussions between the parties. 
For a complete overview of the status of the requested links between post-trading 
infrastructures, see table in Annex II. 
As shown above, after the Code came into force, many requests for 
interoperability and access were sent to incumbent infrastructures but only 
two were actually put in place. In addition, MiFID also stimulated the entry of 
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new competing infrastructures in the clearing space.  
Despite conflicting findings, costs of trading and clearing services went 
down by 60% between 2007 and 2009, while costs of settlement services seem 
t o  h a v e  g o n e  d o w n  o n l y  i n  s o m e  m a r k e t s ,  a l s o  d u e  t o  t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e  
pressures coming from the upstream trading market thanks to the 
introduction of MiFID (Oxera, 2009; EU COM, 2009b, p. 3). The fragmentation 
of European financial markets infrastructure, in particular for equities, is still 
led by geographical aspects (i.e. national markets; see figures above). 
In the aftermath of to the financial crisis, risk reduction seems to prevail 
over cost reduction, which was a main objective of the Code. As a result, 
interoperability agreements are being more deeply scrutinised for potential 
threats to infrastructure integrity, while important guidelines are still in the 
implementation phase (Sections 3.5.3 and 3.8.3, FESE et al., 2007). In 
particular, the crisis drew attention to potential risks, such as competitive 
pressures that could lead to a race-to-the-bottom in terms of risk management 
practices. Moreover, asymmetry in collateralisation agreements should be the 
object of further examination and sound internationally-agreed standards. 
The whole post-trading sector will be eventually reshuffled by an array 
of new European regulations. It is essential that EU co-legislators ensure 
strong coherence among these legal texts by giving to each piece of legislation 
a specific role, minimising conflicts and promoting legal certainty.  
 
Conclusion # 15   
Academic literature has consistently suggested that market infrastructures, particularly for 
equity markets, are network structures that should operate in a competitive environment. 
MiFID should therefore take action to keep barriers of entry and exit low, but with due 
attention to economies of scope and potential efficiencies. The Code of Conduct succeeded in 
improving price transparency and stimulated interoperability. More remains to be done, 
however, to solve existent commercial and technical challenges in terms of access, 
interoperability and unbundling. Ultimately, MiFID will favour freedom of access by 
investment firms to competing market infrastructures. In effect, while the original MiFID 
Directive (Article 34) envisaged a level playing field in terms of non-discriminatory access to 
competing infrastructures, the transposition of this provision into national law and its 
enforcement has been inconsistent across EU member states. As such, greater efforts need to 
be made to ensure consistency in the enforcement of the regulatory framework. For this 
purpose, not only the revision of MiFID will play a role, but also concurrent legislations such 
as European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), Securities Law Directive (SLD) and 
Central Securities Depository Regulation (CSDR). 
6.   Provision of investment services 
 
MiFID represents an important attempt to design a harmonised framework of 
rules for the provision of investment service in the European Economic Area 
(EEA). It adopts a ‘functional approach’ by regulating market participants 
according to the actual investment service169 they provide. Within its scope, 
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the Directive therefore applies to all market participants, with some important 
exemptions.170 
In parallel with a more competitive environment for trading venues, 
MiFID sought to harmonise and strengthen the level of investor protection 
and market integrity through two sets of rules: 
1)  Organisational requirements (ORs); and 
2)  ‘Conduct of Business’ (CoB) rules.  
The former aims at strengthening market integrity (i.e., fighting market 
abuses and attempts to manipulate markets) and improve resilience. The 
latter targets greater investor protection and market efficiency. These rules 
consist of fairly detailed provisions, which should be read in conjunction with 
the general obligation for investment firms to “act honestly, fairly and 
professionally” in the best interest of clients (Art. 19.1, MiFID), and the rules 
on trade and transaction reporting (see Section 4). The overarching objectives 
of investor protection, market integrity, and market resilience also operate as 
high-level principles (informing the legislation and serving as guidelines for 
its interpretation). For instance, in order to increase investor protection, 
‘investment advice’, (an ancillary service under the ISD), became a core 
investment service under MiFID, subject to the authorisation of the competent 
financial authority. This means that even market players providing only this 
service171 can compete at European level and need to comply with MiFID. 
 
6.1  The nature of investment services and investors 
The exchange of financial instruments – and more generally the search for the 
best allocation of resources – involves a wide array of (financial) services, 
which typically fall under MiFID, either as ‘core investment’ or ‘ancillary’ 
services. The nature of services sometimes raises economic and regulatory 
issues, particularly whenever the quality of the service is observable only 
after its use or is not verifiable at all. The former situation is an example of 
‘experience’ goods, and the latter is a case of ‘credence’ goods.172 Investment 
services, besides those activities that are not offered to third parties (e.g. 
‘dealing on own account’), are made up of aspects from both experience and 
credence goods.173 Most notably, investment services may be affected by: 
Nature of 
investment 
service 
                                                                                                                                                                      
latter are typically provided in combination with the former. However, no authorisation to operate as MiFID 
investment firm should be granted if only ancillary services are provided (Art. 6.1, MiFID). Ancillary services can 
only be provided in combination with investment services to benefit from the European passport. The definition 
of investment service under MiFID should be read in combination with the exemptions set by Art. 2.1. 
170 See, in particular Art. 2.1, MiFID. Amongst others, MiFID most notably set exemptions for insurance 
companies, energy firms, and UCITS and pension funds (Art. 2.1(a)(h)(i)(k)). 
171 ‘Generic advices’ are not included in the definition, see Recital 81, Implementing Directive.  
172 Products and services can be classified in three categories: search goods; experience goods; and credence 
goods. A search good consists of a product or service for which it is possible to assess the quality before the 
purchase. Search elements include those attributes of the relationship that are easily detected and understood by 
customers. An experience good, however, is a product or service for which the buyer can evaluate the quality 
only after the purchase and its use. Finally, a credence good is a product or service whose value and quality 
cannot be assessed even after its use, as features cannot be easily compared with other products or services. See 
Nelson (1970). 
173 For a general discussion of investor protection and competition policy issues in financial services, see Renda & 
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1)  Strong information asymmetries between providers and customers 
(including limited financial education); 
2)  High switching costs due to ‘sunk’ investments (lock-in effects); 
3)  Cognitive biases in decision-making and judgment that affect investors; 
and 
4)  Difficulties for the customer to ‘shop around’. 
Firstly, two particular aspects generate asymmetric information 
between investment firms and their clients: i) limited financial education and 
rationality; and ii) private information. The former is related to the type 
investor. In effect, retail investors have typically less knowledge of investment 
products and financial markets than professional and institutional ones, who 
usually own the necessary resources to reduce any informational gap vis-à-vis 
investment firms and can leverage their contractual power. However, all 
investors can behave ‘irrationally’ and increase their informational gap (see 
below). The latter cause of asymmetric information comes from the 
investment firm that finally owns private information as a result of its 
investments for the provision of investment services. For instance, a dealer 
knows better than its clients how order execution works, precisely because 
order execution is a core part of its business. 
Informati
on asymmetry 
Asymmetric information between providers and customers may spark 
other market effects, which may include transaction-specific investments (or 
sunk costs)174. For instance, for a retail investor, the relationship between the 
provider and the customer is often based on trust given the overwhelming 
difference in knowledge and access to information. This situation generates 
‘sunk’ and switching costs, since when a customer changes provider it loses 
the transaction-specific cost/investment, and faces an additional, equally 
‘sunk’ cost to familiarise with the new provider. This effect is particularly 
strong for investment products, where the fiduciary relationship with the 
service provider may be a fundamental transaction-specific asset, in particular 
for retail investors (see Llewellyn, 1995; next sections). Transaction-specific 
costs/investments may amount to switching costs, which lock in consumers 
and ultimately give the investment firm the opportunity to unilaterally 
increase its prices over its rivals since customers would de facto be locked in. 
Under these circumstances, competing investment firms would have to offer 
discounts that offset switching costs in order to attract rivals’ customers. For 
retail investors, in particular, the following costs impede switching providers 
(Klemperer, 1995; OFT, 2008; Renda & Valiante, 2010): 
•  Transaction costs, e.g. documentation, time, fees, search costs, other 
information costs, learning costs, etc.; 
•  ‘Exit’ costs, due to, e.g. loyalty programmes, etc.; 
•  Uncertainty costs, since the quality or suitability of a product can only be 
observable after purchase (experience attributes), or can never be fully 
observed by the customer (credence attributes); 
•  Psychological costs, mainly in the case of goods with a high significant 
Switchin
g costs 
                                                      
174 Sunk costs are irreversible costs paid once to produce or to consume a specific service or product. They 
represent a barrier to entry for producers and a barrier to switch for consumers. Sunk costs linked to investment 
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credence attributes (‘mutual trust’), such as investment advice. 
In particular, experience and credence attributes represent a transaction-
specific investment for customers that make switching very difficult (so-called 
status quo  bias). Retail investors may potentially suffer all the above costs, 
while wholesale investors typically encounter only transaction costs and an 
opportunity costs when they switch provider. An example of opportunity 
cost may be the risk of suffering market impact in order execution, which can 
ultimately restrain institutional investors from changing provider.  
Another aspect that may influence the provision of investment services, 
for retail investors in particular, are so-called ‘cognitive biases’. These are 
investor behaviours that violate the assumption of ‘rationality’ and standard 
economic principles. In particular, investors (Posner, 1998; Jolls et al., 2000): 
•  Do not necessarily maximise their utility in every circumstance; 
•  Do not often have stable preferences (e.g. sunk costs and initial allocation 
of entitlements may dominate in their decisions); and 
•  Do not have the ability to process or accumulate an optimal amount of 
the information available in the market. 
The violation of rational assumptions lies on three cognitive limits (Jolls 
et al., 2000): i) Bounded rationality; ii) Bounded willpower; and iii) Bounded 
self-interest. 175 
Bounded rationality (Simon, 1957) refers to limits faced by human 
beings in terms of accessible information, mental capacity and available time. 
It should be distinguished from rational ignorance.176 In addition, individuals 
are often ‘path-dependent’ in their choices, especially when they cannot fully 
appraise the value of something they already possess (Korobkin & Ulen, 2000; 
Sunstein, 2000; Jolls, 2007). As to bounded willpower, it leads people to act in 
conflict with their long-term interests, even though they anticipate pervasive 
effects in so doing (e.g. smokers). Finally, bounded self-interest may push 
people to care about treating others fairly because they want to be treated in 
the same way. Agents will act ‘nicer’ or ‘nastier’ depending on how the other 
party treats them. All these cognitive limits also occur with the provision of 
services not related to investment. However, the experience and credence 
attributes present in investment services can magnify the effects of cognitive 
limits on judgment and decision-making processes. As result, MiFID has laid 
out a regulatory scheme that offers greater protection to final investors with 
particular attention to retail investors, who suffer more from experience and 
credence attributes. 
Cognitive biases 
Moreover, due to the abovementioned costs, only an insufficient 
number of ‘marginal’ consumers is actually able to ‘shop around’, thereby 
‘Shopping 
around’ 
                                                      
175 For an overall analysis of potential cognitive biases resulting from these cognitive limits, see Renda & Valiante 
(2010), pp. 51-55. For instance, the ‘overconfidence bias’ means that “people tend to overestimate (to be 
overconfident about) the probability of an outcome if an example of the event has recently occurred (linked to the 
prospect theory and the precedent behaviour). Therefore, consumers are generally overconfident in their abilities 
and in their future fortunes. For example, many people invest, believing that they can beat the stock market, or 
they underestimate the risk that illness or unemployment may cause difficulty in repaying a loan.” (p. 54) 
176 It represents the situation in which the investor is not able to or finds it inconvenient to put effort in 
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limiting the flow of information that helps to correct market failures. In effect, 
by ‘shopping around’, informed consumers generate a positive externality on 
uninformed ones (as long as they are able to see them) that may have too little 
incentive to acquire information (Hynes & Posner 2001). 
MiFID brought together all these concerns and introduced a more 
paternalistic approach to consumer protection. For instance, MiFID intervenes 
on firm-client relationships by setting obligations such as the good faith 
clause (Art. 19.1) or ‘best execution’ duties (Art. 19 and 21, MiFID). In effect, 
these duties try to palliate two phenomena present in firm-client 
relationships: 
1)  A lack of effective monitoring (moral hazard); and 
2)  A lack of ability to assess the quality of the service (adverse selection). 
The former has broad implications for how services are offered and 
disclosed to clients. MiFID organisational requirements play a primary role in 
containing adverse effects by promoting a more effective monitoring and 
discouraging moral hazard. Adverse selection, in particular, may drive good 
quality services out of business with consequences for the stability of the 
market. In this regard, MiFID business conduct rules ensure that investors are 
aware and able to understand the risks they take and, ideally, evaluate prices 
against actual product quality.  
The introduction of stricter pre-trade and post-trade transparency has 
also increased the flow of pre-contractual and post-contractual information, 
which contributes to reduce adverse selection and moral hazard for end 
investors (besides any test of suitability and appropriateness foreseen by 
MiFID). It follows that MiFID organisational, conduct of business and 
transparency rules have been more consistently applied, with positive effects 
also on market structure and its long-term efficiency. 
MiFID 
Requirements 
6.2  Fiduciary duties 
 
A contract between two parties for the provision of a product or service 
entails a complex web of aspects, which cannot be fully anticipated. Contracts 
are therefore ‘incomplete’ by their very own nature, no matter the 
sophistication or evenness of parties’ contractual power.  
The degree of completeness of a contract depends mainly on four 
factors (Hermalin et al., 2007, p. 11):  
i)  Specification costs; 
ii)  Monitoring costs;  
iii)  Enforcement costs; and 
iv)  Need for pre-contractual commitment. 
Firstly, high specification costs make the drawing up of the ‘perfect’ 
contract impossible for several reasons. Most notably, a contract cannot 
usually cover all potential contingencies in the provision of a good or service, 
especially when deferred in time, as it is impossible to predict all future 
events. This universal cost affects every contractual provision of services or 
goods.  
Secondly, costs of monitoring that the transaction has been executed 
may be comparably prohibitive (or even be not observable or verifiable at 
Contract 
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all)177. This situation hinders the possibility of devising contracts effectively. 
Thirdly, contracts may not be enforced because costs can be too high in 
absolute or relative terms (in comparison to the potential benefits). 
Enforcement is strictly related to monitoring costs. If a party cannot verify the 
execution of a contract, a competent authority or judge may not be capable of 
doing so either. In this case, in addition to default rules,178 the provision of 
‘experience and credence’ goods or services is combined with strong remedies 
(e.g. punitive damages) and fiduciary duties (general clauses). In particular, 
when verifiability is low, strong remedies may reduce the agent’s pre-
contractual commitment to act in its own interest.  
Last but not least, in order to enter into a contract, parties need to trust 
the other party’s commitment; otherwise, they may not take on the risk of 
going into the agreement. This is particularly true in transactions where 
reputational aspects are crucial to the success of the deal, such as investment 
advice.  
Investment services, as mentioned above, involve an agency 
relationship with high specification and monitoring costs, due to their 
experience and credence attributes. Moreover, even though investment 
services are frequently observable, the scarce ability to verify their execution 
(low verifiability) often makes enforcement too costly.  
This complexity can have differing degrees of intensity, in relation to 
the type of transaction cost or information asymmetry. For instance, retail 
investors may feel an investment service is too complex for their level of 
knowledge and wholesale investors may fear the economic implications of 
complexity on other aspects of their business. For all these reasons, in 
addition to greater competition, regulators have pushed for the recognition of 
fiduciary duties in the provision of investment services. The concept of 
fiduciary duty originates from the Common Law duty of the agent (e.g. 
broker) to be loyal to the principal (e.g. investor). Fiduciary duties are 
typically coupled with disgorgement, that is, the restitution of any gain 
obtained by the agent as a result of its actions against the principal’s interests 
(Easterbrook & Fischel, 1993). In this way, legislation has gradually overcome 
its formalistic approach to the law of contract (the ‘sanctity of the contract’) 
based on the fiction of ‘arms-length’ transactions and equally powerful 
counterparties. By recognising that parties do not frequently have the same 
bargaining power, legislation has gradually afforded more protection to the 
‘weaker’ party of the contract. In effect, the party with in theory more 
contractual power can hardly impose its own contractual conditions today. 
Financial regulation has followed the same trend and increased protection for 
final investors, moving from an original ‘duty to read’ to a ‘duty to disclose’, 
Investment 
services 
                                                      
177 Observability and verifiability are indispensable to define a contractual contingency. However, they may come 
at high cost, since it includes tasks such as investigation, measurement, documentation and monitoring (Hermalin 
et al., 2007)  
178 Default rules are those rules that apply to a legally binding agreement if not decided by parties otherwise. 
They are effective in reducing transaction costs – setting the ground for a contractual agreement – and they may 
encourage informationally advantaged parties to reveal their type. Default rules have the role to balance the 
contractual power between structurally strong and weak counterparties in terms of private information. 
However, default rules need to be carefully drafted as they may increase transaction costs if parties need too often 
to contract around them because they are or ineffective or too costly.  128 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
and now to a ‘duty to behave’. In Civil Law countries,179 a preference to deal 
with fiduciary relationships through bilateral negotiations (contracts) has 
often given a crucial role to national legislation in dealing with these issues. 
Therefore, by applying Common Law-based principles such as fiduciary 
duties, the European legislator has decided to introduce, in a pre-existing 
legal system mainly based on Civil Law principles, concepts that need the 
underpinning of strong national and supra-national enforcement 
mechanisms, which have been  conspicuously absent at European level (Pistor 
& Xu, 2002, pp. 32-33).  
More generally, fiduciary duties apply to situations in which there are: 
1)  Information asymmetries (moral hazard and adverse selection); 
2)  Transaction costs; 
3)  Cognitive biases; and 
4)  Market frictions (limited competition). 
Also the literature on marketing portrays trust, satisfaction and average 
perceived cost (including switching costs) as key determinants of customer 
loyalty (amongst others, Graf et al., 2008).  
Additional cognitive biases may affect retail investors’ behaviours and 
make the provision of investment services even less observable and verifiable, 
a n d  s o  d e  f a c t o  e v e n  m o r e  a k i n  t o  fiduciary duties. Wholesale investors, 
however, typically have the contractual power to modify contract terms if 
they are not devised properly, while for retail investors costs are typically too 
high. Hence, many fiduciary duties have been formulated differently for retail 
and professional investors.  
The breadth of these duties is very important, though. On the one hand, 
strict fiduciary duties may have two unintended consequences. They may 
preclude investors’ ability to contract around specific terms; or make pre-
contractual commitment too high, generating clients’ overreliance in the 
positive outcome of the transaction. As a consequence, a protective approach 
would end up damaging precisely those investors the regulation seeks to 
protect. On the other hand, a loose definition can make enforcement too costly 
and expose the beneficiary/principal to two types of agents’ wrongdoing 
(Cooter & Freedman, 1991):  
i)  The fiduciary/agent may misappropriate the principal’s asset or some 
of its value (moral hazard); and  
ii)  The fiduciary/agent may neglect the management of the asset 
(negligence or violation of the duty of care).  
In the US, the fiduciary duty is recognised in two kinds of situations: 
when the contract explicitly recognises a fiduciary relationship (e.g. principal-
agent); and when specific circumstances surrounding the transaction and the 
relationship occur. ‘Trust’, ‘confidence’ and ‘influence’ are typically those 
                                                      
179 Civil Law countries are those countries in which law is primarily codified or designed with other written 
regulations, while the role of the judges is to verify their application with low space for interpretation. By 
contrast, Common Law countries are those where law is developed through court decisions. However, since the 
last century these two systems have been getting closer. For instance, a typically common law country such as the 
US has recently approved an enormous package of financial reforms (Dodd-Frank bill) that will need to be 
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circumstances that denote the existence of a fiduciary duty (Frankel, 1983, p. 
829). In effect, a fiduciary duty should not be considered as a moral belief, but 
legal ground should be found in the potential sources of failure for the 
contractual relationship (Easterbrook & Fischel, 1993). A fiduciary relation is a 
contractual one, characterised by unusually high costs of specification and 
monitoring. 
Due to high specification and monitoring costs, MiFID and more 
generally EU regulation have gradually recognised fiduciary aspects to the 
agency relationship between the provider of financial services and its 
customers (in particular, for retail investors). The use of general clauses in the 
legal text, such as ‘good faith’ or ‘fairness’, has afforded judges much needed 
flexibility, especially in Civil Law countries,180 to formally recognise fiduciary 
duties and to devise them in line with the nature of the counterparty and the 
relationship. MiFID, in particular, has introduced a general clause that 
explains the fiduciary duty between providers and clients by asking the 
provider to act in client’s interest (Art. 19.1). However, general clauses should 
not be seen as vague statements, but have a clear contractual meaning. For 
instance, the concept of ‘fairness’ can be seen as a deviation from a benchmark 
transaction that shifts the balance in favour of the more entitled party (Jolls et 
al., 2000). There are two general clauses upon which organisational 
requirements and conduct-of-business rules are designed (see figure below): 
1)  The general requirement to “act honestly, fairly and professionally in 
accordance with the best interests of its clients” (Art. 19.1, MiFID); and 
2)  The general requirement to make sure that “all information, including 
marketing communications, addressed by the investment firm to clients 
or potential clients shall be fair, clear and not misleading” (Art. 19.2, 
MiFID). 
The enforcement of fiduciary duties has been typically left to competent 
authorities through information coming mostly in via trade and transaction 
reporting, plus other substantial supervisory powers (Art. 50, MiFID) and the 
possibility to file civil litigations. However, no harmonised system of 
sanctions is in place so far in Europe. The Commission (2010b) is looking into 
the possibility of granting further powers of investigation to competent 
authorities. It is also examining the feasibility of harmonising the regime for 
remedies, such as sanctions based on the losses generated by the 
infringement, and not on the disgorgement (restitution of profits).  
 
MiFID 
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while the role of the judges is to verify their application with low space for interpretation. By contrast, Common 
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Figure 31. General clauses 
‘Best interests of clients’ 
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‘Fair, clear, not misleading 
information’ (art.19.2)
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Source: Authors.  
 
Finally, competition between investment firms may improve the quality 
of the provision of investment services without making it necessary to tighten 
legislation or monitoring. Competition may generate pre-contractual 
incentives to behave in the best interest of investors, but with unclear effects 
on the implementation of rules already in place. On the one hand, in 
particular, if firms do not act cooperatively, competition may reduce 
monitoring costs and promote greater compliance with fiduciary duties. On 
the other hand, however, if firms do cooperate, competition may result in a 
collusive equilibrium based on a shared ‘soft’ interpretation of fiduciary 
duties across firms, if they are not soundly defined. 
 
6.3  Organisational rules  
 
MiFID organisational requirements (ORs) aim at promoting integrity and 
orderly functioning of financial markets (Recital 5), as well as “integrity, 
competence and soundness among investment firms and entities that operate 
regulated markets or MTFs” (Recital 2, Implementing Directive). For instance, 
ORs improve monitoring and compliance with conflicts of interest rules and 
prevention of misselling practices by requiring disclosure, recordkeeping and 
other material obligations. The Directive (Art. 13)181 sets a wide array of 
organisational requirements, which are needed in order to gain authorisation 
but can be slightly aligned with the logic of the firm’s relevant markets. This 
list of requirements has had a major impact on the internal controls of 
investment firms and must be applied also by UCITS management companies 
if they perform portfolio management and advisory services.182 Moreover, 
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ORs apply not only to investment firms but also to official MiFID trading 
venues (RMs and MTFs, Art. 14, 26, 39 and 43). However, diverse 
interpretations by member states of the ‘proportionate approach’ set by 
MiFID (Art. 13.4) have promoted a fragmented implementation of these 
requirements across trading venues, de facto setting the scene for different 
rules being applied to similar activities. The review of MiFID should look at 
the possibility to finally align material obligations.  
Besides a general clause to comply with MiFID rules and procedures 
(Art. 13.2, MiFID), the Directive set strict requirements to improve internal 
mechanisms of:  
1)  Compliance;  
2)  Risk management;  
3)  Order handling; and  
4)  Transparency to clients. 
Firstly, the Directive set organisational requirements to ensure the 
creation of ‘adequate policies’ and compliance with MiFID rules through:  
•  A general duty to ‘establish adequate policy and procedures’ and 
comply with MiFID rules (Art. 13.2 MiFID);183 
•  The appointment of a compliance officer (objective and independent);184 
•  Obligations for tied agents (Art. 23, MiFID); and 
•  Recordkeeping (13.6, 25.2, MiFID).185 
Most notably, the investment firm is required to appoint a compliance 
officer that should be able to independently ensure compliance, with enough 
powers and resources to solicit the firm to correct any policies or procedures 
that do not comply with MiFID obligations. The Directive also requires firms 
to keep records of all services and transactions (including transaction reports) 
taking into account proportionality with regard to the type of business and 
the range of investment services and activities performed. Investment firms 
then must retain all required records for a period of 5 years or longer if 
requested. Records that refer to obligations and rights for the investment firm 
and its clients shall be retained for a period that is at least equal to the 
duration of the relationship with the client (Art. 51.1, Impl. Dir.). Records 
shall be finally stored in data management systems and be easily accessible 
for future reference by competent authorities (Art. 51.2, Impl. Dir.). CESR 
(2010c, p.10) has remarked the importance of record keeping obligations in 
four areas: 
i)  Reception and transmission of orders; 
ii)  Execution of orders on behalf of the client; 
iii)  Dealing on own account; and 
iv)  Portfolio management.  
For some group of consumers, the investment firm should keep records 
of the investment advice as well. However, CESR noted that, since investment 
Compliance 
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advice services are usually offered face-to-face, setting recordkeeping 
obligations would be costly and very difficult to implement. Other ways to 
improve quality of investment advice should be taken into consideration (see 
Section 6.3.1). 
Secondly, ORs define rules concerning the firm’s risk management 
system. In particular, the Directive sets: 
•  A system of internal controls (e.g. independent internal audit, IT, etc; 
Art. 13.4-13.5,);186 
•  The possibility to outsource non-core operational services (Art. 13.5);187 
•  A client order handling system (Art. 22.1 and 22.2);188 and  
•  The safeguard and administration of clients’ financial assets (Art. 13.7, 
13.8).189 
This framework of rules aims at improving internal risk management 
and ensuring continuity in the provision of investment services. Furthermore, 
MiFID attempts to improve the control of counterparty risk, as well as 
economic, financial and operational risks. In particular, the Directive forbids 
excessive risk-taking actions by using clients’ assets to deal on own account if 
the client has not explicitly expressed his/her consent. These rules have not 
prevented the recent financial crisis, but they presumably played a crucial 
role in limiting the negative effects of cases in which the broker/dealer also 
offered custodian services and made use of clients’ assets to deal on own 
account or did not segregate assets with third parties, putting additional 
credit risk on assets that should have been protected from bankruptcy 
procedures (e.g. the Lehman Brothers case). However, asset segregation with 
third parties is currently foreseen by MiFID only for clients that are not credit 
institutions. Clients can eventually oppose the decision to segregate the assets 
but only with regard to a specific entity, however.  
In addition, MiFID (Recital 27) exempts investment firms from applying 
client asset protection rules when full ownership of funds and financial 
instruments has been transferred to cover any client obligation. The 
Commission is looking into this matter and may decide to remove this 
possibility (at least for retail clients’ assets), which was a main issue in a 
recent bankruptcy procedure (Lehman Brothers; EU COM, 2010b, p. 70).190 
Investment firms would also be required to improve disclosure on asset 
segregation and diversify the placement of client funds using different third 
parties. 
Risk 
management 
Finally, MiFID has set organisational requirements, which amounts to a 
new discipline for information disclosure to clients, with the particular role of 
containing conflicts of interest. 
More specifically, the Directive defines: 
Transparency to 
clients 
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189 Art. 19, 20, 42, 43, 48, and 49, Implementing Directive. 
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•  Rules on personal transactions;191 
•  Conflict of interests rules and inducements disclosure (Art. 13.3, 18.1, 
and 18.2);192 and 
•  Information to clients rules (Art. 19.2, 19.3 and 19.8).193 
Disclosure to clients should protect clients’ interests and information 
should be “fair, clear and not misleading” (Art. 19.2). Most notably, MiFID 
organisational requirements introduced new rules to prevent investment 
firms from acting in conflict with their clients’ interests by identifying, 
managing and, if they cannot be eliminated, disclosing these conflicts to 
prospective clients before approaching investors to offer a transaction. In 
order to comply with the general clause on “acting honestly, fairly and 
professionally in accordance with the best interest of a client” (Art. 19.1), the 
investment firm should disclose fees, commissions and non-monetary benefits 
(inducements) that are neither directly generated by the investment service 
provided to clients nor do they help to increase the quality of the service 
(Recital 39, Impl. Dir.). This rule aims at limiting undue influence by interest 
groups on the provision of services to clients. Furthermore, the legal text 
should be consistent with the forthcoming legislative proposal on Packaged 
Retail Investment Products (PRIPs),194 which will define the terms of pre-
contractual information. The Commission also proposed to increase the level 
of information to be disclosed to clients when dealing with complex financial 
instruments (EU COM 2010b, p. 58). Information about risks/gains ex ante 
and ongoing quarterly reports on the instruments and their underlying 
should be disclosed to clients.  
The European Commission (2010b) is reviewing some of the 
organisational requirements discussed above. In particular, concerning 
inducements, it is currently foreseen that if the amount of inducements cannot 
be clearly determined, the method of calculation should be disclosed (Art. 26 
(b)(i), Impl. Dir.; CESR, 2010i). As MiFID does not define the requirements to 
be disclosed in the form of a ‘methodology’, in line with the Commission’s 
view, this has created difficulties to quantify or provide a tool to quantify the 
level of inducements. In this respect, the Commission has proposed to 
introduce: 
1)  Ex-post reporting obligations; 
2)  More details and templates for disclosure to clients; 
3)  Other requirements to be assessed by supervisors to define if 
inducements enhance the quality of the service; 
4)  A ban on inducements provided by a third party in case of portfolio 
management services; and 
5)  A ban on inducements provided by a third party for intermediary 
providing independent advice. 
Inducements may not only distort incentives to provide an investment 
New proposals 
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service in the best interest of clients, but they may also be used to give 
compensation to brokers that may potentially distort incentives. 
The Commission (2010b, p. 65) also proposes to clarify and modify rules 
on activities concerning “dealing on own account”.195 Most importantly, 
orders executed using matched principal (so-called ‘back to back’ 
transactions196) would be considered as ‘dealing on own account’, but they 
would not fall under the Capital Adequacy Directive (Dir. 2006/49/EC). They 
would not fall either under MiFID, unless the transaction was tagged as 
‘market-making’ or was executed outside organised MiFID venues “on an 
organised, frequent and systematic basis” (Art. 2.1(d)). 
Moreover, the Commission (2010b, pp. 66-72) proposes to strengthen 
authorisation and organisational requirements in general. In particular, 
members of the board of directors would pass a ‘fit and proper’ test, which 
would evaluate their time commitment and other aspects relevant for the 
exercise of their functions. The Commission also proposes to promote the 
inclusion in the board of non-executive directors with supervisory functions. 
Additional requirements would need to be taken into consideration for 
the launch of products, operations and services. The legal text would be 
modified (EU COM, 2010b, p. 68) to include these requirements, which would 
need to be applied before the financial instrument is offered to clients (sale 
policy). In particular, investment firms should: 
i)  Run a ‘compatibility test’ with clients’ needs; 
ii)  Strengthen duties of compliance with MiFID rules and risk 
management of the product; 
iii)   Stress test products as ‘appropriate’ (Art. 5, Impl. Dir.) and periodically 
review distribution and performance of products and services; 
iv)  Ensure that staff receive appropriate training for new products; and 
v)  Ensure that the board has more effective control on these aspects. 
In this way, MiFID introduced a further layer of organisational 
requirements to be applied before approaching the client. Sales policies are 
generally designed to increase the guarantee and the protection of investors, 
rather than to improve pre-sale services or increase the possibility of investors 
to ‘shop around’. In this sense, increasing the protection of investors does not 
necessarily mean improving their awareness of the risk they take.  
Sales policies 
In addition, the proposal entails the removal of member states’ 
discretion upon the use of recording for communications between the 
investment firm and the client. Recording would become mandatory while 
still preserving individuals’ privacy and respecting the rules on data 
protection. Member states may extend the obligation to services other than 
“the receipt and transmission of orders and execution of orders and 
Telephone 
recording 
                                                      
195 “‘Dealing on own account’ means trading against proprietary capital resulting in the conclusion of transactions 
in one or more financial instruments”, Art. 4.1(6), MiFID. 
196 Back-to-back transactions consist of a chain of securities transactions among multiple counterparties (typically 
investment firms) involving the purchase and sale of a security, for settlement on a single date. It may refer, for 
instance, to the case in which the investment firm C buys a security from investment firm A and, at the same time, 
it sells the same security to investor B during the same day. These are transactions perfectly matched with very 
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transactions concluded when dealing on own account in all financial 
instruments” (e.g. portfolio management; EU COM, p. 75). Records would be 
stored for at least 3 years. This type of organisational requirement would be a 
strong deterrent against market abuses and promote greater compliance with 
MiFID rules, but it would come at a cost for market participants and 
competent authorities. (CESR, 2010c). However, it would promote greater 
enforcement across Europe, in particular if supervisory arrangements 
between authorities on their use are effectively harmonised.  
Conclusion # 16   
Organisational requirements play a crucial role in ensuring business continuity, market 
integrity and investor protection. A proper implementation of the Directive should be 
ensured by harmonising ORs and supervisory practices across Europe and removing 
ambiguities in the legal text. Moreover, strengthening consistency with other upcoming 
regulations would avoid inefficiencies and promote a uniform regime of investor protection 
and market integrity within Europe, which would increase legal certainty and the 
attractiveness of investment services.  
6.3.1  Investment advice: Striking the right balance 
 
Investment advice is topic subject to heated debate in Europe, in particular 
after the scandals that shook financial markets a few years ago (e.g. Parmalat) 
and more recently as a result of the financial crisis, both of which have 
dramatically impaired investors’ confidence. The nature of the investment 
advice service lies on a trust-based and usually long-term relationship, which 
emerges from a situation of strong informational asymmetry between the 
provider and the client (mostly retail investors). This relationship has wider 
implications and it usually qualifies as a transaction-specific investment (TSI), 
as illustrated in the seminal contribution by Williamson (1975). In effect, 
customers face ‘sunk’ investments/costs that typically deter them from 
switching providers (changing provider frequently means losing the previous 
TSI and facing an additional one in order to become familiar with the new 
provider). 
The information and behavioural biases involved can lead to rather 
high ‘perceived’ switching costs, difficulties in evaluating alternatives, and 
consequently low price transparency and customer mobility.197 This leads 
customers to rely on proxies to establish the value of a given investment 
option – the proxy, in this case, being the advice received by their service 
provider. For this reason, so-called ‘relationship banking’ is brought into the 
sphere of consumer protection. In more detail, the provider-customer 
relationship can be described by two dimensions: i) the ‘depth’ of the 
relationship, stemming from the ‘off-contract’ relationship (typical in some 
The ‘advice’ 
                                                      
197 In this respect, the retail financial services sector can be said to differ noticeably from other economic sectors. 
For example, in the telecommunications or energy sectors consumers are less likely to suffer from an information 
asymmetry, provided that they have visibility of the quality of service and relative price of the offer. At the same 
time, the elements of “trust”, “transaction specific investments” and “bounded rationality” are much less 
important in these fields. Finally, especially in the telecommunications sector, consumers are more likely to shop 
around for better offers. 136 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
brokerage services), and ii) its thickness, defined as the information conveyed 
to the bank through the multiple financial contracts and services. In 
particular, the thickness of the provider-customer relationship offers 
customers a range of potential advantages, but may also give the informed 
provider the opportunity to capture rents by engaging in hold-up behaviour 
and false representation of both market and contractual conditions. In many 
cases, this relationship is strengthened by personal feelings with the person 
who represents the provider.198 
Investment advice is usually provided by investment firms that also 
offer other investment services. This situation, next to the abovementioned 
aspects, highlight the importance of proper ‘advice’ for the efficient allocation 
of capitals, which needs to overcome the risk of conflicts of interest. The 
investors’ quest for ‘independent advice’ has drawn attention to improving 
the quality of this service. Divergent views emerge around the specific way 
investment advice could be boosted to help restore investors’ confidence. On 
the one hand, those who believe that greater disclosure and stricter 
organisational requirements can enhance the quality and attractiveness of 
investment advice. In particular, in a report sponsored by EFAMA (2010), 
asset managers suggested implementing, amongst the others, four actions at 
point of sale: 
1)  Disclosure of the nature of the distributors’ services; 
2)  Full and detailed disclosure of all cost items and the principles of 
remuneration arrangements; 
3)  Introduction of a standardised advisor certificate; and 
4)  Granting investors a right of withdrawal. 
Disclosure should include the origin of the income of the adviser, 
whether it comes only from the fees charged for the advice or depends on the 
products sold and in which way. This side of the market challenges the idea 
that imposing an independent charging structure, with no alternatives, will 
increase the costs of advice and ultimately discourage investors from using, 
with strong direct and indirect repercussions on the efficient allocation of 
resources in the market. All information should be disclosed to investors 
before signing the contract, in order to allow them to ‘shop around’. 
Disclosure would increase investors’ confidence in the advice service, thereby 
promoting its use. Moreover, the advice service needs to meet the suitability 
test in MIFID (see next section), which helps to improve its quality and design 
the service in the clients’ best interest. 
In the area of pre-contractual information changes in MiFID will need to 
be reconciled with other regulatory initiatives at European level (such as 
PRIPs, IMD Review, and Prospectus Directive). 
On the other hand, some market participants (in particular, retail 
investors) claim that – besides the importance of improving disclosure and 
the role of the suitability test – there should be a thorough review of the 
incentives which impede advice to be ‘independent’. In particular, they argue 
that, in order to be considered ‘independent’, the investment advice should be 
Independence 
                                                      
198 For a more comprehensive analysis of the interaction between switching costs and cognitive biases, see Renda 
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based on an ‘independent’ system of remuneration, by receiving only fees for 
the provision of the service. No commission should be set by product 
providers (see box below). The strict independence of advisers could be 
achieved by severing the links between fees and products. However, this 
severance should be handled with care by allowing alternative forms of 
advice to be ultimately offered to clients.    
Box 15. A new regime for investment advice: the FSA’s proposal 
The UK Financial Services Authority (FSA, 2010a) proposed the introduction of a new 
system of ‘adviser charging’ for retail investment products. If investment advice is to be 
disclosed as ‘independent’, it would need to have its own charges either upfront or taken 
from the investment returns. Furthermore, charges should not be supplemented with other 
commissions given by product providers, even in form of non-monetary benefits 
(inducements). The purpose is to ensure the independence of advice for retail clients and 
avoid the rules being circumvented through the use of ‘soft’ commissions. Fees should be 
contracted and fully disclosed upfront (even potentially ‘ongoing charges’)199. In addition, 
only advisers who provide a fair and independent analysis on a wide range of retail 
investment products would be considered ‘independent’ under the FSA proposal. The 
adviser would have to demonstrate that he/she conducted a fair and independent analysis 
of the ‘relevant market’ for investment products. The ‘relevant market’ would include all 
retail investment products that are capable of meeting investors’ needs. Since the range of 
products is potentially very wide, it would be preferable to further detail this definition in 
order to fully implement it. Investment advice that would not comply with these 
requirements would be named ‘restricted’, or ‘non-independent’. This service will anyway 
need to meet the suitability test under MiFID.  
This new compensation scheme will impact consumer access to advice, possibly by 
both reducing the number of advisers and increasing its cost. The proposal, however, aims at 
enhancing “the market’s reputation and build consumer confidence, improving 
sustainability of the sector in the longer term” (FSA, 2010a, p. 18). Anyway, the proposal 
would not prohibit the provision of ‘restricted’ investment advice but only force its 
disclosure. The authority also commissioned an impact study, which concluded that the 
introduction of this charging system could result in “an 11% reduction in the number of 
advisers; a 9% reduction in total revenues across all advisers, and an 11% reduction in the 
number of clients advised, assuming that other firms did not expand and there were no new 
entrants” (Oxera, 2010). New entrants would require high initial investments to build 
sufficient reputational capital. This situation may create high barriers to entry the market of 
advice services. However, it carries high potential benefits in terms of more efficient 
allocation of resources and reduced opportunity costs by avoiding investors being redirected 
towards more expensive investment products against their interest. However, both costs and 
benefits are difficult to quantify, so the overall effect is unclear. 
The Commission (2010b, p. 56) has also proposed a number of measures 
to improve investment advice: 
1)  Enhancing disclosure to clients by stating whether the service is based 
on an ‘independent and fair’ analysis; 
New proposals 
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2)  Defining ‘independent and fair’ analysis as one that considers a wide 
range of investment products and is carried by a firm that does not 
accept any payments or benefits from product providers; 
3)  Increasing reporting to clients about performance and market value of 
the financial instruments recommended, and to keep updated 
information about the client; and 
4)  Clarifying, when applicable, if the investment advice is also provided 
online. 
This proposal does not clarify whether investment advice that does not 
comply with the definition of ‘independent and fair’ advice would remain 
available to investors. The UK proposal from the FSA does allow so-called 
‘restricted’ advice, that is, advice under conflicts of interest, to be offered as an 
alternative to independent advice. The proposal from the Commission does 
not clarify whether the fee can be embedded in the costs of the investment 
product and if both remuneration systems can coexist. In addition, no 
proposals have been formulated where the adviser is a company owned by a 
group that also offers the sale of other investment products. In this case, the 
conflict of interest may also be high, since – even though the investment firm 
does not receive any monetary or non-monetary benefit for the advice – the 
whole group benefits from the activity of the adviser. 
Conclusion # 17   
Some market participants claim that – besides the importance of improving disclosure and 
the role of the suitability test – there should be a thorough review of the mechanisms of 
incentives, which prevent advice from being ‘independent’. In particular, they argue that to 
be considered ‘independent’, investment advice should be based on an ‘independent’ system 
of remuneration, by receiving only fees from the clients. No commission should be set by 
product providers. Other market participants argue that obliging investors to pay for the 
advice would increase the access costs to these services and dramatically reduce the use of 
advisory services, with potential long-term costs for end investors. They suggest keeping the 
possibility to remunerate distribution through commissions, but with the requirement to 
improve disclosure on the nature of the services, in particular disclosing if the advisor is 
solely remunerated by the client or whether he is remunerated by a product provider. Full 
disclosure of all costs items and remuneration arrangements should be made before signing 
the contract. This would improve the ability of investors to choose the service that best suits 
their own interest. In the area of pre-contractual information, changes in MiFID will need to 
be reconciled with other regulatory initiatives at European level (such as PRIPs, IMD 
Review, and Prospectus Directive). 
6.4  Conduct of business rules  
 
The final piece of the investor protection puzzle under MiFID is a set of rules 
to regulate the conduct-of-business (CoB). CoB rules provide some 
contractual definitions for the set of fiduciary duties that apply in a 
transaction in investment services.  
Accordingly, the Directive recognises a fiduciary obligation between 
clients and service providers through its general clauses and specific CoB 
rules, such as:  
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i)  Best execution (Art. 19.1 and 21);200 
ii)  Conflicts of interest rules (Art. 13.3 and 18);201 
iii)  Suitability and appropriateness tests (so-called ‘know-your-customer 
rules’; Art. 19.4 and 19.5)202 and 
iv)  Other relevant requirements (in particular, information to clients,203 
client agreements,204 orders handling,205 and marketing rules).206 
In addition, MiFID rules specify exemptions for eligible counterparties 
(Art. 24) and define client classification (see Section 6.4.2).207 The constant 
growth in the last decades of asset under management and the widespread 
provision of investment services and products have brought regulators to set 
the rules of the game on how investment services are actually provided to end 
users. In effect, as portfolios become more tailored to the needs of investors 
and to more volatile market trends, the exposure to complex financial 
products may increase. Against this background, CoB rules are becoming 
more and more important. In addition, by regulating CoB, MiFID has 
managed to harmonise an important part of investor protection in Europe. 
The Commission is also looking at the extension of CoB rules to firms 
exempted by MiFID ex Art. 3 (EU COM, 2010b, p. 52). 
6.4.1  Conflicts of interests under MiFID 
 
Conflicts of interest (CoIs) arise where the interests of a market intermediary 
are “inconsistent with, or diverge from, those of its clients, investors, or 
others” (IOSCO, 2007, p. 6). In this respect, it is in the nature of the business of 
an intermediary to face CoIs since it needs to exercise discretion in the 
provision of investment services and has to deal with numerous kinds of 
clients. These aspects make CoIs ubiquitous in financial services. In effect, 
CoIs need to be seen as ‘part of the deal’, inherent to the provision of 
investment services, since they cannot be suppressed completely, but 
regulators can work to minimise both the conflicts themselves and their 
negative effects. This regulatory task is performed by analysing whether CoI 
are exploited and are imposing further agency costs (Walter, 2006). 
Divergence of interests in an agency relationship may be driven by two 
factors: i) information asymmetry and ii) transaction costs. In addition, these 
two elements depend heavily on market frictions, and in particular on the 
level of competition between market players and their reputational capital. 
Notably, reputational risk in financial services plays an important role, since 
its uncertainty and unpredictability may drastically reduce expected revenues 
and put pressure on the management to commit to the service provided. 
However, reputational capital is difficult to measure and may not represent 
Definition 
                                                      
200 Art. 44-46, Impl. Dir. 
201 Art. 21-25, Impl. Dir. 
202 Art. 35-37, Impl. Dir. 
203 Art. 19.8, MiFID, and Art. 40-43 Impl. Dir. 
204 Art. 19.7, MiFID, art 14.3 and 39 Impl. Dir. 
205 Art. 22, MiFID and Art. 47-49 Impl. Dir. 
206 Art. 19.2, MiFID, Art. 24 and 27, Impl. Dir. 
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an asset for those managers who do not commit to a long-term relationship 
with the investment firm.  
There are three types of conflict (IOSCO, 2010d):  
1)  Firm/client;  
2)  Client/client; and 
3)  Infra-group conflicts. 
The first concerns a direct conflict between the provider and the client. 
For instance, the broker may favour its own proprietary desk at the client’s 
expense. The ‘client/client’ conflict refers, for example, to an intermediary 
that favours a group of institutional investors over its retail clients. The third 
is the activity of an international dealer group that favours one of the group’s 
investment firms in one member state to the detriment of a firm of the group 
in another member state. These conflicts a r e  m o r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  d e t e c t  s i n c e  
there are exogenous variables, such as legal and fiscal cross-border 
implications, which can severely raise the costs of monitoring and detecting 
the potential wrongdoing. At retail level, these conflicts are even stronger 
since information asymmetry and transaction costs are much higher. Controls 
should therefore be devised according to the nature of the counterparty. 
MiFID has designed a system of internal controls to prevent, identify, 
manage and eventually disclose CoIs (Art. 18), in line with the general clause 
to act in clients’ best interests (Art. 19.1). With this sound statement, the 
Directive attempts to secure two important objectives: consumer protection 
and market integrity. In particular, the Directive designed a system of 
organisational (disclosure) and CoB requirements, which aim to prevent, 
manage, identify and disclose CoIs in sensitive areas, such as brokerage 
and/or proprietary trading, securities offerings, advice, and asset 
management services (Recital 26, Impl. Dir.). 
MiFID 
Controls over CoIs can be essentially either internal or external. Internal 
controls may consist of (IOSCO, 2007; 2010d): 
•  An internal committee to check conflicts and the functioning of internal 
controls; 
•  CoIs policies (to design control tools and compliance mechanisms, even 
infra-group, Art. 22, Impl. Dir.); 
•  Clear guidance to refrain from acting in case of conflict; 
•  Information barriers and restrictions (e.g. Chinese walls; Art. 22.3(a), 
Impl. Dir.); and 
•  Disclosure to clients (caveat emptor; Art. 18-19). 
Besides disclosure requirements, internal measures are designed to 
work primarily ex ante as active and passive organisational arrangements. 
Moreover, once the conflict has been identified but cannot be eliminated, it 
should be disclosed in line with the principle of caveat emptor, which foresees 
that the client must be informed about the CoI but still bears the ultimate 
responsibility. In this regard, disclosure is effective if it represents a sufficient 
warning, which prevents the client from pursuing the transaction in some 
cases. Ineffective disclosure can be counterproductive and can induce self-
interested agents to behave more aggressively (protected by the disclosure 
requirements). In addition, if disclosure is not clear enough (e.g. examples), 
investors may experience a cognitive bias and ultimately increase their trust 
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in the intermediary (Enriques, 2006).   
MiFID leaves some flexibility to member states to design their own rules 
to control CoIs at organisational level (Art. 22.3, Impl. Dir.). This provision 
aims to ensure that rules and procedures are designed in line with the 
specificities of the country where CoIs emerge. However, this flexibility has 
boundaries set by MiFID Level 1 (Art. 31), which do not allow member states 
to draw up requirements additional to those defined by the Directive. On the 
one hand, too much flexibility could unleash a race-to-the-bottom among 
member states to attract more business and capital. On the other hand, a rigid 
set of rules would not allow member states to design the factual rules and 
procedures to fight conflicts of interest in line with the social, cultural, legal 
and economic context of the country. It is unquestionable that there are 
countries in which CoIs are met with a higher level of tolerance, which calls 
for stronger controls and sanctions. Under sound and effective organisational 
arrangements, supervisors would be able to bring legal suits on behalf of 
clients, especially where the clients are retail investors who are deterred by 
the costs of litigation. Currently, however, the system of sanctions across 
member states is highly fragmented. This situation may create space for 
supervisory arbitrages in favour of countries applying low administrative 
fines. 
Finally, external controls may also help to limit the side effects of CoIs. 
In particular, regulation in related areas, civil litigations, supervisory powers 
and a highly competitive environment can increase the level of prevention, 
identification, and management of CoIs. In effect, the way CoIs manifest 
themselves may differ depending on the selling practices involved. For 
instance, ‘steering’ practices are frequently used in services that offer advice 
on investment products, whenever the portfolio of options presented to the 
client includes the advisers’ own products. ‘Steering’ consists of stressing to 
the investor the advantage of subscribing to a more costly product because of 
the re-edit this generates for the advisor, which is not clearly disclosed to the 
client. Sometimes this amounts to an intentional misjudgement of the 
individual’s risk by the financial intermediary to extract a rent in a specific 
period, by imposing specific requirements or additional fees. Other examples 
of CoIs arise with the provision of corporate finance services, such as pricing 
the value of a company that is also a borrower from the same intermediary. 
This situation may induce the intermediary to overprice the value of the 
company to be able to raise enough money in a future security offering (e.g. 
IPO).      
As mentioned above, the Commission (2010b) is looking at the 
possibility of harmonising and strengthening the current regime of sanction, 
if there is a violation of MiFID rules, as well as introducing the principle of 
civil liability for investment services providers in order to level investor 
protection across the EU. Managing conflicts and structuring incentives for 
the distribution of financial products are major concerns for the definition of 
new implementing measures for CoIs. 
New proposals 
Conclusion # 18   
MiFID rules on conflicts of interest represent a first step in the introduction of a common 
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such conflicts. Further initiatives to strengthen the current regime and align supervisory 
practices would enhance the treatment of these conflicts and benefit financial markets. A 
harmonised set of sanctions, however, should be combined with flexibility for member states 
to adapt rules and procedures in line with their national contexts, in order to ultimately 
guarantee the goal of a sound and safe environment of protection for investors. 
6.4.2  Client categorisation 
 
To complement the recognition of fiduciary duties, MiFID introduced a 
regime of client and product classification through which it assigns different 
levels of protection to clients. According to MiFID, the level of protection 
offered by CoB requirements should be related to the clients’ classification. 
The Directive, therefore, defines two main categories of clients: 
i)  Retail (Art. 4.1 (12)); and 
ii)  Professional (annex II, Sec. 1, MiFID). 
Client 
classification  
All investors that are not classified as ‘professional’ fall under the ‘retail’ 
category (definition by exclusion) and enjoy the highest level of protection 
afforded by MiFID, typically through the application of all ORs and CoB 
rules. However, they may ask to be treated as ‘professional’, if they pass two 
tests: a basic test (which assesses the expertise, experience and knowledge of 
the client); and a specific test (which requires the investor to meet two out of 
three ‘wealth-related’ thresholds, as defined by Annex II, Section 1, MiFID). 
Retail 
Professional investors are those who have the expertise and are able to 
make their own investment decisions. To them, a ‘softer’ regime applies that 
takes into account their more sophisticated nature,  e.g.: they only receive 
client information on request. MiFID ‘rules’ are the same overall for both 
retail and professional investors, but are tailored to the nature and needs of 
each group of investors. Professional investors are, amongst those listed in 
Annex II, Section 1.1 MiFID, investment firms, credit institutions or insurance 
companies. They can ask to be treated as retail clients but the other party has 
to agree. They may also request to become an eligible counterparty.  
Professional 
The Directive, in effect, introduced a third ‘special’ category, called 
‘eligible counterparties’ (ECP; Art. 24).208 This group of entities includes the 
most sophisticated clients, such as investment funds – either alternative 
investment funds (AIFs) or UCITS. Only few CoB rules and ORs apply to 
them, such as client agreement rules (Art. 18) and order handling rules (if 
acting as broker; Art. 19.8). Professional investors may request to be treated as 
ECPs if their member state has decided to implement this possibility. These 
investors need to meet a different test from the one adopted for retail 
investors to be considered professional. Professional investors must meet two 
out of these three criteria (Annex II, Section 1.2): 
1)  A balance sheet of more than €20 million; 
ECPs 
                                                      
208 ECPs are “investment firms, credit institutions, insurance companies, UCITS and their management 
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2)  A net turnover of more than €40 million; and  
3)  Own funds of more than €2 million. 
The ‘light touch’ regime applies to ECPs when they offer services such 
as execution of orders; dealing on own account; reception and transmission of 
orders; or any related ancillary service. 
Client classification should be defined before providing the service and 
should be included in the contract or anyway stated in writing. Retail 
investors cannot be classified as ‘ECPs’, while financial institutions (including 
ECPs) can be classified on request as ‘non-professional’ (retail; Art. 24.2, 
MiFID). All other combined classifications are possible. For instance, the 
management company of an investment fund may ask a dealer, executing an 
order on its behalf, to provide best execution following ‘retail’ instead of the 
‘professional’ standards, since the fund mainly collects investments from 
retail investors. The firm/dealer also needs to agree to this request and if it so 
does, it would have to apply the relevant retail or professional tests when 
offering services to such eligible counterparties. Some segments of the market 
suggest that portfolio managers should be entitled to require reclassification 
as ‘retail’ clients, since there is a mismatch in their rights and obligations. 
Portfolio managers are eligible counterparties under MiFID but they manage 
money on behalf of professional and retail clients, and they have the 
obligation to act in the best interest of their clients when placing orders for 
execution. Others, however, consider this request to be inappropriate because 
it may also be used for activities unrelated to retail clients, and most notably 
because this would no longer justify that portfolio managers gain directly 
(through commission on profits) from rules that should go directly to serving 
retail clients. In effect, their role goes beyond the execution on behalf of 
investors. 
 
It is a commonly held view that the client categorisation regime should 
not be radically changed (CESR, 2010c; EU COM, 2010b). Current proposals, 
however, concern (EU COM, 2010b): the possibility to extend the general 
clause of Art. 19.1 to ECPs; the limitation of the ECP regime only to non-
complex products and the exclusion of non-financial institutions from the 
ECP regime; the abolishment of the presumption that professional investors 
have the necessary expertise and knowledge; and the exclusion of 
municipalities209 from being classified as ECP or professional per se. In 
particular, abolishing the presumption of expertise and knowledge for 
professional investors would require investment firms to treat them as retail 
clients. This situation, on the one hand, increases the general level of 
protection in the market, but it boosts overall costs of dealing with clients, on 
the other. To reduce the imbalance of this trade-off towards costs, an 
opportunity to opt out of the protection for retail clients should be left 
available to be unilaterally exercised at any time for those who consider 
themselves to be ‘professional’ investors. However, there is also a bias that 
comes into play. A homogeneous application of retail investors’ protection 
rules may need the implementation of sophisticated and burdensome 
protection tests, which may be perceived as high sunk costs for investors to 
comply with standard procedures (such as complex and long questionnaires). 
New proposals 
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They may ultimately decide to opt out to avoid those time-consuming 
obligations. Abolishing such distinctions may therefore generate unclear 
effects on the provision of investment services. 
Conclusion # 19   
Although the crisis showed that some of the eligible counterparties (ECPs) were not able to 
understand risk ‘properly’, the client categorisation regime should not be subject to a major 
overhaul. Since portfolio managers are eligible counterparties under MiFID but manage 
money on behalf of professional and retail clients and have the obligation to act in the best 
interest, some market participants suggest that portfolio managers should be entitled to 
unilaterally require the reclassification as ‘retail’ clients. Others, however, advocate the 
inappropriateness of this request since their role is more than execution on behalf of 
investors, but they would directly gain (commissions on profits) from rules that should 
theoretically only benefit retail investors. 
6.4.3  Suitability and appropriateness tests 
“The duty of suitability rejects the prevailing paradigma of caveat emptor and 
forces providers to internalise the harm that they cause when they exploit 
information asymmetries to the detriment of customers.” (Engel & McCoy, 
2002, p. 1334).  
The fiduciary relationship between the provider of investment services 
and the client implies an obligation to act in the best interests of the latter 
(Art. 19.1). In accordance with this general clause, MiFID CoB rules include a 
duty to make an adequate investigation of investors’ suitability210 through a 
specific suitability test (‘know your customer’ obligation)211 and an 
appropriateness test (‘know the security’),212 to ensure that the investor has a 
professional knowledge of the risk involved in the service provided (Hazen, 
2006).  
 
The suitability and appropriateness tests are respectively articulated in 
Articles 19.4 and 19.5. Investment firms must acquire three types of 
information about their clients (or potential clients), to be able to decide if the 
service is ‘suitable’ for them:  
1)  knowledge and expertise,  
2)  financial situation, and  
3)  investment objectives.  
The ‘suitability test’ applies to discretionary portfolio management and 
advisory services. In other words, the ‘suitability test’ applies when the 
service offered includes an element of recommendation or discretion. Since 
Suitability and 
appropriateness 
test 
                                                      
210 The suitability rule was originally defined in USA as an antifraud device (violation of the Rule 10b-5 under 
section 10(b) SEC Act 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, 2001). See Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594 (2d 
Cir. 1978). In the EU, instead, the suitability rule was created as a rule to protect investors’ confidence and to 
foster market integrity; see Art. 19.4, MiFID and Art. 35-37, Impl. Dir.; Moloney (2008). 
211 US Courts consider “unsuitable” an investment that is incompatible with the investor’s objectives and if the 
broker recommended it, even though she knew or reasonably believed that the investment was inappropriate. See 
Kreenan v. D.H. Blair & Co., 838 F. Supp. 82, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).  
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the concept of suitability is fairly abstract, in practice there is a need to 
translate it into a meaningful service for clients. For professionals, these 
requirements apply less stringently since the provider can presume that the 
investor has enough knowledge and expertise and, particularly for advice, 
that the investor is able to sustain any financial risk (Art. 35.2, 36, Impl. Dir.). 
Implementing legislation may need to further specify several aspects of the 
suitability test, which is already described more extensively than the 
‘appropriateness test’ in the Implementing Directive. Simple risk profiles may 
not be enough, so firms may need to look at the cultural and behavioural 
attitudes of their clients, as well as at other risk diversification measures (e.g. 
geographical aspects). There is a lot of subjectivity/hindsight in every 
transactions involving investment services that may push people to give less 
consideration to aspects related to the performance (through risk profile 
assessment) than it was originally thought. Hitherto, assessing other aspects 
than risk profiles would improve the reliability of the suitability test. It is also 
worth noting that the implementation of suitability requirements among 
member states may have raised barriers to market products in some 
countries. It would be worthwhile to explore the consequences of a 
fragmented implementation.  
The introduction into the regulation of very specific requirements to 
assess risk profile and suitability may become a ‘mythical search’ for a risk-
free solution for consumers. The last pioneers who left for this search never 
returned. Rather than focusing only on the appropriate level of risk for 
investors, trying to mimic investors’ choice, a more workable alternative 
would be to make sure investors are fairly ‘informed’ about the risks they 
decide to incur, which is one of the original objectives of MiFID. 
Responsibility should ultimately fall on investors. However, a loose definition 
of suitability that shifts the whole burden onto investors is not desirable 
either. Above all, service providers need to assist investors in their decisional 
process. Notably, an array of aspects (behavioural and financial) should be 
considered in a suitability test. Most of all, firms should look at the risk 
attitude and the decision style of consumers when they create a personalised 
investment portfolio. Only the combination of these aspects will allow a 
meaningful rating process of products and clients, thereby leading firms to 
provide a more suitable service. Finally, supervisors should make sure that 
the implementation of suitability requirements is uniform since differences in 
national implementation can create costly barriers to the cross-border 
provision of services, as well as important fractures in the level of protection 
for end investors. The suitability and appropriateness tests are among the 
main pillars of the CoB rules introduced by MiFID, and are meant to 
strengthen the protection of investors and the quality of the services provided 
to them. This protection is particularly relevant where firms are providing 
cross-border services through an EU passport. However, the roll-out of the 
infrastructure to perform these two tests has required uniform 
implementation and has come at a significant cost. One-off costs to upgrade 
systems and update clients’ information are among the most important, next 
to the costs of assessing the compliance of services and products with the 
MiFID framework (FSA, 2006b, p. 18). 
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Conclusion # 20   
The suitability test is a crucial aspect of the provision of investment advice and portfolio 
management services. Views diverge slightly on how to assess the knowledge, financial 
situation and objectives of investors, and in particular, on how deeply the suitability test 
should look into investors’ habits and their willingness to undertake risk. Some members 
regret the lack of harmonisation in the implementation of suitability requirements for 
discretionary portfolio management. These members would welcome action by ESMA to 
improve legal certainty and reduce barriers to market investment products across the EU. 
However, other members do not think any intervention is needed in this regard and are 
satisfied with the current level of harmonisation. 
The ‘appropriateness test’ applies for non-advised services, such as 
reception and transmission of orders.213 Whenever the firms realise that 
according to the information provided the product or service offered is not 
appropriate for the client, the firm shall warn the client. Such warnings could 
be provided in a standard format. The ‘appropriateness test’ applies when the 
client does not rely on the firms’ recommendation or advice.214 The amount of 
information the investment firm needs from the client concerns the client’s 
knowledge and experience in the investment field relevant to the service 
offered (Art. 19.5) and this information depends on the complexity and risk of 
the product. As mentioned above, the investment firm can assume that 
professional clients have enough knowledge and experience to understand 
risks. Besides, the information about clients that needs to be collected refers to 
(Art. 37, Impl. Dir.):  
1)  The types of service, transaction and financial instrument;  
2)  The nature, volume, and frequency of the client’s transactions; and  
3)   The profession and level of education.  
For non-complex financial instruments, clients can opt out of these 
safeguards (appropriateness test), asking for an ‘execution-only’ service. 
‘Non-complex instruments’ (Art. 38, Impl. Dir.), currently under MiFID, are: 
1)  Shares admitted to trading on RMs; 
2)  Money market instruments; 
3)  Bonds and other securitised debt (with no embedded derivative); 
4)  UCITS; and 
5)  Other non-complex financial instruments (Art. 38, Impl. Dir.). 
Remaining instruments are classified as ‘complex’, so investors using 
those them cannot opt out of the appropriateness test. In case of non-complex 
instruments, for execution-only services provided without an appropriateness 
test, retail clients should be adequately warned, the service should be 
provided at the initiative of the client, and the firm has to comply with CoIs 
rules (Casey and Lannoo, 2009).  
Appropriateness 
test 
                                                      
213 See Casey and Lannoo (2009), pp. 46-53. 
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The definition of ‘complex’ vs ‘non-complex’ financial instruments is 
under discussion (CESR, 2010c and EU COM, 2010b, p. 55). Two options have 
been proposed (EU COM 2010b, p. 55):  
1)  Excluding all financial instruments that embed a derivative and all 
UCITS that adopt complex strategies (to be defined) from the non-
complex category;  
2)  Removing the distinction between complex and non-complex financial 
instruments, and applying the appropriateness test to all financial 
instruments.  
The first proposal requires a revision of the UCITS Directive in order to 
define which UCITS follow complex strategies. In this regard, it is hard to 
split the complexity factor from the risk factor and, for UCITS in particular, 
units are typically sold to investors under the latter’s presumption that the 
product is non-complex and moderately risky given the ‘security’ image of 
the brand. If more complex and perhaps riskier strategies are pursued 
through UCITS, it should be left to the UCITS Directive (2006/65/EC) to 
differentiate complex and non-complex UCITS if necessary.  
The second proposal may create higher costs for those market 
participants whose offer concentrates on non-complex products. Moreover, 
the impact of competition among investment firms on investor protection 
rules is uncertain, since typically those protection rules prescribed by MiFID 
are not actually priced by the investors, who do not tend to require these 
services if not unilaterally offered. With strong competitive pressures and 
insufficient supervision, incentives to apply these requirements might 
consistently be insufficient. 
New proposals 
Conclusion # 21   
MiFID foresees a different regime for ‘execution-only’ services based on the product 
classification between complex and non-complex financial instruments. Any change should 
take into account that complexity does not necessarily mean more risk. The objective should 
be to verify if the product is in line with investors’ understanding of the ultimate risk that 
they are going to bear. Regulation should not decide the level of risk investors want to take. 
Some market participants believe that certain UCITS might have become too complex 
to be easily understood by investors and so to skip the appropriateness test, at least for retail 
clients. Others, instead, argue that classification, in particular for UCITS, should remain as 
such, since a change in classification could damage the UCITS brand outside the EU. 
 
Box 16. MiFID and asset management at a crossroads 
MiFID has had widespread implications for several areas of financial markets, in particular 
for the asset management business. Besides the application of MiFID to portfolio 
management services, it is the interaction between MiFID and UCITS that raises concerns. In 
particular, MiFID sets a formal exemption (Art. 2.1 (h)) that has not been de facto applied. In 
effect, UCITS are currently exempted from the appropriateness test as non-complex financial 
instruments, which means that they are part of the Directive. UCITS management companies 
are then classified as ECPs under MiFID, therefore best execution or suitability tests are not 
applied, unless agreed otherwise. Besides these formal exemptions, there are several aspects 148 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
that put UCITS under the MiFID spotlight. UCITS typically apply and get the status of 
professional investor, but they also ask to be treated as retail investors, since the investment 
product is mainly designed for retail investors. The UCITS Directive also provides for similar 
organisational requirements as those in MiFID (Recital 1, UCITS Implementing Directive 
2010/43/EU) to create a level playing field between UCITS managers and MiFID investment 
firms undertaking portfolio management services. 
Overall, there are other aspects that emerge with the revision of MiFID as points of 
discussion that may affect the debate on UCITS. Among others, the following aspects would 
have an impact on the asset management industry: 
•  Unilaterally granting retail best execution to managers of retail funds (without the 
need for the agreement of dealers); 
•  Modifying current definitions of complex versus non-complex financial instruments; 
•  Investigating the status of the implementation of suitability requirements for 
investment advice and discretionary portfolio services; and 
•  Changing the charging structure for investment advice and its basic requirements, and 
promoting greater inducement disclosure. 
The interaction between these areas may have important implications for the future of 
the industry, in particular for the convergence between alternative and traditional 
investments (if no differential status would be granted to traditional investments) and on the 
traditional distribution channels (by changing the role and nature of investment advice).  
6.4.4  Grasping the definition and economics of ‘best execution’ obligations 
 
MiFID (Art. 19.1) requires that an investment firm act “in accordance with the 
best interests of its clients” to ensure a high level of investor protection. 
Besides the general clause, which de facto sets an important fiduciary duty, 
the article sets a dynamic obligation of ‘results’ (Giraud & D’Hondt, 2006), 
which calls for investment firms to ensure best execution when they offer:   
•  Execution of orders on behalf of the clients (Art. 21, MiFID); 
•  Reception and transmission of orders in relation to one or more 
financial instruments (Art. 45.4, Impl. Dir.); and 
•  Portfolio management (Art. 45.4, Impl. Dir.). 
These duties apply to all financial instruments, except spot foreign 
exchange instruments. Best execution obligations, should therefore be 
achieved by: 
1)  Taking “all reasonable steps” to obtain the best net result for the client, 
“taking into account price, costs, speed, likelihood of execution and 
settlement, size, nature or any other consideration relevant to the 
execution of the order.” (Art. 21.1, MiFID); 
2)  Drafting an effective and detailed order execution policy that includes 
the execution venues and the parameters of choice, and then getting the 
client’s agreement (Art. 21.2, 21.3, MiFID); 
3)  Demonstrating, at the request of the client, that execution has been 
carried out in accordance with the existing execution policy, which 
allows the achievement the best possible result (Art. 21.3, 21.4, MiFID). 
From these detailed requirements, some argue that the Directive aims at 
imposing an obligation of ‘means’. So far, however, regulators have not 
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clarified yet whether MiFID’s original spirit was towards ‘results’ (dynamic 
approach) or ‘means’ (static approach).  
Firstly, MiFID draws up a comprehensive definition of best execution, 
which takes into account all potential factors that can affect a financial 
transaction (as there is not a universal definition of best execution). Such 
factors can have different meanings that should be then considered.215 For 
instance, costs can be seen as ‘implicit’ or ‘explicit’ and they can assume 
different forms according to multiple factors, such as the nature of the client.  
In this regard, the criteria to be considered by investment firms when 
performing best execution of an order are the following (Art. 44.1, Impl. Dir.): 
i)  Specific instructions given by the client; 
ii)  Nature of the client (retail or professional); 
iii)  Nature of the financial instruments; and 
iv)  Nature of the execution venues. 
What should be considered as best execution for retail clients (typically 
price and costs) may not be the same for professionals (Art. 44.3, Impl. Dir.). 
The difficulty of drawing up a precise definition of what is best execution is 
obvious in today’s financial markets. Accordingly, the Directive does not give 
an easy-to-enforce definition of best execution either. The legal text tries to 
grasp all factors influencing a financial transaction, but does so in a general 
manner. However, this situation is not necessarily a detriment to final 
investors for two reasons, which should always be verified. On the one hand, 
general clauses are typically set to define a fiduciary duty, which should by 
definition fill gaps in incomplete contracts, i.e.  when it is too costly and 
difficult for the contracting parties to specify all relevant terms. This situation 
does not call for detailed provisions in the law, but rather requires stronger 
enforcement tools and judicial review and the flexible application of best 
execution requirements (Macey & O’Hara, 1997 & 2005). On the other hand, 
when transaction costs are sufficiently low, a broad definition allows 
counterparties to bargain and ‘contract around’ the duty of best execution or 
customise it (even ‘opt out’) . In addition, technological developments (Smart 
Order Routers, SORs) support the customisation of best execution policies, 
even in a context of great market fragmentation where best execution cannot 
be easily verified.  
Nevertheless, a strict regulatory definition can increase verifiability but 
the quality of the execution (investment) service would be potentially lower, 
with ultimately potential negative effects on demand. A too precise definition 
of best execution may exacerbate ex ante commitment and so inefficient 
investments. Current legal text sets the boundaries in which competing 
investment firms tailor execution policies in line with clients’ interests. More 
should be done to increase verifiability by improving the content of execution 
policies and the quality and depth of market data. 
Definition 
Secondly, as said, a loose contract may provide enough flexibility to 
contract around (or opt out) at the risk of distorting ex ante commitments. 
Pre-contractual investments, however, are primarily based on execution 
Execution 
policies 
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policies. By improving the quality of execution policies, the contract therefore 
becomes less vague. In particular, by promoting: 
•  Quality of execution policies; and 
•  Observability and verifiability of best execution (through better and 
more data).  
On the quality of execution policies, MiFID obliges investment firms to 
make a list of execution venues where the intermediary is going to execute the 
orders, and a list of the factors affecting the choice of a specific trading venue 
(19.3 and 21.3, MiFID).216 Best execution policies should receive the client’s 
consent, and firms must review their policies once a year or whenever a 
‘material change’ occurs, for instance when “a significant new execution 
venue emerges” (FSA, 2006a, p. 34), and assess them on a regular basis (Art. 
45.6 and 46, Implementing Directive). In addition, member states should 
require investment firms to monitor the effectiveness of execution 
arrangements (Art. 21.4, MiFID) and national authorities may expressly ask 
investment firms to be able to demonstrate to clients that the transaction is 
compliant with their execution policy and so with best execution 
requirements (Art. 21.5, MiFID). To facilitate disclosure to clients about the 
execution policy, the Commission (2010b) has therefore proposed to introduce 
a template for policies.   
MiFID also allows for different types of best execution policies, 
especially in relation to the selection of the venue for diverse asset classes and 
clients. Execution policies do not need to be defined on an order-by-order 
basis (dynamic approach) but in general (static approach).217 However, the 
regular review of best execution policies currently provides some space for 
introducing dynamicity in the way investment firms provide best execution. 
The interpretation of what ‘dynamic’ means is perceived differently by the 
market. Some argue that dynamism refers to the obligation to modify 
execution policies on an order-by-order basis (led by a general obligation of 
‘results’). In this sense, dynamic order execution may be more efficient and 
convenient for clients than static approaches, which only meet the minimum 
legal requirement (Ende et al., 2008). Some others believe that ‘dynamic’ 
generally means reviewing the execution policy if major events occur and 
assessing the effectiveness of execution arrangements periodically as required 
b y  M i F I D .  I n  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  i n  t h e i r  view, there are no pending issues with 
regard to execution policies, besides a need for a proper implementation of 
current MiFID requirements and the lack of high quality data to verify best 
execution. 
Thirdly, broad legal definitions call for greater enforcement of execution  Observability 
                                                      
216 This list must be reviewed periodically, taking into account “execution venue fees, clearing and settlement fees 
and any other fees paid to third parties involved in the execution of the order” (Art. 44.3, Impl. Dir.). Effective 
barriers to add new venues can be (among others, CESR, 2010h, p.5): (1) The lack of interoperability between 
clearing houses, so the inability to choose a ‘clearer of choice’; (2) Local rules which prevent remote membership 
of exchanges or complex re-registration processes; (3) Different regulatory regimes and clearing and settlement 
requirements in several countries, creating obstacles to competition between venues; (4) Absence of a central 
counterparty continues to be a clearing problem for some venues; (5) Distance – speed (or latency), mitigated by 
new facilities, e.g. hosting facilities, IT developments etc.; and (6) System costs, integration to back office and 
settlement systems. 
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policies by national financial authorities. However, current legislation leaves 
gaps that make enforcement difficult, such as the difficulty to assess factors 
other than price and speed, and the current design of best execution duties, 
which allows exemptions and do not make directly accountable specific 
trading practices.218 Moreover, the lack of quality data on execution for 
financial instruments makes comparability of post-trade information 
complicated.219 MiFID requires firms to act in their clients’ best interest (Art. 
19.1), which constitutes a good-faith clause that should allow judges the 
necessary discretion to decide whether best execution has effectively taken 
place. However, since MiFID also defines what constitutes the client’s ‘best 
interests’, it impairs judiciary discretion and rather favours the principle of 
caveat emptor. This principle is not satisfactory either, due to the lack of 
verifiability, which means investors have to choose among execution policies 
that may not always be implemented properly. Observability and verifiability 
are considered minimal informational requirements for an event to define a 
contractual contingency (Hermalin et al., 2007). Best execution is characterised 
as a contractual term but it is not verifiable, even though observable 
(monitoring costs that are too high). It is therefore fundamental to improve 
the available quantity and quality of execution data (CESR, 2010b), which can 
also reduce the transaction costs of contracting ‘around’ the best execution 
requirements, as set by the Directive. Bargaining something that is not 
verifiable does not make any sense ‘contractually’. The Commission (2010b) 
also believes that better and more data should be combined with an effective 
civil liability for the investment firm. 
and verifiability 
Best execution duties influence two different areas: market structure 
and investor protection (Macey & O’Hara, 1997). Best execution de facto is 
only the one that the market is willing to provide, thus order flow markets 
must be competitive. Best execution is synonymous with low transaction 
costs. It is achieved when the least number of resources are lost in 
intermediation, for the execution services industry (Harris, 1996). Best 
execution policies must ensure that, when the abovementioned conditions are 
met, the investment firm screens the whole market, in particular those 
execution venues that can offer best execution to clients. On the one hand, the 
duty of best execution may sustain a competitive environment between 
trading venues, as incumbents are indirectly forced to deliver better quality of 
execution (in terms of lower implicit and explicit trading costs), due to the 
investment firms’ commitment to deliver best execution. This pressure 
reduces the incentives to define an oligopolistic setting with newcomers to the 
market, and among investment firms (as they ought to compete around 
quality and dynamicity of execution policies). On the other hand, this duty 
comes from a more important recognition of a fiduciary relationship between 
client and investment firm and aims at protecting end investors. Strong 
Market structure 
                                                      
218 For instance, the US case law recognises as ‘industry practice’ - therefore not considered violation of the best 
execution duty - accepting a rebate for directing order flow to a particular broker or trading venue; see Macey & 
O’Hara (1997), pp.195-196.  
219 CESR is also looking to define an appropriate execution metric in order to measure execution (on a quarterly 
basis) in shares (for other financial instruments it has been postponed to a future discussion) and it may ask 
execution venues to produce reports on execution quality using metrics set by CESR. CESR (2010), “Investor 
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information asymmetries between client and investment firm may impede the 
definition of what precise factors should be taken into account to achieve best 
execution for a specific client (McCleskey, 2004). 
The lack of an immediately applicable definition of best execution and 
the fear of undermining the structure of the US national market system led 
the SEC to impose a strict definition of best execution (around the best 
available price, i.e. National Best Bid and Offer, NBBO) and require brokers to 
report execution performance statistics (SEC, 1962). In this regard, the US 
regulators decided to fix an enforceable requirement (price) under securities 
regulation and to leave to markets, under competition, the provision of 
related services that help to achieve best execution (such as speed, multi-
market trading, etc). 
For non-equity financial instruments, traded OTC or on inter-dealer 
platforms, best execution may rely on other relevant aspects such as national 
legal rules, counterparty risk, products and market feasibility. In particular, it 
may be relevant to consider the volumes traded on a specific platform, as well 
as the type of organised venue or the details of the dealer that represents the 
counterparty in an OTC transaction. In line with the type of venue where the 
transaction is executed, execution policies should consider the most 
appropriate approach.  
Nevertheless, it may be difficult to find comparable data for some 
complex derivative or credit product, or to see pre-trade information on 
prices. The kind of transparency obligations adopted for equities may not be 
as beneficial as for other types of markets and products (see Section 4). For 
instance, buying a bond that is only traded OTC for a retail client may not be 
compliant with the price factor of best execution since the counterparty would 
only agree to sell at a specific price set unilaterally (due to the low size). There 
is no space for negotiation and it is not verifiable if the trade could have 
occurred with a different dealer (the information is simply not available). In a 
RFQ trading model there is more chance that the investment firm can choose 
between few competing bid/offer prices and therefore to apply best execution 
obligations. 
Non-equity 
markets 
Conclusion # 22   
Best execution duties lie at the foundation of the fiduciary relationship between service 
providers and clients. Execution policies and data are essential aspects of the effectiveness of 
these legal requirements. MiFID tries to grasp all factors influencing the best execution of a 
financial transaction, and does so in a very general manner. A strict legal definition (price-
only) would assume that other services needed to achieve best execution (such as speed, 
transaction cost analysis, etc) would be efficiently provided by the market itself under 
competition, with no need of a formal legal protection. A broad definition, however, is not 
necessarily detrimental for final investors as long as execution policies are properly 
implemented and data allows sufficient verifiability of execution. Conflicting views emerge 
between those who argue that execution policies should be designed around a ‘dynamic’ 
obligation of ‘result’, i.e. complying with the minimum legal requirements is not enough in 
their view to achieve best execution. Other participants however challenge the view that 
issues with best execution come from execution policies, which are MiFID-compliant. 
Investors themselves receive full information about their execution policies. Both recognise 
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platforms, which are under discussion within the debate on the new transparency regime.  
Overall, MiFID requires firms to act in their clients’ best interest (Art. 19.1), which 
constitutes a good-faith clause that should allow judges the necessary discretion to decide 
whether best execution has effectively taken place. However, since MiFID also defines what 
constitutes the client’s ‘best interests’, it impairs judiciary discretion and rather favours the 
principle of caveat emptor. This principle is not satisfactory either, due to the lack of 
verifiability, which means investors have to choose among execution policies that may not 
always be implemented properly. Observability and verifiability are considered minimal 
informational requirements for an event to define a contractual contingency. 
Best execution also impacts on market structure. Best execution de facto is synonymous 
of low transaction costs and is achieved when the fewest resources are lost in intermediation. 
Best execution policies must ensure that, when the abovementioned conditions are met, the 
investment firm screens the whole market, in particular those execution venues that can offer 
best execution to clients. Hitherto, the duty of best execution sustains a competitive 
environment between trading venues, as incumbents are indirectly forced to deliver better 
quality of execution, due to the investment firms’ commitment to deliver it. 
7.  A new regime for commodity derivatives 
Commodities markets play a fundamental role for our economies. They 
ensure that demand and offer of commodities find their best market clearing 
price. MiFID acknowledged the different context into which firms may need 
to enter in a financial transaction in commodity derivatives by giving full 
exemption to those firms providing investment services in those instruments, 
if their main business or the core activity of the group is not the provision of 
investment services or the transaction is done for hedging purposes (when 
dealing on own account; Art. 2.1 (d) (i) (k) (l), MiFID). The Directive de facto 
grants a broad exemption to groups such as energy companies, which 
frequently use derivatives to cover exposures (see figure below). For instance, 
energy companies providing electricity need to cover their exposures since 
electricity cannot be stored and its availability is subject to many endogenous 
(e.g. infrastructure, alternative renewable energies) and exogenous variables 
(e.g. weather). The need to hedge those risks requires energy companies to be 
heavily involved in trading activities on‐exchange and over‐the‐counter. 
In order to minimise regulatory burdens on such hedges, the text of the 
Directive currently grants full exemption for the provision of investment 
services related to commodities, except if this is part of a group whose main 
business is the provision of investment services (e.g. dealers). The exemption 
is not by instrument (commodity derivatives are included in the definitions of 
Annex I, Section C, MiFID) but by use (hedging) or main business/activity of 
the firm. No sound definition of how ‘hedging’ activities can actually be 
classified is currently available. 
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Figure 32. Exemptions for commodity instruments and firms 
 
Source: RWE Supply & Trading. 
   
The recent increase in market prices and volatility of such goods has 
diverted attention away from a potential link between prices on spot markets 
and volumes and prices of transactions done on underlying future markets. 
The alleged ‘financialisation’ of commodities and their prices formation 
process has put many derivatives transactions under the regulatory spotlight, 
in an attempt to address the historical high price volatility in commodity 
markets. It needs to be said that derivative markets (in particular, future 
markets) are just one of the variables that may affect the price formation 
processes of commodities. Amongst other variables, there are fundamental 
aspects such as: demand (e.g. the GDP is a valid measure); supply constraints; 
transportation costs; storage costs; and other exogenous factors (weather, 
political stability, etc). Uncertainty about the global economic outlook, 
testified by the rise in the prices of commodities such as gold, does not help to 
control volatility either. The growing uncertainty has increased producers' 
needs to find protection by increasingly accessing sophisticated financial 
transactions, particularly in derivatives markets. These markets provide a 
formidable mean of hedging against price changes in the physical product. 
Since markets, however, would not be liquid with only investors hedging in 
the same direction (there would be no counterparty to their trades), 
speculation, intended as a way of trading by investing in gathering private 
information, becomes indispensable to create a buffer of 'noise' trading that 
can give markets enough liquidity. 
The financial 
crisis 
Besides fragmented and conflicting views on the role of financial 
markets on commodity prices, regulators are asking for more powers and 
transparency over positions in commodity derivatives in order to avoid risks 
of manipulation and better control market participants’ positions (EU COM, 
2010b, pp. 37-39). One option to reach these objectives implies a partial or 
total removal of exemptions under MiFID. This situation would extend the 
scope of MiFID and bring the energy and energy trading markets into the 
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scope of financial market regulation for the first time. Additional regulatory 
and capital requirements will apply to business firms that will need to get 
authorisation as MiFID investment firms. For instance, energy companies 
running a trading desk internally will have to set up a licensed investment 
firm. Such firms would be then subject to the full regime of the Capital 
Requirements Directive (“CRD”) and need to hold regulatory capital if the 
parallel exemption for commodity firms under the CRD is not extended 
beyond 2014 (capital requirements applying to commodities firms will be 
most likely subject to a separate review under CRD).  
Instead of regulating market participants, another viable option would 
be to strengthen regulation on trading activities through new market integrity 
and transparency rules (e.g. transaction and trade reporting).  
The Commission (2010b) has suggested introducing new reporting 
obligations for positions in commodity derivatives, covering all official 
venues (RMs, MTFs, OTFs). The proposal – in line with the Review requested 
by MiFID in Art. 65.3 – requires investment firms and banks to disclose the 
counterparty, which can be an entity classified under EU legislation (such as 
UCITS, credit institution, etc) or a commercial trader (not classified under any 
EU legislation), and then decide if more information is needed. An alternative 
option would require reporting only for transactions not qualifying as 
‘hedges’, using current international accounting standards such as IFRS IAS 
39. A combination of the previous two options is also on the table.  
In line with the approach to the Review, the Commission will most 
probably narrow the breadth of the exemptions in order to cover commercial 
firms that are not sophisticated clients under MiFID ORs and CoB rules. To 
achieve this, Art. 2.1(i) and 2.1(d) would clarify that the exemption should be 
granted only to the business of “hedging physical and price risks” (EU COM, 
2010b, p. 41). To verify if activities are “ancillary” to the main business, 
quantitative (e.g. a certain percentage of the main business) and qualitative 
measures should be introduced (e.g. dedicated personnel). Finally, the 
exemption of Art. 2.1(k) seems to overlap with the others, so it could be 
deleted. However, the original intention of this exemption was to enable a 
review of the capital requirements for investment firms dealing with 
commodities before applying any MiFID rules and CRD regime, and giving 
the time to define an appropriate prudential regime for this business. Finally, 
the Commission decided that capital requirements for these firms will be 
consistently defined in a specific review of the Directive 2006/49 (EU COM, 
2010b, p. 41). 
As a result of these multiple changes, investment firms dealing with 
commodities not for hedging purposes will need to apply licensing, 
transparency, conduct of business rules and organisational rules as well as 
potential requirements under the CRD regime.220 They will therefore need to 
set up MiFID licensed firms and apply organisational requirements and CoB 
rules.  
                                                      
220 This approach does not seem to be in line with the legal text proposed for central counterparty (CCP) clearing 
of over-the-counter derivatives in the recent proposal of European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR; COM 
(2010), 484/5). In that proposal, non-financial counterparties are not in principle covered by the scope of the 
regulation if they do not breach a certain clearing threshold.  156 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
On transparency and legal exemptions, market views are split between 
those who believe that exemptions should be kept as they now stand or allow 
for a less onerous regime for these companies, and those who favour a 
comprehensive harmonisation of rules in this area. On the one hand, some 
market participants (in particular, energy companies) believe that the removal 
of the exemption will harm their business (especially for small companies) 
and indirectly affect underlying prices (e.g. energy prices). The inclusion of 
these companies in the MiFID original regime will mean:  
1)  Treating specialised commodity firms as financial institutions, even 
though they do not access central bank money or other credit facilities 
at favourable terms, do not offer products to retail investors (or are not 
retail investors themselves), and do not add up to the systemic risk of 
the financial system U;221 
2)  Imposing commodity firms to transfer their business to a 
MiFID‐licensed firm (high compliance costs) and 
3)  Complying with all MiFID requirements (CoB and ORs).  
In their view, the potentially positive effects of being classified as a 
MiFID-licensed firm may not offset the actual costs of this proposal. In 
particular, benefits would include:  
i)  The availability of an EU passport for MiFID investment firms, which 
may not be useful for some participants, such as energy trading 
companies, as they do not offer cross-border investment services;  
ii)  The assurance of continuity of the trading business under the MiFID 
framework (ORs);  
iii)  A harmonised set of rules for investor protection (CoB).  
As a result, the imbalance between benefits and costs may boost 
hedging costs, either causing energy price for end-consumers to go up or 
reducing the overall use of hedging tools. The proposal may also reduce 
liquidity and competition by raising barriers to entry, in contrast with 
widespread processes of market liberalisation in many sectors (e.g. energy).  
On the other hand, some market participants and regulators stress the 
importance of levelling the playing field in terms of market transparency 
among different classes of traders (also for financial stability purposes). 
Greater transparency may also improve price formation processes in 
commodity related markets (such as future markets), ultimately ensuring 
better price formation in the underlying commodity market. Finally, small 
firms (e.g. farmers) whose main business is not the provision of investment 
services, will in this way be granted a greater set of investor protection rules, 
which should reduce the possibilities of fraud and market manipulation. 
Market views 
Furthermore, the definition of a commodity derivative as a financial  Definition under 
MiFID 
                                                      
221 The joint advice of the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (‘CEBS’) to the EU Commission (“CEBS-
Advice”) in 2008 clearly states that “… systemic risk concerns [of commodities business firms]… appear 
significantly smaller relative to the systemic risks posed by banks and ISD financial investment firms. In the 
commodities case studies examined in this report, systemic concerns were limited and contained.” See, joint 
CESR-CEBS Advice (ref. CESR/08-752), 15 October 2008, see ref. 12, ref. 38 et seq., 213 et seq., 282 et seq., 
(http://www.c-ebs.org/getdoc/ee9b85fa-4d64-48dc-9f45-a7350881ddac/2008-15-10-CESR-CEBS-advice-on-
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instrument under MiFID is also under discussion in order to have a larger 
coverage of over-the-counter derivatives (EU COM, 2010b, pp. 41-42). In 
addition to the requirement for the physical delivery of the commodity to 
take place on at least two trading days, an OTC derivative contract would be 
considered MiFID financial instrument if:  
(1)  Traded or equivalent to a contract t r a d e d  o n  R M s ,  M T F s ,  o r  s i m i l a r  
facility and  
(2)  Standardised in terms of price, lot, date of delivery, etc.  
A third requirement concerning the need to be cleared on a CCP or 
being subject to the payment of margins is currently under discussion. 
However, the requirement to be centrally cleared would restrict the number 
of OTC derivatives that would fall under MiFID rules. In addition, by doing 
so, the eligibility requirements for CCP-clearing would be indirectly applied 
to trading, where different conditions and a regulatory approach under 
MiFID applies. Moreover, current legal text may diverge from the US Dodd-
Frank Act, which exempts physically settled OTC forward transactions from 
the definition of a ‘swap’. The level playing field between the EU and US 
regulation should be preserved. 
With the review of MiFID, regulators and competent authorities 
advocate strengthening and harmonising supervisory powers to control the 
build-up of systemic risk and disorderly markets arising from market 
manipulation. These powers should allow setting position limits to minimise 
the risks of price and market manipulation (Langen, 2010; EU COM, 2010b, 
pp.82-83).222  
‘Curbing speculation’ is a vague objective, since how someone can 
actually distinguish between hedging and speculative trading remains highly 
controversial. ‘Speculation’ involves the use of private information based on 
greater market knowledge, which is different from inside information 
(manipulation).223 Informed trading activities – based on more or less 
sophisticated expectations that market prices may go in a specific direction – 
may be also done for hedging purposes. For instance, an electricity company 
willing to cover its future exposure by purchasing a future price contract 
based on the expectation that prices may go up/down, even though the 
company does not currently own the commodity (energy is not storable), 
which would be hardly defined as speculation, even though it looks that way. 
In addition, with no investors investing in information there would be no 
space for hedgers to find a counterparty that actually prices and is willing to 
trade the probability that the event to be hedged in the end will not occur. 
Regulators, therefore, should shed light on the risks of price and market 
manipulation in commodity markets, potentially arising from the 
accumulation of dominant net positions in derivatives markets (in particular, 
futures markets). The attempt to squeeze the market by collecting a dominant 
share of a commodity future for a specific settlement date may have 
Position limits 
and management 
                                                      
222 In line also with the US ‘Dodd-Frank’ Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, P.L. 111-203, H.R. 
4173. 
223 The border between private ‘legal’ information and ‘inside’ information is often so unclear that regulators may 
be willing to ban trading a product rather than monitoring activities on an ongoing basis. See Art. 1, Market 
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disruptive effects on spot prices, since the dominant owner of a long position 
for that date may exercise unreasonable upward pressure on futures prices 
and thereby indirectly on spot market prices as well. 
To reduce the harmful effects of settlement squeezes, regulators and 
supervisors typically adopt two tools: position limits and position 
management. Position limits may be imposed not only for exchange-traded 
products but also for OTC contracts. In addition, counterparties entering the 
derivative contract could be asked to provide a full explanation of the 
position and other relevant documentation, besides the regulatory 
requirements currently in place. Position limits may need to be further 
investigated to determine the size of a position that can be deemed to be 
manipulative. It is essential to ensure that limits are neither set at 
unsustainable (too low) nor at irrelevant levels (too high), which would mean 
either an excessive shift in market structure or no impact at all. In addition, 
the extension to OTC contracts, on the one side, may reduce the incentives to 
move some of the trading activities from open markets to OTC. On the other 
side, position limits for OTC contracts may increase the number of trades and 
eventually the costs that the ‘requesting’ counterparty should pay, since it 
could not benefit from the freedom to privately negotiate an important risk 
exposure. However, it greatly depends on how the position limit would be 
formulated, whether or not it would be an obligation to reduce size of the 
position below the limit, or whether it would only require disclosure to 
regulators. Position limits generally impose on commodity traders a cap on 
the size of transactions based on broader indicators. Some argue that these 
measures may be easily circumvented by trading more frequently with 
smaller sizes, which makes supervision a more complex and costly activity. 
By contrast, the use of position limits may be indispensable in markets where 
the single transaction can directly manipulate prices, such as physical markets 
or markets for non-storable commodities (e.g. electricity exchanges). 
Position management allows the detection of dominant net positions at 
the end of the trading day and a more accurate monitoring of systemic risk. If 
positions create unreasonable upward or downward pressures on prices, 
market operators can require traders, at the beginning of the next trading day, 
to reduce their positions. Position management may thus be a more effective 
tool for tackling this issue, since manipulation in commodity markets does 
not usually come from the impact on prices of the availability of investors to 
transact a security at a specific price, but from the availability of 
counterparties to bargain a future position. Since the availability of settlement 
dates is actually quite limited, it would be more meaningful to collect all 
trading reports and calculate the total net position of an investor in that 
specific market. In securities markets, however, the availability of securities is 
typically wider and manipulation comes frequently from the misuse of a 
single or multiple transactions by exploiting inside information or the 
accumulated size (trading with knowledge). Some have also cast doubt on the 
improper use of leverage. These worries also concern securities markets, but 
the issue itself should be confined to the reforms on capital requirements for 
financial institutions (Basel III), as it may be more appropriate to tackle them 
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Conclusion # 23   
Narrowing exemptions for commodity derivatives under MiFID may have a substantial 
impact on the business of non-financial companies. Some market participants advocate the 
need for a level playing field between financial and non-financial firms when they come to 
trade financial instruments. In their view, it would represent an important step towards 
greater transparency and investor protection, while others ask for further investigation of the 
unintended consequences in terms of higher costs of hedging relevant exposures in the 
market, as well as lower competitiveness, liquidity, and competition. The need for 
consistency across several regulations in the commodity business may need a more fully 
articulated answer and coordination with initiatives to define capital requirements for 
investment firms.  
‘Curbing speculation’ is a vague objective, since how someone can actually distinguish 
between hedging and speculative trading remains highly controversial. Regulators instead 
should shed light on the risks of price manipulation potentially arising from the 
accumulation of dominant net positions in derivatives markets (futures). Strengthening 
supervisory powers may in principle be effective to control price manipulation, but its role in 
controlling systemic risk may be doubtful, in particular through position limits. The use of 
position management tools to monitor the size of net positions would be more effective.  
8.  Conclusions 
 
The MiFID review is an opportunity to boost investor confidence and 
strengthen the resilience, efficiency and transparency of financial markets and 
instruments. Investor protection and market efficiency should remain the 
guiding principles of the Directive but be reconciled with broader goals 
brought about by the financial crisis, such as market safety and financial 
stability. Regulation, as a consequence, will become more prescriptive so the 
market will be left with less freedom to self-regulate. Supervisors will carry 
on the difficult task to keep rules up-to-date with fast-changing market 
developments. Regulators should also make sure that the revised text will be 
coherent with other forthcoming legislations, which will also touch upon 
areas primarily falling under MiFID. 
 
MiFID has changed the landscape of European capital markets for the 
better in many ways. Most notably, the Directive has led to a more 
competitive environment, huge investments in technologies, and greater 
investor protection. The revision of the Directive, however, should clarify 
intended scopes and fill regulatory gaps in the legal text, as well as create a 
more harmonised framework of supervisory practices among member states. 
It should make sure that the benefits of a new competitive environment are 
spread along the value chain and passedon to final users, retail and wholesale 
investors, as appropriate. 
 
Transparency plays a crucial role in the smooth functioning of financial 
markets and the monitoring of systemic risk. It also ensures that the process 
of price formation works well, through efficient price discovery mechanisms. 
However, transparency is not a panacea for market failures. Ill-defined 
transparency requirements would harm market efficiency in less-liquid 
markets with no increase in investor protection or reduction of systemic risk. 
Hence, regulatory intervention should be proportional to the nature of each 
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market, whether auction or bilateral, and take into account the dynamics 
through which orders find their market clearing price. 
Pre-trade transparency supports the functioning of venues’ trading 
mechanisms, as well as efficient price discovery and the implementation of 
best execution policies. Under certain conditions, however, pre-trade 
transparency may impair market liquidity. 
For equity financial instruments, waivers of pre-trade transparency 
should be retained. A move towards a sounder rule-based approach, 
however, should be balanced with flexible application and ongoing 
supervision in order to meet market needs. Conflicting views in the market 
emerge when discussing the breadth of these exemptions. Regulators need to 
devise a new set of rules that promotes the efficient and stability of Europe’s 
capital markets and meets investors’ needs with no adverse impact on market 
structure, market liquidity, efficiency, or investor confidence. In addition, the 
consistent and uniform application across Europe should be ensured. 
For non-equity financial instruments, a strong push towards more pre-
trade public disclosure would require, in some cases, a rethink of the current 
market structure for less-liquid asset classes, and a shift from its mainly 
institutional demand to a more retail and smaller professional one. Clashing 
positions in this area emerge as a result of different views around the most 
efficient market structure for these products.  
Liquidity in non-equity markets, such as markets for bonds, derivatives 
and structured products, is mostly handled through quote-driven auction 
markets, inter-dealer platforms or purely bilateral negotiations through the 
direct commitment of dealers’ capital. For auction markets, whether led by 
dealers/market-makers (quote-driven) or directly by demand (order-driven), 
pre-trade transparency is strictly needed. For inter-dealer platforms (request-
for-quotes model) or bilateral negotiations, where dealers commit capital by 
being non-neutral counterparties, less pre-trade transparency than in order-
driven ones (e.g. equity) could enable them to function properly. Executable 
prices might thus not always be consistently available. Current market 
structure, however, does not impede future market developments in the years 
to arrive at a different structure of intermediation and nature of the demand. 
The alternative to a shift in market structure and demand, which may 
not necessarily occur, is to design a different transparency regime from the 
one applied to equities. However, an appropriate level of pre-trade 
transparency may be beneficial for non-auction markets as well, as it reduces 
investors’ search costs and promotes greater competition among dealers.  
 
Turning to post-trade disclosure, the financial crisis called for a further 
layer of transparency requirements. A new regime should include the 
disclosure of aggregate data on capital markets to monitor systemic risk and 
increase market integrity and efficiency. The extension of trade reporting to 
both shares admitted to trading only on MTFs, or to organised trading 
facilities and to equity-like instruments would be helpful, since all these 
instruments serve similar purposes. However, for financial instruments other 
than shares and the like, the mere extension of the rules for equities would 
most probably generate inconsistencies, given their diverse nature.  
 
For equity markets, transparency issues remain with the quality of OTC 
market data and the costs of consolidated solutions.  In the post-MiFID 
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environment, several aspects have contributed to reduce the quality of data 
and hindered its consolidation. The MiFID review should promote a greater 
standardisation of both data formats (code identifiers, etc) and flags. Market 
initiatives should consistently reduce the number of trade flags, currently 
around 50, to fewer than 10 across Europe. In this regard, ESMA should 
rather support current industry-led initiatives to improve standardisation and 
reduce inconsistencies. However, either the Commission or ESMA should be 
able to impose consistency if commercial initiatives do not lead to a 
satisfactory solution in a reasonable timeframe.  
Finally, on time limits for trade reporting, reducing the maximum 
allowed delay for equity transactions from three minutes to one may prove 
immaterial since this delay cannot be exploited by trading platforms in favour 
of their members. In any case, the legal obligation is to report ‘as close to real 
time as possible’ and this duty should be duly enforced. All market data that 
is not subject to delays should be freely available after 15 minutes, in line with 
ESMA’s recommendations. Delays should be permitted in specific 
circumstances, with appropriate calibration for trades done at the end of the 
day. 
For non-equity markets, post-trade transparency should be consistently 
applied both to auction markets and purely over-the-counter bilateral 
transactions. For this purpose, the post-trade transparency regime for equities 
should be extended, with appropriate changes, to all financial instruments 
admitted to trading on regulated markets (RMs), multilateral trading facilities 
(MTFs), or organised trading facilities (OTFs). A transparency regime 
disclosing meaningful information would stimulate price discovery.  
Exemptions and due calibrations should be based on ‘dynamic’ 
liquidity measures, to be defined at Level 2, in order to preserve efficient price 
formation and to guarantee an effective monitoring of systemic risk. 
Calibrations should take into account the nature of these markets and of each 
financial instrument, rather than a division into broader categories (e.g. by 
asset classes). Finally, dynamic measures of liquidity can be designed around 
aspects such as frequency of trades, overall turnover or prospective liquidity, 
product standardisation, or transaction size. 
Confidential disclosure to regulators (transaction reporting) should be 
extended to all financial instruments admitted to trading on RMs, MTFs or 
OTFs. In addition, to monitor the build-up of systemic risk, aggregate data on 
net exposures, in particular for financial instruments whose value is linked to 
an underlying asset (e.g. structured financial products or OTC derivatives) 
should be disclosed, leveraging current infrastructures such as trade 
repositories. 
 
Priority should be given to removing obstacles to the use of 
consolidated post-trade data solutions i n  t e r m s  o f  c o s t s  a n d  l a c k  o f  d a t a  
quality. Unbundling of data services and fees would reduce costs and 
increase the accessibility to consolidated data solutions. Broader actions by 
competition authorities to identify potentially unfair and anticompetitive 
practices in the market for data should also be undertaken. Further positive 
contribution may come from the standardisation of data formats and the use 
of harmonised flags. Consolidated tapes, therefore, can be designed and 
offered by competing data operators once the ‘rules of the game’ have been 
clearly defined and duly enforced. These tapes could potentially cover not 
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only shares but also other financial instruments admitted to trading on RMs, 
MTFs or organised trading facilities, once an appropriate post-trade 
transparency regime is in place. Only if the industry fails to deliver, should 
ESMA adopt the necessary arrangements to set a single consolidated tape in 
the EU. 
Narrowing exemptions for commodity derivatives under MiFID is an 
action coherent with the post-crisis approach to regulation. However, this 
action may have a substantial impact on the business of non-financial 
companies by requiring them to become MiFID-licensed investment firms and 
eventually to be subject to capital requirements. The consequences in terms of 
the cost of hedging relevant exposures under narrower exemptions should be 
further investigated.  
‘Curbing speculation’ is a vague objective, since how to distinguish 
between hedging and speculative trading remains highly controversial. 
Regulators should instead shed light on the risks of price manipulation that 
arise from the accumulation of dominant net positions in future and 
derivatives markets. Supervisory powers should be strengthened through 
position limits, for physical markets or markets for non-storable commodities 
(e.g. electricity). There should also be position management mechanisms to 
monitor whether operators reach a net dominant position in the market, 
which may lead to manipulative actions. 
 
MiFID should ensure a harmonised approach in the application of 
regulatory requirements for official trading venues. Regulated markets and 
multilateral trading facilities should be subject to convergent legal obligations 
and supervisory oversight across member states.  
 
On the classification of broker-dealer crossing networks (BCNs), there 
is no agreement between market participants on prospected proposals. 
However, the Review should clarify what kind of trades are subject to OTC 
requirements under MiFID (e.g. ‘child’ or ‘parent’ orders). Current proposals 
would bring further confusion to current definitions. For instance, 
‘multilateral’ does not mean that third parties can enter an order; t it rather 
means that the platform does not act on its ‘own account’ where matching 
transactions, and therefore does not exercise any discretion on how trading 
interests should interact.  
 
Financial market infrastructures, e.g.  trading venues, are competing 
networks. Stronger action by competent authorities is needed to keep barriers 
to entry and exit low, giving due attention to economies of scale and scope. 
Legislation and supervisory practice should work together to realise a more 
open market architecture. The industry’s Code of Conduct was a positive first 
step in this direction. However, more needs to be done to solve existing 
commercial and technical challenges. Increased accessibility to the post-
trading infrastructure could be achieved through unbundling and better 
interoperability of services, together with clearer legal definitions (e.g. 
‘legitimate commercial ground’).  
 
The systemic importance of modern capital markets highlights the inner 
tensions among financial stability, market efficiency and technological 
innovation. A well-functioning market must balance efficiency and safety to 
avoid disequilibria. A coherent set of emergency procedures in case of market 
disruptions should be designed in consultation with market participants (e.g. 
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circuit breakers). There are a several efficient monitoring systems already in 
place, which could serve as model systems.  
Best execution duties lie at the foundation of the fiduciary relationship 
between service providers and clients. MiFID should clarify if execution 
policies should follow an obligation of ‘means’ or a more general obligation of 
‘results’. More accurate execution policies and better quality for execution 
data should allow sufficient verifiability of execution. 
 
Investment advice must always be ‘suitable’ under MiFID. However, 
conflicts of interest may affect the quality of investment advice. These can 
arise from the remuneration structure and/or from disclosure levels. 
Mandating a purely fee-based remuneration structure, however, may increase 
service costs and reduce access to advice by investors, with unclear long-term 
effects. It might be preferable to make both remuneration solutions available 
and, in addition, to mandate disclosure of all adviser fees. In this way, 
investors themselves would be able to choose one that best suits their needs. 
 
The distinction between complex and non-complex financial 
instruments should be reviewed under the caveat that complexity does not 
necessarily mean more risk. The objective should be to distinguish products 
according to the investors’ ability to understand the ultimate risk they carry. 
Regulation should not decide the level of risk investors ultimately want to 
take. 
 
MiFID rules on conflicts of interest are not only disclosure 
requirements but provide rules for the identification and management of 
these conflicts. However, this set of rules should be coupled with harmonised 
supervisory practices and a strong common set of sanctions that would allow 
some flexibility to member states to adapt rules and procedures in line with 
their national contexts. 
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Annex I. List of Acronyms 
ADT   Average Daily (order book) Turnover 
ASO   Average Size of Orders 
ATS   Alternative Trading System 
BCS   Broker-dealer Crossing System 
BCN   Broker-dealer Crossing Network 
CATS   Computerised Automated Trading System 
CDS   Credit Default Swap 
CEBS   Committee of European Banking Supervisors  
CESR   Committee of European Securities Regulators 
CFTC   Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
CoB   Conduct-of-Business 
CoI   Conflicts of Interest 
CRD   Capital Requirements Directive 
DA Direct  Access 
DEA   Direct Electronic Access 
DMA   Direct Market Access 
DTCC  Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation  
EBBO   European Best Bid and Offer 
EEA  European Economic Area 
EMIR  European Market Infrastructure Regulation 
ECP Eligible  Counterparty 
ETD Exchange-Traded  Derivative 
ESMA   European Securities and Markets Authority 
FINRA   Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
HFT   High-Frequency Trading 
IMD   Insurance Mediation Directive 
IOSCO   International Organization of Securities Commissions 
IPO   Initial Public Offer 
LISO   Large In Scale Order 
MAD   Market Abuse Directive 
MiFID  Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
MTF  Multilateral Trading Facility 
NASDAQ    National Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotations Systems 
NBBO   National Best Bid and Offer 
NYSE   New York Stock Exchange 
OLOB   Open Limit-Order Book 
OTF   Organised Trading Facility 
PRIP  
RFQ   Request For Quote 
RM   Regulated Market MIFID 2.0: CASTING NEW LIGHT ON EUROPE’S CAPITAL MARKETS | 177 
 
SA   Sponsored Access 
SEC   Securities and Exchange Commission 
SEF   Swap Execution Facility 
SFP   Structured Financial product 
SI   Systematic Internaliser 
SMS   Standard Market Size 
STP   Straight-Through Processing 
UCITS   Undertakings for Collective Investments in Transferable 
Securities 
VWAP  Volume Weighted Average Price 
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Annex II. The objectives of the Task Force    
The Task Force was composed of 31 members, who represented most 
segments of European capital markets.224 It aims at increasing knowledge 
around new economic and regulatory issues brought about by MiFID and to 
include – where agreement was found – recommendations that may support 
the regulatory and policy-making process. This report, in effect, offers its 
contribution based on a coherent and – wherever possible – agreed approach 
to relevant regulatory and economic issues, aimed at avoiding haphazard or 
ill-informed decisions. 
Mandate 
The Task Force is an independent and non-political group representing 
major segments of the industry (see list of participants). The report is built on 
the basic tenets of financial markets and it has been drafted to be 
understandable not just by technical experts and to address readers on issues 
and technicalities of European capital markets. Official papers of the CESR 
and the European Commission provided background documents for each of 
the five meetings held from June to November 2010.  
 
The members acknowledges that the scope of the Task Force is fairly 
broad, and hence priority has been given to three main areas: 
1.  Pre- and post-trade transparency (including extension of post-trade 
requirements to non-equity markets, and improved over-the-counter 
trade transparency and reporting); 
2.  Trading venues classification (including regulated markets, 
multilateral trading facilities and other trading venues225) and market 
microstructure; and 
3.  Conduct of business rules (including selling practices and best 
execution). 
The approach taken aimed to combine theoretical aspects from diverse 
disciplines (e.g. competition policy, economics, financial regulation, etc.) 
with more empirical aspects (such as market data) and members’ direct 
contributions. One of the objectives of the Task Force report therefore is to 
clarify where differences of views are due to the use of different definitions 
and also, most notably, to provide data in order to give issues their real 
value. 
Priorities 
The report will present as many recommendations as possible but it is 
intended to include recommendations only when there is general consensus 
between all the segments represented in the Task Force, including both 
members and observers. Recommendations will represent the views of the 
Task Force participants only, and not those of the rapporteurs, while the 
content of the Report is mainly their work. The role of the rapporteurs thus is 
to set out the views of the Members in a proper and neutral manner. 
Recommenda-
tions 
The final report takes into account all different views – including 
minority ones – explaining them in a fair and, where possible, neutral 
Fair 
description 
                                                      
224 No representatives of issuers associations were formally involved in the work of the Task Force. 
225 In particular, organised trading facilities, so-called ‘OTFs’ (EU COM, 2010b). MIFID 2.0: CASTING NEW LIGHT ON EUROPE’S CAPITAL MARKETS | 179 
 
manner. The report aims at having a balanced and well-documented set of 
facts. The intention was not to seek to force consensus when views clearly 
differed.  
Activities and meetings of the Task Force have followed a tight 
timeline from June to December 2010. As shown below, the Group held five 
meetings, three of which were devoted to a discussion of the core issues of 
the MiFID Review. 
 
Figure AII.1 Task Force timeline 
Materials and members’ contributions/presentations have been circulated in 
order to enrich the content of each session. Meeting reports have been a helpful tool 
to crystallise recommendations in the aftermath of each meeting.  
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Annex III 
 
Table AIII.1 Overview of regulated markets226 and pan-European MTFs’227 
  Trading Services  Clearing Services 
Settlement 
Services 
Market 
Model 
  Platform  Type228       
LSE 
TradElect 
(Electronic) 
SETS (Order-
driven) 
SETSqx 
(Hybrid) 
SEAQ (Quote-
driven) 
LCH.Clearnet Ltd  
SIX X-clear 
Eurex Clearing229 
Euroclear UK & 
Ireland 
Horizontal 
NYSE 
Euronext
230  
Universal 
Trading 
Platform 
(Electronic) 
Order-driven 
LCH.Clearnet231 SA 
Interbolsa (Lisbon) 
Eurex Clearing232 
Euroclear Group233 
Interbolsa (Lisbon) 
Semi-
Horizontal 
Deutsche 
Börse 
Xetra 11.0 
(Electronic) 
Frankfurter 
Order-driven Eurex  Clearing234 
Clearstream 
Banking 
Frankfurt235 
Vertical 
                                                      
226 For latest developments in access and interoperability for clearing and settlement of cash equities between 
trading platform and CCPs/CSDs and between CCPs and/or CSDs, please see FESE, EACH & ECSDA, “Joint 
Status Update of the Code of Conduct”, (http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-
markets/docs/code/mog/20100315_fese_each_ecsda_en.pdf). There are three types of access to the 
infrastructure: standard access (SA); customized unilateral access (CUA or CA); and transaction feed access 
(TFA). ‘Interoperability’ between infrastructures means “advanced forms of relationships amongst Organisations 
where an Organisation is not generally connecting to existing standard service offerings of the other 
Organisations but where Organisations agree to establish customised solutions. Amongst its objectives, 
Interoperability will aim to provide a service to the customers such that they have choice of service provider. 
Such agreement will require Organisations to incur additional technical development”. Please, see FESE, EACH 
and ECSDA, “European Code of Conduct for Clearing and Settlement”, § 23-24 
(http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-markets/docs/code/code_en.pdf).  
227 Firms that showed interest in entering the market (potential competitors) but have not yet been granted the 
link with incumbent infrastructures are represented in Italics. 
228 According to different rules, the vast majority of these order-driven markets are supported by liquidity 
providers, i.e. market-makers allowed to submit quotes if needed. 
229 Requested a TFA to LSE. 
230 Includes Paris (CAC 40), Amsterdam (AEX), Brussels (BEL 20), and Lisbon (PSI 20). 
231 NYSE Euronext has recently decided to terminate its contract with LCH.Clearnet and it will start soon clearing 
trades in-house; (http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2010-05-24/nyse-euronext-challenges-cme). 
232 Requested a TFA to Euronext Lisbon, Paris, Amsterdam and Brussels and a TFA to Euroclear Belgium, France 
and Netherlands, and Interbolsa. 
233 Euroclear Group comprises International Central Securities Depository (ICSD) Euroclear Bank in Brussels and 
Central Securities Depositories (CSDs) Euroclear Belgium, Euroclear Finland, Euroclear France, Euroclear 
Nederland, Euroclear Sweden and Euroclear UK & Ireland.  
234 TFA request from SIX x-clear not live. 
235 Part of Link Up Markets, a joint venture by ten leading Central Securities Depositories (CSDs) – Clearstream 
Banking AG Frankfurt (Germany), Cyprus Stock Exchange (Cyprus), Hellenic Exchanges S.A. (Greece), 
IBERCLEAR (Spain), MCDR (Egypt), Oesterreichische Kontrollbank AG (Austria), SIX SIS AG (Switzerland), 
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Wertpapier
börse, 
Frankfurt 
Stock 
Exchange 
(Floor 
Trading) 
Euroclear Bank236 
SIS SegaInterSettle237 
BME 
Spanish 
Exchange
s 
SIBE 
(Electronic) 
Order-driven  Iberclear238  Iberclear239  Vertical 
Borsa 
Italiana 
TradElect 
(Electronic) 
Order-driven CC&G 
Monte Titoli 
Euroclear Bank240 
Vertical 
Nasdaq 
OMX 
Nordic241 
INET 
Nordic 
(Electronic) 
Order-driven 
EMCF242  
EuroCCP243 
SIX X-clear244 
Euroclear Sweden 
and Finland, VP 
Securities 
(Denmark)245  
Vertical 
SIX 
Swiss 
Exchange 
SIX 
Platform 
(Electronic) 
Order-driven 
SIX X-clear 
LCH. Clearnet 
Eurex Clearing246 
EMCF247 
SIS 
SegaInterSettle248 
Clearstream249 
Euroclear Bank250 
Vertical 
Oslo 
TradElect 
(Electronic) 
Order-driven 
Oslo Clearing 
LCH.Clearnet251 
VPS252   
                                                                                                                                                                      
STRATE (South Africa), VP SECURITIES (Denmark) and VPS (Norway). Its key objective is to improve efficiency 
and reduce costs of post-trade processing of cross-border securities transactions by streamlined interoperability 
on the CSD layer. 
Launched on 30 March 2009, Link Up Markets has established a common infrastructure allowing for streamlined 
interoperability between CSD markets and introducing efficient cross-border processing capabilities. The solution 
enables CSD customers to significantly reduce the cost gap between settling and safekeeping domestic and 
foreign securities. 
236 TFA with Eurex Clearing requested. 
237 Requested TFA with FWB and Eurex, and SA or CA with Clearstream.  
238 Iberclear provides risk management services. A project to set up a CCP is in progress, with a consultation open 
by the Spanish Supervisor (CNMV). 
239 Part of Link Up Markets. See footnote 235 above. 
240 Requested a TFA with CC&G. 
241 Includes Copenhagen (OMX Copenhagen 20, or OMXC20), Stockholm (OMX Stockholm 30 Index, or 
OMXS30), Helsinki (OMX Helsinki 25, or OMXH25), and Iceland (OMX Iceland 6 PI ISK, or OMXI6ISK). 
242 European Multilateral Clearing Facility; EMCF is owned 78% by ABN AMRO Bank N.V. and 22% by 
NASDAQ OMX AB. 
243 Not live yet. MoU with Nasdaq OMX to clear equities for Copenhagen, Stockholm and Helsinki. 
244 Not live yet. Interoperability between CCPs dealing with trades executed on Nasdaq OMX Nordic (EMCF). 
245 Part of Link Up Markets. See footnote 235 above. 
246 It requested: TFA and Interoperability with SIX X-clear; interoperability with LCH.CLearnet; and TFA with 
SIX Platform and SIS SegaInterSettle. 
247 TFA requested. 
248 Part of Link Up Markets. See footnote 235 above. 
249 SA or CA with SIS SegaInterSettle and SIX Platform requested. 
250 TFA with X-Clear requested  182 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
Athens 
OASIS 
(Integrated 
Automatic 
System for 
Electronic 
Trading) 
(Electronic) 
Order-driven ATHEXClear  S.A. 
Hellenic Exchanges 
S.A.253 
Vertical 
Warsaw 
WARSET 
(WARsaw 
Stock 
Exchange 
Trading 
System) 
(Electronic) 
Order-driven 
National 
Depository for 
Securities 
National 
Depository for 
Securities 
Vertical 
Vienna 
Xetra 
(Electronic) 
Order-driven 
Central 
Counterparty 
Austria (CCP.A) 
Oesterreichische 
Kontrollbank AG 
(OeKB)254 
Vertical 
Budapest 
MMTS 
(Multi 
Market 
Trading 
System) 
Order-driven 
Central Clearing 
House 
and Depository Rt. 
(KELER) 
Central Clearing 
House 
and Depository Rt. 
(KELER) 
Vertical 
Prague  - Order-driven 
Central Securities 
Depository Prague 
Central Securities 
Depository Prague 
Vertical 
Irish SE 
ISE Xetra 
11.0 
(electronic) 
Order-driven  Eurex Clearing 
Euroclear UK & 
Ireland 
Horizontal 
Buchares
t 
BSE 
Horizon – 
EFA 
Software 
Services 
(electronic) 
Order-driven  BSE Equator  BSE Equator  Vertical 
Cyprus 
OASIS 
(Integrated 
Automatic 
System for 
Electronic 
Trading) 
(Electronic) 
Order-driven 
Cyprus Stock 
Exchange CSD 
Cyprus Stock 
Exchange CSD255 
Vertical 
Ljubljan
a 
BTS 
(Electronic) 
Order-driven 
KDD (Central 
Securities Clearing 
Corporation) 
KDD (Central 
Securities Clearing 
Corporation) 
Vertical 
Nasdaq 
OMX 
INET Baltic 
(Electronic) 
 Order-driven  National CSDs  National CSDs  Horizontal 
                                                                                                                                                                      
251 Interoperability with Oslo Clearing requested. 
252 Part of Link Up Markets. See footnote 235 above. 
253 Part of Link Up Markets. See footnote 235 above. 
254 Part of Link Up Markets. See footnote 235 above. 
255 Part of Link Up Markets. See footnote 235 above. MIFID 2.0: CASTING NEW LIGHT ON EUROPE’S CAPITAL MARKETS | 183 
 
Baltic256 
Bulgaria
n SE 
Xetra 
(Electronic) 
Order-driven  Central depository  Central depository  Vertical 
Belgrade 
BELEXFIX 
(Electronic) 
Order-driven 
Central Securities 
Depository and 
Clearing House a.d. 
Beograd 
Central Securities 
Depository and 
Clearing House a.d. 
Beograd 
Vertical 
Luxembo
urg 
UTP 
(Universal 
Trading 
Platform 
SM) 
(Electronic) 
Order-driven LCH.Clearnet 
Bank’s and ICSD’s 
books 
Horizontal 
Bratislav
a 
EBOS 
(Electronic 
Stock 
Exchange 
Trading 
System) 
(Electronic) 
Order-driven 
Central Securities 
Depositary of the 
Slovak Republic 
(CSD SR) 
Central Securities 
Depositary of the 
Slovak Republic 
(CSD SR) 
Vertical 
 
Malta SE 
 
Horizon 
(Electronic) 
Order-driven 
Malta Stock 
Exchange CSD  
Malta Stock 
Exchange CSD  
Vertical 
Lit Pan-
European 
Venues
257 
Trading Services  Clearing Services  Settlement 
Services 
Market 
Model 
Chi-X 
Chi-X 
Platform 
(Electronic
) 
Order-driven 
EMCF 
SIX X-clear 
LCH.Clearnet258 
National CSDs  Horizontal 
Turquois
e 
Millenniu
m 
Exchange 
platform 
(Electronic
) 
Order-driven 
EuroCCP 
SIX X-clear259 
LCH.Clearnet260 
National CSDs 
Euroclear Bank261 
Horizontal 
BATS 
Europe 
BATS MTF 
(Electronic
) 
Order-driven 
LCH.Clearnet262 
EMCF 
SIX X-clear263 
National CSDs  Horizontal 
                                                      
256 Includes Tallinn (OMX Tallinn, or OMXT), Riga (OMX Riga, or OMXR), and Vilnius (OMX Vilnius, or OMXV). 
257 The biggest 11 venues by turnover (Thomson Reuters data; January - May 2010). 
258 Requested a TFA to Chi-X and Interoperability with EMCF. 
259 Requested a TFA to Turquoise and Interoperability with EuroCCP. 
260 TFA to Turquoise requested. 
261 TFA to EuroCCP requested. 
262 TFA to BATS Europe requested (for all Irish securities). 
263 Not live yet. 184 | VALIANTE & LANNOO 
NYSE 
Arca 
Europe 
Universal 
Trading 
Platform - 
NYSE 
Euronext 
systems 
(Electronic
) 
Order-driven 
LCH.Clearnet264 
EuroCCP 
National CSDs  Horizontal 
Xetra 
Internati
onal 
 
Xetra 11.0 
(Electronic
) 
Order-driven  Eurex Clearing 
National CSDs 
Clearstream 
Banking Frankfurt 
Vertical 
Nomura 
NX 
Nomura 
NX 
(Electronic
) 
Order-driven  Nomura NX  Nomura NX  Vertical 
Equiduct 
Equiduct 
(Electronic
) 
Order-driven 
LCH.Clearnet 
Depending on 
home market265 
National CSDs  Horizontal 
Burgund
y 
BTP 
(Burgundy 
Trading 
Platform) 
(Electronic
) 
Order-driven EMCF 
Euroclear Sweden 
and Finland, VP 
Securities Denmark 
Horizontal 
UBS 
MTF  UBS MTF  Order-driven 
Six X-clear 
EuroCCP266 
National CSDs  Horizontal 
 
  
                                                      
264 TFA to NYSE Arca requested.   
265 SIX x-clear for German stocks. 
266 To be activated when interoperability models have been approved by national authorities. MIFID 2.0: CASTING NEW LIGHT ON EUROPE’S CAPITAL MARKETS | 185 
 
Annex IV. Figures and Tables illustrating equity markets 
Figure AIV.1 Global market domestic capitalisation 1993-2009 
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Source: WFE. 
 
Table AIV.1 Market capitalisation ($ million) 
NYSE Euronext (US)  11,837,793.3 
LSE Group  3,452,292.6 
Tokyo SE  3,306,082.0 
NASDAQ OMX  3,239,492.4 
NYSE Euronext (Europe)   2,869,393.1 
Shanghai SE  2,704,778.5 
Hong Kong Exchanges  2,305,142.8 
TSX Group  1,676,814.2 
BME Spanish Exchanges   1,434,540.5 
BM&FBOVESPA  1,337,247.7 
Deutsche Börse  1,292,355.3 
Source: WFE. 
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Figure AIV.2 European (10 biggest trading venue) aggregate annual turnover ($ million)  
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Sources: BATS Europe, FESE and Thomson Reuters. 
Table IV.2 EEA market share by national market 
London 22.385%
Frankfurt 16.474%
Paris 15.646%
Milan 9.652%
Zurich 8.443%
Madrid 6.752%
Amsterdam 6.318%
Stockholm 5.409%
Oslo 2.377%
Helsinki 2.065%
Copenhagen 1.128%
Brussels 1.119%
Lisbon 0.467%
Vienna 0.366%
Others 1.399%
 
Sources: BATS Europe, Thomson Reuters (Jan-Dec 2010, % turnover; lit and auction books). 
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Figure AIV.3 Trading volumes by trading venue, 2010 
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Sources: BATS Europe, Thomson Reuters (Volumes Lit, Auction, Dark Books). 
Figure AIV.4 Turnover by order book, 2010 
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Source: Thomson Reuters (2010 turnover). 
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Figure AIV.5 EU27 debt and securitised financial instruments (outstanding; €billion) 
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Figure AIV.6 EU27 issuance of debt and securitised financial instruments (€billion) 
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Figure AIV.7 EU27 financial highlights (1) (€ million) 
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Figure AIV.8 EU27 financial highlights (2) (€ million) 
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Sources: ECMI (2010) data from Eurostat, BIS, WFE,  
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Figure AIV.9 OTC (notional) vs exchange-traded derivatives (ETDs) (€ billion) 
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Sources: ECMI (2010), data from BIS, WFE (ETD are estimations by defectdefault?). 
Figure AIV.10 OTC (gross market value) vs exchange-traded derivatives (€ billion) 
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Sources: ECMI (2010), data from BIS, WFE (ETD are estimations by defect). 
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Figure AIV.11 Global debt and derivatives markets vs world GDP (€ billion) 
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Sourcse: ECMI (2010); data from BIS, Eurostat, World Economic Outlook, AFME. 
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